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An introduction to Urban Poverty in Asia and the Pacific 
 
In Asia and the Pacific, approximately 641 million people live on less than $1 a day. In line with 
Goal 1 of the Millennium Development Goals, they are referred to as the “absolute poor”. Using 
this global poverty line makes it easy to measure and compare numbers of poor, The number of 
people living on less than $1 a day place an important role in the advocacy work for increased 
and sustained efforts to eradicate absolute poverty in the world, as called for in the Millennium 
Declaration.  
 
A global poverty line based purely on income does, however, also have disadvantages. The 
global poverty line of $1 a day has to be adjusted to local conditions (and possibly even to the 
types of poor) which are not easy to define. More importantly, poverty is not just a matter of low 
income.  
 
Amartya Sen’s publication Development as Freedom defines poverty as the deprivation of basic 
capabilities that provide a person with the freedoms to choose the life he or she has reason to 
value.  The capabilities include good health, education, social networks and command over 
economic resources as well as influence on decision-making that affects ones life etc.  Income is 
important because it allows a person to develop capabilities and it results from putting the 
capabilities to use, but it is only a means to live a valuable life.    
 
Consequently, ESCAP defines poverty as having three inter-related and inter-locking aspects: (a) 
lack of  regular income and employment opportunities – this could also be expanded to 
purchasing power, (b) lack of access to services such as health, education and water, and (c) lack 
of political power, participation, dignity and respect. This way of looking at poverty is in line 
with the definitions by other organizations.  
 
A multi-dimensional definition of poverty, whereby all deprivations are inter woven, may make 
it, however, more difficult to objectively and quantifiably measure people’s poverty.  Some will 
argue that calculating, for example, the ‘cost of exclusion’ is a practical way to measure a social 
good. Others will argue that measuring the ‘cost of exclusion’ shifts the emphasis of the social 
and political aspects of poverty into a monetary dimension, thereby reducing poverty to a 
monetary issue. 
 
This “reductionist” approach to poverty has serious implications for poverty reduction and social 
protection policies. If the conditions and manifestations of poverty in urban areas is intrinsically 
different from that of rural areas, then it follows that the social protection measures and 
approaches needed must be also different. Unless policy-makers understand the true nature, 
causes and manifestations of poverty, they will not be able to design effective social protection 
policies and programmes to address poverty. Therefore, it is important to determine how best 
(for the sake of poverty reduction) poverty can be measured 
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Urban poverty in Asia and the Pacific 
 
Diversity is perhaps the most striking characteristic of the Asian region; this includes inter alia 
geographic, demographic, economic and developmental differences among countries of the 
region.  This volume includes case studies from countries1 representing three Asian sub-regions.  
These are North and North-East Asia, South-East Asia as well as South and South-West Asia.   
 
Geographic diversity 
 
As shown in Figure 1, in 2005 the land area of countries in the sub-regions2 ranged from its 
smallest countries including the Maldives (300 square km), and Singapore (676 square km), to its 
largest countries including India (2,969,342 square km) and China (9,306,132 square km).  
Stretching from the tropics to the Northern hemisphere, Asia includes both the highest elevation 
in the world (the Himilayas in Nepal) as well as very low levels of elevation (such as the low 
lying river deltas of South-East Asia).    
 
Varying Demographics 
 
In 2005 the majority of the region’s population was found in South and South-West Asia where 
some of the countries with the largest populations were found (India with 1,134,403,140 people 
in 2005, as well as the populous countries Indonesia and Bangladesh); two of the smallest 
populations are also found here (Bhutan with 637,010 and the Maldives with 295,300).  The sub-
region is also characterized by having the highest average annual rate of population growth 
(1.66% from 2000 to 2005) as well as quite high population density (361 people per square 
kilometre). 
 
The next most populous region is North and North-East Asia where the population is dominated 
by China, the most populous country in the world (1,312,978,860).  Despite the large size of its 
population, the sub-region’s population growth is quite slow, averaging 0.62% annually.  
Population density is low in China (139 people per square kilometre) and thus the sub-region’s 
average is also quite low at 131.5.   
  
South-East Asia is less populous with 557,669,010 people in 2005.  Its population is growing 
quite quickly (1.41% annually) but the population density is low (129 people per square 
kilometer).   
 
With an enormous land mass and such a large share of the world’s population the region not 
surprisingly home to numerous ethnic groups as well as religions including Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Confucianism, Shintoism, Islam, and Christianity. 
 
                                                
1 China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam.   
2 As defined by UN ESCAP. 
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Table 1 Population Size, Land Area, Population Density and Growth in Asian Countries 
1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008
East and North-East 
Asia 1,343,912 1,546,920 11,762,902 11,763,650 114.25 131.5 1.28 0.52
China 1,149,069 1,336,311 9,597,970 9,597,865 120 139 1.39 0.58
DPR Korea 20,143 23,867 120,539 120,540 167 198 1.49 0.32
Hong Kong, China 5,705 7,279 1,080 1,100 5,282 6,617 1.13 1.01
Japan 123,537 127,938 377,802 377,911 327 339 0.37 -0.02
Macao, China 372 484 17 28 21,388 17,290 3.23 0.63
Mongolia 2,216 2,654 1,571,688 1,570,225 1 2 2.54 0.94
Republic of Korea 42,869 48,388 99,260 99,259 432 487 0.96 0.34
South-East Asia 440,574 579,835 4,494,277 4,492,406 98 129 1.91 1.28
Brunei Darussalam 257 398 5,770 5,770 45 69 2.87 2.07
Cambodia 9,698 14,697 181,027 181,045 54 81 3.53 1.76
Indonesia 182,847 234,342 1,904,651 1,904,604 96 123 1.68 1.17
Lao PDR 4,076 5,963 236,856 236,806 17 25 3.05 1.76
Malaysia 18,103 27,027 329,751 329,753 55 82 2.84 1.71
Myanmar 40,147 49,221 676,556 676,571 59 73 1.63 0.87
Philippines 61,226 89,651 299,995 299,997 204 299 2.38 1.92
Singapore 3,016 4,490 680 699 4,436 6,424 2.42 1.21
Thailand 54,291 64,316 513,102 513,133 106 125 1.24 0.68
Timor-Leste 740 1,193 14,869 14,869 50 80 2.71 3.27
Viet Nam 66,173 88,537 331,028 329,306 200 269 2.25 1.33
South and South-West 
Asia 1,249,903 1,739,861 7,668,115 7,668,301 163 227 2.29 1.55
Afghanistan 12,659 28,226 652,207 652,164 19 43 4.28 3.98
Bangladesh 113,049 161,318 144,000 144,000 785 1,120 2.33 1.67
Bhutan 547 667 46,984 46,999 12 14 0.96 1.28
India 860,195 1,186,186 3,287,203 3,287,290 262 361 2.18 1.47
Iran (Islamic Rep.) 56,674 72,212 1,745,416 1,745,087 32 41 2.63 1.41
Maldives 216 311 300 300 719 1,037 3.19 1.8
Nepal 19,114 28,757 147,179 147,180 130 195 2.45 1.99
Pakistan 112,991 166,961 796,102 796,115 142 210 3.1 1.87
Sri Lanka 17,114 19,394 65,609 65,610 261 296 1.28 0.49
Turkey 57,345 75,830 783,609 783,529 73 97 1.84 1.27
Generated by United Nations ESCAP online database: 08/10/2009 10:56
Source: www.unescap.org.  
Sub-region or Country
Population Density  
(popn per km2)Population size in '000s  Land Area in km2
Rate of 
Population 
Growth
 
 
Varying levels of Economic Prosperity and Growth 
 
The region includes countries of all levels of economic prosperity ranging from that of Myanmar 
or Nepal to Australia or Japan.  Rates of economic growth vary as well, but for the most part the 
region has extraordinarily high rates of economic growth in recent years.  China recorded the 
highest rates (an average of 10.6% annual growth in per capita GDP in purchasing power parity 
from 2005 – 2008).  Growth was also rapid in the highly populous country of India (7.1% over 
the same period).  Rates were highest in South-East Asia (6.4%) followed by East and North-
East Asia (6.3%), and South and South-West Asia (5.8%).  This contrasts the much lower rates 
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in other regions of the world (3.5% in Africa, 3.9% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2.3% in 
Europe and 1.0% in North America).    
 
Table 2 Gross Domestic Product in Purchasing Power Parity 
1990 2008 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2008
East & North-East Asia 3,866 8,487 4.2 3.3 4.8 6.3
China 1,099 5,511 10.9 7.6 8.9 10.6
Japan 25,953 31,484 1.2 0.8 1.2 1.3
Mongolia 2,332 3,297 -4.3 1.6 5.1 8.1
Korea, Republic of 11,383 25,498 6.7 3.5 4.0 3.8
South-East Asia 2,362 4,635 5.2 1.1 3.6 6.4
Brunei Darussalam 49,438 0.3 -1.1 -0.2
Cambodia 1,760 4.9 7.4 6.8
Indonesia 2,077 3,674 6.2 -0.7 3.3 4.7
Lao People's Democratic Republic 947 1,986 3.4 3.7 4.5 5.9
Malaysia 6,646 13,139 6.7 2.3 2.7 3.8
Myanmar 345 4.3 6.4 8.0
Philippines 2,385 3,244 -0.1 1.8 2.5 3.5
Singapore 23,855 45,553 5.7 3.5 3.2 1.4
Thailand 3,769 7,120 7.3 -0.3 3.9 3.5
Timor-Leste 740 -4.0 1.2
Viet Nam 902 2,574 6.1 5.6 6.1 6.3
South and South-West Asia 1,734 3,318 2.4 3.1 4.3 5.8
Bangladesh 680 1,233 2.3 3.2 3.7 4.9
Bhutan 1,669 4,395 5.5 4.2 4.6 9.3
India 1,208 2,747 3.1 4.0 5.4 7.1
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 6,254 10,783 1.7 2.4 4.0 5.0
Maldives 5,087 6.2 4.7 8.4
Nepal 710 1,028 2.6 2.3 1.2 2.3
Pakistan 1,678 2,444 2.0 0.8 2.5 3.8
Sri Lanka 2,018 4,215 4.2 4.3 2.9 5.9
Turkey 7,806 12,264 1.4 2.3 3.1 3.8
Rate of growth in GDP in 2005 PPP                    dollars 
per Cap
No data available for Democratic People's Republic of Korea or Afghanistan.  Source: GDP in 2005 PPP per Capita from 
www.unescap.org.  Rates of growth of GDP in 2005 PPP per capita calculated using data from www.unescap.org.  
Sub-region or Country
GDP in 2005 PPP 
dollars per Cap
 
 
Uneven Poverty Reduction 
 
Asia’s remarkable growth has contributed to significant poverty reduction, although it has been 
highly uneven within and between countries.  In recent years the region has made remarkable 
strides in poverty reduction, however poverty persists and improvements vary widely among and 
within countries.  As shown in Table X poverty3 reduction has been most rapid in East and 
Northeast Asia falling from 60.14% in 1990 to 15.93% in 2005; this largely reflects the 
reductions in China where the majority of East and Northeast Asians reside.  Reductions have 
                                                
3 As measured by the share of the population living on less that $1.25 a day. 
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been enjoyed in South-East Asia as well (from 39.15% in 1990 to 18.86% in 2005) and although 
to a lesser extent, in South and South-West Asia (46.99% in 1990 to 35.51% in 2005).   
 
Despite great achievement in reducing poverty, the problem persists; in 2005 the region was still 
home to about 60% of the world’s poor who live on less than $1.25 a day.  The subregion with 
the largest total number of people living in poverty is South and South-West Asia (589,597,100 
in 2005).  This reflects in large part the high poverty rate and large population size of India 
(41.64% and 1,134,403,140 in 2005), but it is also consistent with the high levels of poverty in 
countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan.  Despite the relatively low headcount 
poverty rate for North and North-East Asia the total number of people living in poverty in that 
sub-region is quite large and was about 242,529,800 in 2005; this is due to the large size of the 
population of China.  The total number of people living in poverty in South-East Asia was 
105,176,400 in 2005.  Development levels as measured by the Human Development Index4 
range from a very high level with Japan ranked at the 10th highest level of development in the 
world to Afghanistan which is ranked 181st (the 2nd lowest level of development in the world).   
 
                                                
4 UNDP’s composite measure of health (human life expectancy), education (adult literacy rate and school 
enrollment rates) and economy (gross domestic product per capita). 
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Table 3 Percentage Population Living on Less than $1.25 a day and Human Development 
Index 
 
earliest   latest Value 2007 Rank 2007
East and North-East Asia 60.14 (1990) 15.93 (2005)
China 60.2 (1990) 15.9 (2005) 0.77 92
Japan - - 0.96 10
Mongolia 18.8 (1995) 22.38 (2005) 0.73 115
Republic of Korea - - 0.94 26
South-East Asia 39.15 (1990) 18.86 (2005)
Brunei Darussalam 0.92 30
Cambodia 48.6 (1994) 40.19 (2004) 0.59 137
Indonesia 54.3 (1990) 21.4 (2005) 0.73 111
Lao PDR 55.7 (1992) 43.96 (2002) 0.62 133
Malaysia 3.22 (1984) 0.54 (2004) 0.83 66
Myanmar 0.59 138
Philippines 34.9 (1985) 22.62 (2006) 0.75 105
Singapore 0.94 23
Thailand 21.92 (1981) 0.4 (2004) 0.78 87
Timor-Leste 52.94 (2001) 0.49 162
Viet Nam 63.7 (1992) 21.45 (2006) 0.73 116
South and South-West Asia 46.99 (1990) 35.51 (2005)
Afghanistan 0.35 181
Bangladesh 66.77 (1991) 49.64 (2005) 0.54 146
Bhutan 26.23 (2003) 0.62 132
India 51.26 (1990) 41.64 (2005) 0.61 134
Iran (Islamic Rep.) 4.19 (1986) 1.45 (2005) 0.78 88
Maldives 0.77 95
Nepal 68.4 (1995) 55.12 (2003) 0.55 144
Pakistan 66.46 (1987) 22.59 (2004) 0.57 141
Sri Lanka 19.96 (1985) 13.95 (2002) 0.76 102
Turkey 1.32 (1987) 2.72 (2005)
Human Development Index
No data for cells marked with a -.  No data for DPR Korea, Hong Kong, China, Macao, China, and Myanmar.  
Sources: Headcount Poverty from unescap.org.  HDI from 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/display_cf_xls_indicator.cfm?indic_byyear_id=87.
Sub-region or Country
Percentage
 
 
Importance of Urban Issues in Asia and the Pacific 
 
In 2008 49.9% of the world’s population lived in urban areas.  As shown in Table 4 below the 
share of the population living in urban areas5 is much lower in the three Asian sub-regions 
considered in this volume.  It is highest in East and North-East Asia at 46.9% followed by South-
East Asia at 46.5% and finally South and South-West Asia where only 32.7% of the population 
                                                
5 It is important to acknowledge that the definition of urban varies widely from country to country and across time, 
so cross country and inter-temporal analysis is problematic.   
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is urban.  The two largest countries, China and India have relatively small shares of the 
population living in urban areas (43.2% and 29.5% respectively).   
 
Urban issues are important, because, although the share of the population living in urban areas is 
low, the rate of urban population growth is quite high.  Service provision often can not keep up 
with the rate of urban population growth which results largely from rural to urban migration.  At 
the global level urban population growth was 2% in 2008, however, as shown in Table 4, the rate 
was higher in the three sub-regions considered.  Urban populations of South-East Asia grew by 
3.1% in 2008, South and South-West Asia by 2.6% and East and North-East Asia by 2.3%.   
 
 
Table 4 Urban Population Share and Growth 
1990 2008 1990 2008
East and North-East Asia 33 46.9 4 2.3
China 27.4 43.2 4.9 2.7
DPR Korea 58.4 62.6 1.8 0.9
Hong Kong, China 99.5 100 1.6 1
Japan 63.1 66.4 1.2 0.3
Macao, China 99.8 100 3.3 0.6
Mongolia 57.0 57.1 2.5 1.2
Republic of Korea 73.8 81.5 3.3 0.6
South-East Asia 31.6 46.5 4.2 3.1
Brunei Darussalam 65.8 74.8 4 2.7
Cambodia 12.6 21.5 3.5 4.8
Indonesia 30.6 51.6 4.9 3.4
Lao PDR 15.4 21.8 5.4 3.7
Malaysia 49.8 70.2 4.5 3
Myanmar 24.9 32.6 2.4 3
Philippines 48.8 65.0 4.8 3.1
Singapore 100 100 2.4 1.2
Thailand 29.4 33.2 2.1 1.7
Timor-Leste 20.8 27.8 5.1 4.9
Viet Nam 20.3 27.8 4.1 3.1
South and South-West Asia 28.0 32.7 3.5 2.6
Afghanistan 18.3 24.0 5.9 5.7
Bangladesh 19.8 26.4 4.8 3.4
Bhutan 7.2 12.1 4 4.2
India 25.6 29.5 3.2 2.4
Iran (Islamic Rep.) 56.3 68.5 3.6 2.2
Maldives 25.8 31.0 3.3 3.4
Nepal 8.9 17.2 6.2 5.0
Pakistan 30.6 36.1 3.9 3.1
Sri Lanka 17.2 15.1 0.4 0.5
Turkey 59.2 68.7 4.1 2
Generated by United Nations ESCAP online database: 08/10/2009 11:01
Sub-region or Country
Annual urban 
population growth 
rate
Urban share of 
population 
Source: http://www.unescap.org/stat/data
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Urban issues are likewise important for countries in the three sub-regions, because many of the 
world’s most populous and densely populated urban agglomerations are located there.  In 2007 
five of the world’s ten largest megacities were located in North-East and South Asia; these were 
Tokyo with a population of 35,676,000 million people, Mumbai (18,978,000 people), Delhi 
(15,926,000), Shanghai (14,987,000), Kolkata (14,787,000), and Dhaka (13,485,000).  All of 
these cities are projected to grow rapidly and by 2025 four of them (Tokyo, Mumbai, Delhi and 
Dhaka) are expected to be the most populous cities in the world and seven of the world’s ten 
largest cities will be located in South and North-East Asia6.  With the rapid urbanization of Asian 
countries complex problems associated with poverty, marginalization and exclusion have 
become more pervasive among its urban population.  Such problems are not new; they have been 
well described in the literature7.   Nevertheless they persist and remain unresolved.   
 
Urbanisation and poverty in Asia – definitions and measurement 
 
The dollar a day poverty line originated in the poverty lines that were widely disseminated for 
the first time through the World Bank’s World Development Report 19908.  The calculations 
were done by Ravaillon and others and are described in full in Ravaillon et al (1991)9.  The 
description given in the World Development Report 1990  is that authors needed a way to 
describe poverty across countries and therefore had to adjust national poverty lines.  The authors 
chose two universal poverty lines by inspecting National poverty lines converted to constant 
1985 PPP prices; the National poverty lines of 32 countries with varying levels of development 
were considered.  $275 per person per year and $370 per person per year were chosen; the 
former is based on the poverty line of India and the latter is based on the poverty lines of several 
low income countries including Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morroco and 
Tanzania.  It is interesting to note that the report itself recognizes that: “This global poverty line 
is inevitably somewhat arbitrary.”  Despite the arbitrary nature the measures were later dubbed 
the “dollar a day” and two dollar a day poverty lines and have become the standard international 
measure of poverty upon which many decisions are based.  The dollar a day measure is in fact 
among the targets for the First Millennium Development Goal.   
 
Criticisms of the dollar a day headcount measure of poverty abound10.  Attempts have been made 
by the World Bank to improve upon the measure in response to these criticisms.  Perhaps the 
most important revision, while still using a money metric poverty measure was made in 2007 by 
Ravaillon, Chen and Sangruala11 .  The authors adjusted for cost of living differentials between 
urban and rural locations using data on consumption from World Bank’s PovCalNet and 
information on cost of living from World Bank’s Poverty Assessments together with data on 
urban population from the UN world urban population.   Poverty headcount and ratios were 
calculated using separate poverty lines for urban and rural areas in 87 countries grouped in the 
                                                
6 UN Habitat (2008).  State of the World’s Cities 2008/ 2009: Harmonius Cities (London, Earthscan). 
7 Sattherwaite, David.                     ;                   ;                and                     . 
8 World Bank, 1990.  World Development Report 1990.  Oxford University Press, Washington DC. 
9 Ravaillon, Martin, Gaurav Datt and Dominique van de Walle, 1991, “Quantifying Absolute Poverty in the 
Developing World,” Review of Income and Wealth 37: 345-361.   
10 Sattherwaite, D…  criticized lack of adjustment for cost of living differential. 
11 Ravaillon, Martin, Shaohua Chen and Prem Sangruala, 2007.  “New Evidence on the Urbanization of 
Global Poverty” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4199, April 2007.   
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following regions: East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa, South Asia12, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Two rural poverty lines ($1.08 and $2.15 a day at 1993 ppp, commonly referred to as one and 
two dollar a day lines) were used.   
 
The Poverty Assessments provided information on the urban-rural cost of living ratio.  Urban 
poverty lines were calculated for each country for which data exists.  For those countries without 
cost of living information the regional average is used. The urban equivalent to the $1.08 rural 
line is approximately $1.40 for countries in East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia.  Lower 
income countries had higher urban-rural cost of living ratios likely due to the greater extent of 
market fragmentation in low income countries.  Household data from 87 countries spanning 1993 
– 2002 (208 surveys, 157 consumption expenditure and 51 income) were used to estimate rural 
and urban poverty rates and headcounts.  Although, poverty was found to be mainly rural and 
even more so than in previous measures, the decline in rural poverty has been greater than the 
decline in urban poverty.  At the dollar a day line, regression analysis is used to compare the rate 
of urbanization of the whole population to that of the poor.  Results show that the poor are 
urbanizing faster than the population as a whole.  When China is removed from the analysis the 
share of urban poor is much higher and the urbanization of poverty is faster.  For East Asia and 
the Pacific rates of urban poverty (largely reflecting the low poverty rate and large population 
reported by China) were about 5% in 1993 and had declined to about 2% in 2002.  China’s urban 
poverty of 3% declined to about 1% over the same period.  Rural poverty is much higher for both 
the region of East-Asia and the Pacific and for China.  Such low rates of urban poverty stand in 
stark contrast to the data from South Asia which show the region’s urban poverty being about 
35% in 1993 and declining to 32% by 2002.   
 
With the exception of China, all areas covered in this volume experienced an increase in the 
urban share of poverty. The urban share of the poor in East Asia and the Pacific was about 6.5% 
in 1993 and is estimated to have increased to about 6.8% by 2002.  In South Asia urban dwellers 
represented about 22% of the poor in 1993 and 25.2% in 2002.  The rate with which the poor are 
urbanizing is however slow enough that it will take many more decades for poverty to cease to 
be a mainly rural phenomenon.   
 
Most recently the country level poverty lines were adjusted to reflect increased cost of living13.  
National level estimates are available for headcount poverty based on $1.25 a day; these are 
presented in the previous section.  Headcount poverty measured for rural areas using a rural 
poverty line and urban areas using an urban poverty line is available for some countries.  Among 
East Asia, South and South-East Asia they are available for 4 countries; these are China, India, 
Indonesia and Nepal.  Values are shown in the table below.  Interestingly, when using the same 
poverty line for both rural and urban areas rural poverty is consistently higher in all four 
countries; however, this does not hold for all countries once the poverty line is adjusted to reflect 
higher cost of living in urban areas.  In India rates of urban poverty are significantly higher than 
rural poverty rates when adjustments are made for the higher cost of living in urban areas.  In 
Indonesia urban and rural poverty rates are largely the same once the adjustment is made.  This 
                                                
12 The World Bank definition of South Asia includes the countries considered in this volume as South-East Asia. 
13 Insert reference from Ravaillon. 
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result suggests that the widely held perception that poverty is more pervasive in rural areas may 
be incorrect.   
 
Table 5 Headcount Poverty by Rural-Urban Split Using $1.25 per day and Cost of Living 
Adjusted Urban Poverty – Selected countries 
Country Sector Poverty Line mid 80s
* mid 90s* 2005
rural 1.25 81 (84) 79 (94) 26
1.25 28 (84) 13 (94) 2
1.71 ** 67 (84) 30 (94) 6
rural 1.25 58 (83) 52 (94) 44
1.25 48 (83) 41 (94) 36
1.71 ** 70 (83) 63 (94) 56
rural 1.25 65 (84) 47 (96) 24
1.25 56 (84) 38 (96) 19
1.39 ** 63 (84) 44 (96) 24
rural 1.25 80 (85) - -
1.25 51 (85) - -
1.55 ** 64 (85) - -
India
Indonesia
* Year of observation is in parentheses.  ** Based on urban-rural cost of living 
differential from Ravaillon, Martin, Shaohua Chen and Prem Sangruala, 2007. 
“New Evidence on the Urbanization of Global Poverty” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 419
Nepal
urban
urban
urban
urban
China
 
 
 
Lack of Indicators of Income Poverty and Well-being at the City Level 
 
City level data is rarely available, however it does exist.  The ADB Cities Databook contains a 
set of very detailed indicators describing conditions of Asian cities; unfortunately the work is not 
on-going.  The most widely recognized source of city level data related to urban poverty is 
provided by UN Habitat; they are the GUO indicators which are presented in the State of the 
World’s Cities Report.  Unfortunately there is limited description provided of methodologies 
used by various cities to produce such estimates.  
 
Household surveys used by government ministries to conduct National Censuses, Socio-
Economic Surveys, Demographic and Health Surveys typically provide provincial or state level 
data, sometimes with rural-urban split, but they rarely provide data at the city level.  A relatively 
new technique known as small area estimation has been developed; it uses econometric 
techniques to combine Census data with Socio-Economic Survey data and thereby obtain 
estimates of income poverty and other measures of poverty and well-being at the sub-national 
level without having to conduct a nationally representative survey.  Participatory approaches at 
the local level involving focus groups, individual interviews, transect walk and other methods to 
gain qualitative descriptions of poverty by the poor themselves are often used to supplement 
conventional data sources or to measure the effectiveness of anti-poverty programmes.  
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Beyond Urban Income Poverty 
 
Definitions of what is urban vary over time and from country to country.  The size and density of 
a population may be considered appropriate for the definition, however, with migration and other 
rural urban linkages the distinction is blurred.  Table 6 below presents definitions of urban areas 
for selected countries of Asia; they vary widely from country to country.   
 
Table 6 National definitions of urban population – Selected countries 
East and North-East Asia 
China 
Up to 1982: total population of cities and towns. Cities had to have a population of at least 100,000 or command special 
administrative, strategic, or economic importance to qualify as cities. Towns were either settlements with more than 3,000 
inhabitants of whom more than 70 per cent were registered as non-agricultural or settlements with a population ranging 
from 2,500 to 3,000 of whom more than 85 per cent were registered as non-agricultural.  
For the 1990 census: (1) all residents of urban districts in provincial and prefectural-level cities; (2) resident population of 
“streets” (jiadao) in county-level cities; (3) population of all residents’ committees in towns. For 1996 and 2000: Not 
available. 
Mongolia Capital and district centres. 
Republic of Korea Places with 50,000 or more inhabitants are usually considered urban. However, the reported proportion urban from the census actually refers to the total population of dong, the administrative division for urban areas, rather than places. 
South-East Asia 
Cambodia Municipalities of Phnom Penh, Bokor and Kep and 13 additional urban centres.   
Malaysia Gazetted areas with their adjoining built-up areas and with a combined population of 10,000 persons or more. 
Myanmar Not available. 
Philippines 
 
All cities and municipalities with a density of at least 1,000 persons per square kilometre; administrative centres, barrios 
of at least 2,000 inhabitants, and those barrios of at least 1,000 inhabitants which are contiguous to the administrative 
centre, in all cities and municipalities with a density of at least 500 persons per square kilometre; and all other 
administrative centres with at least 2,500 inhabitants. 
Singapore City of Singapore   
Thailand Municipalities. In 1999, 981 sanitary districts were reclassified as Tambon municipalities and data for proportion urban were adjusted retrospectively.   
Viet Nam  Places with 4,000 inhabitants or more. 
South and South-West Asia 
Afghanistan Sixty-three localities.  
Bangladesh 
 
Places having a municipality (pourashava), a town (shahar) committee or a cantonment board. In general, urban areas are 
a concentration of at least 5,000 persons in a continuous collection of houses where the community sense is well 
developed and the community maintains public utilities, such as roads, street lighting, water supply, sanitary arrangements, 
etc. These places are generally centres of trade and commerce where the labour force is mostly nonagricultural and literacy 
levels are high. An area that has urban characteristics but has fewer than 5,000 inhabitants may, in special cases, be 
considered urban. 
India 
 
Towns (places with municipal corporation, municipal area committee, town committee, notified area committee or 
cantonment board) and all places having 5,000 inhabitants or more, a density of not fewer than 1,000 persons per square 
mile or 390 per square kilometre, pronounced urban characteristics and at least three-fourths of the adult male population 
employed in pursuits other than agriculture. 
Indonesia Municipalities (kotamadya), regency capitals (kabupaten) and other places with urban characteristics. 
Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision 
 
Poverty may be defined as having three inter-related and inter-locking aspects: (a) lack of  
regular income and employment opportunities – this could also be expanded to purchasing power, 
(b) lack of access to services such as health, education and water, and (c) lack of political power, 
participation, dignity and respect. This way of looking at poverty is similar to that of Amartya 
Sen as he described in Development as Freedom.   
 
In defining urban poverty we therefore face the inherent difficulties in defining urban areas as 
well as the challenges in defining poverty.  Putting these two loosely defined terms together to 
form the term urban poverty it is all the more clear that the concept is quite fluid.   
 
Table 7 below depicts dimensions of the rural, rural-urban and urban experience which impact 
the lives of the poor.  
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Table 7 Living conditions of urban population 
with access to 
improved 
water
with access to 
improved 
sanitation 
with 
sufficient 
living area 
with durable 
structures
Region/ Country 2001 2001 2001 2001 1990 2001 2005 1990 2001 2005 1990 2001
China 94 66 -- -- 44 38 33 137,900 178,300 174,700 2 2
Hong Kong 99 99 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Japan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Mongolia 77 45 -- -- 68 65 58 870 940 870 1 1
Republic of Korea -- -- -- -- 37 37 -- 11,700 14,400 -- -- --
Brunei 99 99 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Cambodia 53 52 -- -- 72 72 79 870 1,700 2,310 6 6
Indonesia 91 84 -- 87 32 23 26 18,000 20,900 28,200 1 1
Laos 59 57 -- -- 66 66 79 420 710 970 5 5
Malaysia 99 99 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Myanmar 88 83 -- -- 31 26 46 3,110 3,600 7,060 1 1
Philippines 92 87 72 95 55 44 44 16,300 20,200 22,800 2 2
Singapore 100 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Thailand 89 98 -- 92 20 2 26 2,000 250 2,060 -19 -19
Timor-Leste -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Vietnam 81 70 100 92 60 47 41 8,100 9,200 9,200 1 1
Afghanistan 19 7 -- -- 98 99 -- 2,500 4,900 4,600 6 6
Bangladesh 99 44 57 60 87 85 71 19,000 30,400 25,200 4 4
Bhutan 86 65 -- -- 70 44 -- 60 70 50 1 1
India 92 67 79 90 61 55 35 131,200 158,400 110,200 2 2
Iran 99 56 -- -- 52 44 30 17,100 20,400 14,600 2 2
Maldives 100 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Nepal 85 20 66 65 97 92 61 1,600 2,700 2,600 5 5
Pakistan 96 88 41 76 79 74 48 26,400 35,600 26,600 3 3
Russian Federation -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Sri Lanka 91 95 86 -- 25 14 -- 900 600 350 -4 -4
Turkey -- -- -- -- 23 18 16 8,000 8,000 7,600 -- --
Percent of Urban Population
Thousands living                 in slums 
Annual slum 
population growth 
rateliving in slums 
Source: http://www.unhabitat.org/stats/
East and North-East Asia
South-East Asia
South and South-West Asia
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At 174,700,000 in 2005 China had the largest number of slum dwellers of any Asian country 
despite having a low share (33%) of its urban population living in slums (low relative to other 
countries in the region).  The large number of slum dwellers was due to the large size of its 
population and the somewhat high rate of urbanization thereof (43% of China’s population is 
urban).  India was home to 110,200,000 slum dwellers (35% of its urban population) in 2005; 
although a sizeable amount, this is less than the size of the slum dwelling population in China 
due both to India’s population being smaller and less urbanized than that of China.    Most other 
countries in this volume had a higher share of their urban population living in slums (41% in 
Viet Nam, 48% in Pakistan, and 44% in the Philippines); each of those countries varied in the 
degree to which they were urbanized (Viet Nam at 28%, Pakistan 36%, and the Philippines 65%).  
Indonesia is one of the region’s more urbanized countries with 52% of its population being urban 
in 2005; a relatively low share of that population (26%) lived in slums in 2005.  
 
Urban poverty and social protection: A case for broadening the agenda 
 
International agency and donors approaches to urban poverty have gone through a number of 
cycles. The dominant discourse of the 1990s was the neo-liberal conviction that greater 
economic opportunity and access to capital is a fundamental basis of poverty reduction, 
particularly in urban areas. Nonetheless, a market-based approach to urban poverty has proven to 
be a narrow framework – both for policy and understanding.  
 
Without a broad and robust understanding of poverty in particular contexts we are unlikely to 
adequately define urban poverty or to design effect interventions. No two experiences of poverty 
are the same, and the multiplicity of causes and contexts are unlikely to be addressed through 
standardised social protection instruments1  
 
Despite the World Bank linking poverty to ‘powerlessness and voicelessness, and vulnerability 
and fear’2 in Voices of the Poor, the extent of a shift in urban policy and social protection 
practice has been uneven. Key development continue to portray and understand urban poverty as 
fundamentally an economic plight which can be measured, quantified and compared across 
communities, cities and States. Despite the outward adoption of Sen’s ideas there has been little 
compelling evidence in a shift in policy direction or thinking on urban poverty.  
 
Nevertheless examples do exist where donors, development agencies, governments (local and 
national) and civil society have combined to develop participatory approaches in defining and 
assessing poverty at a local level. Such efforts are time consuming and involve developing 
partnerships, but also offer a more sustainable and inclusive approach to urban poverty over time. 
The scaling up of the Baan Mankong programme in Thailand, which builds on local capacities in 
tackling housing poverty is an example of this approach. The Baan Mankong programme shows 
a willingness to engage with local communities and to act on their concerns3.   
  
                                                
1 UNESCAP 2007 Facing the challenges of urbanisation (ESCAP/CPR(4)/4), December. 
2 Narayan, D. 2000. Voices of the Poor, p5. 
3 Boonyabancha, S. 2005. ‘Baan Mankong: going to scale with “slum” and squatter upgrading in Thailand’. 
Environment and Urbanization 17,1. 
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In contrast, the weaknesses of not using data collection and analysis with urban poor 
communities in order to creating a learning environment and build capacity have been raised by 
Marcus and Asmorowati1. In examining the World Bank’s Urban Poverty Project (UPP) in 
Indonesia the authors found that the measurements used did not effectively capture the 
complexity of urban poor livelihoods (or the poorest themselves). The resulting project failed 
then to impact on the lives of the poor. This resulted in conflict and the failure to establish 
sustainable and locally owned institutions. 
 
One of the opportunities and challenges from an examination of urban poverty at scale is the role 
of local government and organisations, including communities themselves. Local government 
can play a catalytic role in terms of working with communities, NGOs and central government in 
access to affordable services at scale, in data gathering, in building effective partnerships and 
enhancing social protection and in enhancing voice and participation. The quality of governance 
is an important factor in poverty reduction and there are several lessons in the region from which 
to learn and share.   
  
As stated in the Jakarta Declaration2, an important role for ECSAP lies in the sharing of good 
practices in defining and measuring poverty. There are today a number of initiatives resulting in 
better quality data which tell us more about urban poverty and which can potentially lead to more 
effective evidenced-based planning solutions. Often these also empower and build the capacity 
of those involved in the process. As understanding poverty is linked to appropriate measurements 
there remains an important role in working towards a synthesis of indicators which are more 
dynamic and inclusive. As a regional organisation ESCAP is well placed to facilitate and share 
information and experience in order to strengthen understanding and action on urban poverty in 
the Asia-Pacific. It has a key role to play in assisting its member countries towards a more 
dynamic and reflexive set of practices in order to deal with the significant urban challenges to 
come. 
                                                
1 Marcus, A. and S. Asmorowati 2006. ‘Urban Poverty and the Rural Development Bias: Some notes from 
Indonesia’. Journal of Developing Societies 22: 145. 
2 UNESCAP 2006. Confronting Poverty Reduction in Asia and the Pacific (E/ESCAP/1365, April. 
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Introduction 
 
Any discussion about migration, migrants' well-beings and social protection in Vietnam should 
take into account the so-called ho khau, or the household registration. For over five decades, the 
household registration has been used by the government to control population and their mobility 
by binding a person's whereabouts with his or her economic, social and political entitlements.1 
During the war time and the period when the economy was centrally managed, the household 
registration proved to be an effective mechanism that helped the government to mobilize humans 
for national objectives and to assure relatively efficient distribution of resources and welfares. 
Since the market reforms, often known as doi moi, initiated in the mid-1980s, the function of the 
household registration in controlling the mobility of people has been gradually declined due to 
the rapid growing of employment opportunities in the non-state sector. Yet, ho khau of any 
person remains the prerequisite for his or her access to housing ownership and key public  social 
services. As a result, a migrant who does not have a ho khau is exposed to multiple 
institutionalized vulnerabilities and risks.  
 
This paper examines social protection problems that rural-to-urban migrants face due to their 
residental status as temporary residents at urban centers. It starts with a profile of migration 
situation in Vietnam that highlights urbanization trend, followed by a section that examines 
common vulnerabilties of migrants in four areas of employment, housing, education and health 
care at receiving communities, using both secondary and primary data from a number of surveys. 
The third section is a short review of key social policies and institutionalized practice of the 
central and local governments in which entitlements are household registration based and their 
implications for social protection of migrants. This section and the previous one show that 
unauthorized migrants in the cities are often trapped in a poverty circle sustained by their 
marginalization status as temporary residents and the non-portability of their entitlements. The 
                                                
1 Each household is given a household registration book (so ho khau) which lists the names, sex, date of birth, 
occupation of all household members and their relationship with the household head. In principle, no one can have 
his or her name listed in more than one household book. All residents are exclusively categorized into five groups, 
namely:   
 KT1: Residents (including both non-migrants and migrants) with permanent household registration at 
place of current residence; 
 KT2: Intra-district migrants who have permanent household registration at the province/city of current 
residence; 
 KT3: Migrants who do not have permanent registration at the place of current residence but have 
temporary registration for 6-12 months with the posibility of extension; 
 KT4: Migrants who do not have permanent registration at the place of current residence but have 
temporary registration for 1-6 months; 
 Non-registered residents: Those who do not belong to any of the above caterory.  
Despite recent relaxation, conditions for changing status from temporary to permanent residents are strict, requiring 
migrants to have formal employment, home ownership, and in residence for at least three years. 
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last section provides some policy lessons and program recommendations. Given the abolishment 
of the household registration is possible only in the long run, the paper suggests a new approach 
to transform this system from a measure of migration prevention to a mechanism for social 
protection. 
 
Migration in Vietnam at a glance 
 
Over the past decade, Vietnam has rapidly accelerated into the rank of the fastest growing 
economies in Asia, with the annual growth rate remained around 7-8%. Only with the impact of 
the recent global crisis that this rate has decreased to about 6.5% for the year 2008. One integral 
process of the overall economic development has been the steady increase in migration. Results 
of the recent census show that up to 6.5% of the population aged over 5 migrated (4.5 million 
people) between 1994-1999. Of those migrants, about 1.5 million (33.3%) were rural-rural, 1.2 
milion were rural-urban (26.6%), 1.2 million were urban-urban (26.6%), and 0.4 million were 
urban-rural migrants (8.9%) (Koesveld, 2001). Indeed, many types of migration such as the 
short-term, temporary and seasonal ones, were not included in these figures (Dang et al., 2003). 
 
In overall, out of eight major socio-
economic regions of the country, six lost 
population through migration, while the 
Central Highland and the Southeast 
reported positive net migration. 
Provinces with highest number of out-
migrants were those in the North Central, 
one of the poorest regions in the country. 
Migration flows consisted of mainly 
young adults. The cohort aged 20-24 had 
migration rate that was double that of the 
general population. Large number of 
migrant was urban-bound, or those 
coming to work at expanding industrial 
zones, due to better employment 
opportunities in these areas (GSO & 
UNFPA, 2005). Cities like Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh witnessed a rapid increase in 
proportion of residents who were rural-urban migrants. According to the census, for the period 
1994-1999, the net migration was 115 thousand people for Hanoi and 410 thousand people for 
Ho Chi Minh City, implying migration rate of 4.29% for the former and over 8% for the later 
(Dang et al., 2003). By 1999, 23.5% of the population was urban, up from 19.4 percent ten years 
earlier. By 2004, this figure was 25.8%. Population projection show that the share of urban 
population would be about a third in 2010 and 45 percent in 2020 (Koesveld, 2001). Indeed, 
these figures do not take into account unregistered migrants who are highly visible in life but 
invisible in state statistics. One conservative estimation shows that in 1997, there were 200,000 
spontaneous migrants in the city of Hanoi and four time higher in number in Ho Chi Minh City 
(Dang et al., 2003). 
 
Figure 1: Urbanization trend in Vietnam, 1990-
2020
19.1
21.2
23.7 24.6
25.4 26.7
33
45
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1990 1995 1999 2002 2004 2005 2010 2020
%
   20
Micro-level analysis of migration show that migration is among key household and individual 
strategies for achieving economic security for most of migrants and their families, or even for 
social upward mobility for a minority of them  (Dang, 2008). Migration has been potential for 
poverty alleviation and development of their left-behind and sending communities. In the 
receiving areas, migrants provide sustained labor force to satisfy the labor needs in various 
economic sectors (Le et al, 2005). But migration is also associated with social costs of being 
away from family and the social support networks, formal and informal, at home communities. 
Yet, in overall migrants remain very adaptive to the new working and living environments, as 
most of them considered difficulties and problems of their geographical dislocation are offseted 
by better income compared to the levels they are able to make at home areas (Le & Bach, 2008).  
 
Although the government has recognized that migration is an essential part of poverty alleviation 
and development, it nevertheless remains concerned about the perceived migration's negative 
impacts. Key concerns include the pressures made by rural-urban migrants on already 
overloaded infrastructures and public service systems in urban areas, urban disorder and crime, 
environmental damage, and the resultant labor shortage in rural places of origin. In response, 
government has erected barriers, most notably the household registration system (ho khau), 
aimed at increasing additional costs borne by migrants, apart from relocation costs in order to 
discourage spontaneous movements (Nguyen Thang, 2002). This has created institutionalized 
risks and disadvantages for migrants, adding to the problems they already face as poor and often 
unskilled workers.  
 
Risks and vulnerability associated with migration 
 
This section presents some empirical evidences that highlight critical issues related to rural-urban 
migrants in today Vietnam. Data used for the analysis is drawn from the 2008 Migration Impact 
Survey (2008 MIS) and other secondary migration data sets available in Vietnam.       
 
Who are the KT4 migrants? 
 
The KT4 migrants are among those most vulnerable at the urban settings. For migrants of the 
KT3 status, most already have formal employment and they are at least protected by the Labour 
Code. The KT4 group consists mostly temporary or seasonal labourers with no or low skill who 
migrate from the countryside to urban areas to find works in the informal sector or manufactures.  
 
Indeed, who those migrants are can partly explain where and how they are incorporated into the 
urban labour market as well as the types of risks and vulnerabilities they face due to their 
geographical and social relocation. Empirical data of the 2008 Migration Impact Survey help us 
to understand some key features of this migrant group and their situation. The survey randomly 
sampled over 5500 migrants of all types, of them 767 migrants are of KT4 registration status 
currently residing in  Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.1 The majority of them (73 percent) were born 
and grew up in the countryside, with few have previous migration experiences, particularly  
working and living in urban settings (14 percent changed residence once and only 3 percent 
changed more than once before coming to the cities). Yet, the need to find a paid job is critical, 
                                                
1 The survey was carried out in two sending provinces (Thai Binh, Tien Giang) and two receiving cities (Hanoi, Ho 
Chi Minh City).  
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explaining the move of close to 70 percent of the respondents (the second main reason is for 
schooling in the cities, accounting for 15 percent of the respondents). Given close to a half of the 
migrants (44 percent) are from poor households, migration has been commonly adopted as a  
strategy for survival. But even for the non-poor families, sending some members to cities to 
work is expected to bring about needed cash income to pay for various expenses that can hardly 
covered by the sales of the agricultural products alone. Typically, household members who 
migrate are young (43 percent aged between 18 and 20; 88 percent aged between 15 and 30) and 
in relatively good health conditions (90 percent). Both men and women go, with nearly a half (49 
percent) are unmarried. In fact, more female migrants (56 percent) are found in the survey 
sample. It reflects the availability of employment opportunities for women in the urban areas. 
Female migrants often find jobs in urban service sector, petty trade, and labour intensive 
industries for export that hire mass number of female workers.      
 
One important feature of the group of the KT4 migrants is their low level of education attainment. 
Only 17.6 percent of them have education higher than secondary level. Of the rest, up to 13 
percent have education at the primary level; 39.3 percent at the lower secondary level; and 30.1 
percent at the upper secondary level. Quite few respondents experienced trainings that can help 
them to find skilled jobs. Out of 767 respondents, only 14 or less than 2 percent had vocational 
training (electricity, cooking, mechanics, hair dressing, tailoring, car driving, motorbyke repair, 
shoe repair, etc.). Clearly, with rural background, no urban experiences, poor education and no 
working skill, access to decent jobs for the KT4 migrants is severely limited. As presented below, 
they are instead drawn to work as low-paid labourers employed sporadically in the expanding 
informal sector that is unregulated by the country's Labour Code and other social policies.     
 
Employment 
 
From a stagnant economy of the 1980s, market transition has resulted in unprecedented 
economic growth at the rate of 7-8 percent per annum consistently since the year 2000. Only in 
2008, as the global crisis spreading globally that Vietnam has faced a decrease in the growth rate 
to 6.5 percent. Most of the growth is recorded in the private sector which produces the majority 
of employment. Less measurable is the growth of the informal sector, albeit its boom can be 
observed, particularly at the large urban centers. Job opportunities of this expanding sector is the 
major drive of rural-urban migration (Bach and Le, 1995). Various studies have come to the 
same finding that almost all migrants can find employment upon the first few weeks of arrival in 
the cities. Data of the 2008 MIS show that only 5 percent of the KT4 migrants were unemployed 
at the time of the survey. Similar findings are also found in other studies. For example, a survey 
of 2,600 migrants in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City show that only 2.3 percent of respondents in 
the former city and 4.4 percent of the later were unemployed (Guest, 1998). Another survey of 
917 migrants in Hanoi, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City in 2004 (Social Protection of Migrants 
Survey – SPMS) highlights the high rate of economic activity among the migrants: 48 percent of 
migrants found employment within the first day of their arrival; 80 percent within a week; 100 
percent within 3 months (Le and Bach, 2008).  
 
The very high level of employment found among migrants hides the fact that since the majority 
of rural-urban migrants are those with low or no skill, they often have to accept employment that 
are not easily considered by local residents, particularly the so-called 3D-jobs (i.e. dirty, 
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dangerous, and difficult). Clearly, labor force segmentation at the Vietnamese cities is getting 
wide in which migrants are less likely than the local residents to work in high status occupations 
with better pay and benefits (Guest, 1998). In contrast, migrants are more likely to be employed 
as semi-skilled and/or unskilled workers in either private or informal sectors, including foreign-
invested enterprises such as garment or shoe factories, with lower pay and less or no benefit.  
 
Figure 2: Occupational structure
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The 2008 MIS survey provides data that illustrate in more details the occupational structure of 
the KT4 migrants who moved to live and work in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. As we can see 
from Figure 2, a significant number of the migrants found employment in small enterprises (36 
percent for males and 50 percent for females) of which many are in the informal sector. Private 
services account for employment of 41 percent of male migrants and 19 percent of the female 
migrants. Types of service are diverse, including electrician, restaurant cook, shop keeper, 
security guard, parking lot keeper, photocopy service, hair dressing, motorbike driver, porter, 
shoe shining, janitor, to name just a few. Understandably, more female migrants (15 percent) 
work in petty trade, mostly as street vendors,  compared to male migrants (6 percent). Clearly, 
migrant has formed an important segment of the urban labour market. Yet their incorporation 
reveals not only their employment disadvantages but also risks and vulnerabilities that are typical 
of an expanding but unprotected labour market.  
 
Under the Vietnam Labour Code, labourers in paid employment must be provided with labour 
contracts by their employers, and these contracts must be written.1 These contracts provide some 
level of protection for employees, for example, guaranteeing that labourers should receive 
salaries which should not be under the minimum level defined by the government, be protected 
by the Trade Union, or have other entitlements such as working hours and overtime, work safety, 
                                                
1 Under special conditions  such as domestic work or temporary employment of a duration of less than 3 months, a 
verbal contact is allowed. 
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holidays, maternity leave, social insurance, etc. Yet, data of the 2008 MIS show that 46 percent 
of the migrants in the sample do not have labour contract. The situation is much worse in the 
informal sector where the figure is over 90.  
 
But even where contracts were available, migrants are more often provided with less benefits, 
compared to the local residents. For example, according to the findings of the HCMS survey, 
there were large differences between spontaneous migrants and non-migrants in the benefits that 
respondents believed they could receive. For example, while almost one quarter of female non-
migrants were confident that that they were entitled to maternity leave, only 7% of spontaneous 
migrants had the same belief. Or of waged workers, 93% of non-migrants reported that were 
eligible for paid leave while only 52% of migrants reported so. Similar differentials were also 
reported for payment for sickness benefits, labour and social insurance, and pension rights. 
Temporary migrants were even less likely to receive work-related benefits than were other types 
of migrants (Guest, 1998). Finally, without a labor contract, migrants are also subjects to high 
turn-over rate. Data from another survey (SPMN survey) give the number of 2.6 years of work in 
average for 33 percent of migrants at small urban enterprises. Lack of job security is therefore a 
major concern of 24.7 percent of the migrants in this survey sample (Le et al, 2005).    
 
The absence of labor contract put migrants in particularly vulnerable situation. Low income is 
probably the major trait that characterizes the migrants' employment disadvantages. For the 
entire group of the temporary migrants, 14 percent earn just up to one million dong per month, or 
less than 2USD per day. The bulk of the migrants (63 percent) make between one and two 
millions (60 to 110USD per month, or 2 to 3.7USD per day). Another 16 percent receive from 
two to three millions dong (110 to 166USD per month, or 3.7 to 5.6USD per day). There is less 
than 7 percent of the migrant can earn more than three millions dong per month.  In overall, the 
median of income of the KT4 migrants is just one and a half of million dong, or about 83USD 
per month. 
  
Figure 3: Monthly income of migrants in formal and informal sectors
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Comparison of the subgroups of the migrants show considerable differentials in income, with 
those working in the informal sector earn much less than the migrants employed in the formal 
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job. For example, while nearly 73 percent of the migrants of the latter group earn between two 
and three millions dong, only a half of the migrants in the former group do. One in four migrants 
working in the informal sector is found in the lowest income group. For the migrants in the 
formal sector, the figure is less than seven percent. However, for both groups, quite few migrants 
can earn more than three millions dong (see Figure 3).   
 
 
 
 
Inequality in income is also profound between the male and female migrants. The median of 
income for the male migrants is two millions, while that of the female migrants is one and a half 
million. One in every five male migrants earns between two and three millions versus one in 
every ten females. Nearly 10 percent of the male migrants make over three millions dong per 
month, while for the female migrants, it is less than 3 percent. 
 
Because of their generally low income, the level of 
saving among the KT4 migrants is frustrating. Data of the 
survey shows the mean and median of monthly saving of 
the migrants are 390,000 dong (24.4USD) and 200,000 
dong (12.5USD) respectively. The situation is 
particularly worse for those working in the informal 
sector, as close to a half of the migrants (41.5 percent) 
have no saving at all; 58.2 percent save up to 500,000 
dong (31USD), and only one person out of 287 of those 
44migrants have a saving of 1 million dong (62.5USD).  
Figure 5 illustrates the percentage of the migrants having 
different levels of saving per month. 
 
The lack of sufficient saving means that migration key 
objective (i.e. to support left-behind families) is not realized for most of the migrants. Further, 
any saving, even small, that the migrants try to make is a cut into their own well-being and social 
protection at the cities.   
Figure 4: Monthly income by sex
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Not only low wage but the lack of work-related protection and other benefits also characterize 
jobs performed by the bulk of the KT4 migrants.  In overall, one in three migrants (33 percent) in 
the KT4 sample reported being exposured to toxical substances related to their works. As a result, 
one in five migrants (19%) have experienced sick leave by the time of the survey. Close to one in 
five migrants (17 percent) considered their job to be 'dangerous', with more males than females 
reported so (24 versus 11 percent). The work 'dangers' include possibility of work accidents 
(faced by 44 percent of the migrants; and one in every twenty migrants, or 5.5 percent, have 
already had accidents); even life-threatening tasks (11 percent); rapid deterioration of health (19 
percent); exposure to chemical substance (26.5 percent); and frequent contact with violent 
persons (8.5 percent). Even in this situation, only one in five migrants have accident insurance 
provided by employers. Regarding social insurance, for those working at informal jobs, only 5 
percent is covered.  
 
Housing 
 
Another major difficulty that the KT4 migrants face at the destination is accommodation. As 
spontaneous migration is discouraged by the government, housing policy creates barriers to 
temporary migrants to purchase and possess dwellings at the place of destination. As reflected in 
the data collected in the 2008 MIS, almost all the migrants (93 percent) have to rent a dwelling 
place. Only 3.5 percent of them own the place, and another 3.5 percent live with friends or 
relatives. This figure is quite close to the finding of the 2004 Vietnam Migration Survey that 
shows nearly 90 percent of KT4 migrants lived in rented dwellings. It is a typical situation found 
in the large urban centers and the industrial zones, often locating along city outskirts, that most 
of migrants coming for employment, either in private or informal sector, seek accommodation in 
the so-called boarding houses. The houses can be owned by employers or by local residents. Of 
the former, these accommodations are built to house employees whose rent is often deducted 
from their salary. Of the later, the boarding houses are often additions or rooms within existing 
homes that a homeowner rents by day or month. Living conditions at the boarding houses are at 
minimum. Typically, a migrant must share a room with other migrants. In overall, the average 
area that migrants live in is about 3-4 square meters per person, and 2.5 square meters per person 
in some places (Vietnam Net, 1st November 2004).  Homeowner provides him or her only a bed 
with mat, pillow and blanket (for winter only), and a mosquito net. It is now common that ceiling 
fan is also provided, but there is usually no in-door flush toilet and bathroom, and migrants have 
to share these facilities with other migrant tenants or local residents. Results from another survey 
in 2004 (named Survey on Social Protection of the Most Needy – SPMN) of 917 KT4 migrants 
show that close to 30 percent of them lived onsite at workplace, of them most are construction 
workers working in the private housing construction market. Living at worksite is found to be 
convenient for those migrants, as they do not have to pay rent. However, conditions at 
constructions site is highly unsuitable for living. Clearly, while migrants can pay a minimum or 
nothing for lodging, the cost of these living arrangement directly cut into their other assets, 
mostly their health (Le and Bach, 2008). There are even migrants who sleep on the streets, in 
parks, or under bridges.  
 
The data of the surveys give more insights into the dwelling problems. The first issue of concern 
regards housing type, quality, and amenities. Compared to local residents, migrants are less 
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likely to reside in permanent houses1.  For example, data of the 2004 VMS show the proportion 
of non-migrants living in permanent houses is over twice that of migrants (35 percent compared 
to 16 percent respectively). In contrast, the percentage of non-migrants living in semi-permanent2 
or simple houses3 is only a half of that of migrants (6 percent compared to 13 percent).   
 
The situation is even worse regarding the KT4 migrants, as 85 percent reside in semi-permanent 
or temporary dwellings, and only 15 percent are in permanent houses. House quality is generally 
not only an important indicator of the level of economic well-being of a household but also a 
factor strongly influencing the health status of its members (Nguyen and White, 2007). Poor 
houses mean unfavorable physical conditions preventing the residents from direct exposure to 
natural or hygiene conditions that may negatively affect their health, for example bad weathers 
or pollution. For example, results from a small-scaled survey done by Cu Chi Loi with total of 
about 600 rural-to-urban migrants in three cities and provinces of the South of Vietnam 
(including Ho Chi Minh City, Long An and Binh Duong Provinces) in 2004 indicate that 60 
percent of migrants are living in badly built houses, and 10 percent of migrants are living in 
houses like shelters that are not good enough to keep bad weather out. The data of the 2008 MIS 
survey show that up to 14 percent of the KT4 migrants have to use toilet outside of the dwellings, 
and only 24 percent have access to pipe water which is of good quality. The rest have to use 
either rain water or waters from wells. And while gas has become an increasingly  common 
source of cooking energy, up to 17 percent of the migrants still use coal, kerosene, wood, straw 
for cooking. Source of water, type of toilet, and cooking energy have some correlations with 
health conditions as piped water and flush toilet mean better hygiene conditions for household 
(Nguyen, 2008).  
 
Not only migrants live in houses of low quality, they also have fewer possessions and amenities 
which are other indicators of their worse-off economic status. The 2004 VMS survey listed a 
number of amenities, such as radio, television, telephone, refrigerator, sewing machine, washing 
machine, and motorcycle as some measures of economic well-being of the sampled households. 
Data collected show much lower level of possession of all these amenities among migrant 
households compared to households of local residents. For example, the percentages of migrant 
households possessing motocycles and television are 47 percent and 52 percent compared to 78 
percent and 88 percent respectively for local residents.  
   
Health and access to health care 
 
Issues of health of migrants and their access to health care services have been discussed in some 
previous studies. The major argument is that the relationship between migration and health is 
contradictory, i.e. while migrants are believed to be more exposed to health risks compared to 
non-migrants, the former also tend to have good health due to the selective effect (Nguyen and 
White, 2007; Nguyen, 2008). Data of the 2008 MIS also confirm this selective effect: when being 
                                                
1 Permanent houses are defined here as one- or multi-storey houses which are built in bricks with solid roof 
(tile/concrete roof). 
2 Semi-permanent houses are often defined as those with walls made of bricks/wood/wood frame and with roof 
made of tile/cement-mortar roofing/mental roofing ect. or houses constructed of equivalent materials, but of low 
quality and not solid enough to last and to survive heavy storms or typhoons. 
3 Simple/temporary houses are those built by simple composition and even  less solid materials. Walls are usually 
made of dirt/leaves/woven sheets (not built of bricks or wooden frame) and roof of bamboo/leaf/oil-paper…ect 
   27
asked to rank their own health, 86 percent of the KT4 migrants considered themselves in good 
health, and 4 percent in very good health. Still, there has been increasing evidence showing that 
migrants are less healthy than the population they join (Ha and Ngoc, 2001). For example, a study 
found that being a rural-to-urban migrant, compared with being a non-migrant, had a negative 
effect on almost all health dimensions, and that this effect was maintained after controlling for a 
number of socioeconomic factors (Van Landingham, 2003). Among migrants, other reseachers 
show that not only migrants have worse health than non-migrants, health status of migrants 
deteriorates faster than that of non-migrants (Nguyen and White, 2007). Obviously, hard works in 
mostly 3-D jobs, poor living conditions and lack of regular and quality health care are major 
reasons that make migrants' health deteriorated. Thus, while being selectively healthy, close to 
one in five migrants (17 percent) in the 2008 MIS sample had sick leave of at least one day 
during the last 12 months of the survey. In average, a migrant in the sample had 5 days of 
sickness, reflecting its severity. The longest period of sickness across the sample is 60 days.         
  
Since most of rural-urban migrants are poor, they had difficulties to access health care service. As 
the migrants are foreign to their place of destination, they are usually not familiar with the local 
health care systems and locations of health clinics; hence, they face more difficulties in seeking 
and using health care services. In fact, it is usually found that migrants have poorer health seeking 
behavior and lower use of health services than the native population, when they are not likely to 
have a lower need of care. Numerous studies have documented much lower health expenditure 
among migrants, compared to non-migrants, more difficulties in accessing health care services, 
and the underutilization and delayed utilization of formal health services among migrants (Bolini 
and Siem, 1995; Leclere et al, 1994; Ell and Irma, 1998). 
A study in Vietnam recommended an assessment of whether migration per se can result in 
reduced access to health services, or whether other migration related variables, such as life in 
urban migrant squatter settlements, may have the same effect on health service access (Guest, 
1998). The study noted that one of the main reasons why spontaneous migrants are worse off than 
non-migrants may not be the lack of access to services, even for those without legal registration 
in the city, but rather the cost of such services, as unregistered migrants are obliged to use private 
services while legal residents have access to public services. 
 
Evidence from Vietnam in general shows 
less favorable health utilization behavior 
among migrants, than non-migrants, after 
becoming ill. It was found that among 
those who became ill, migrants who move 
to urban areas are more likely to have non-
preferable health behavior, i.e. they are 
more likely to do nothing or to self-
medicate  rather than using health care 
services, than urban non-migrants. There is 
also a tendency that other groups of 
migrants to urban areas, including 
returning migrants and migrants from 
urban-to-urban areas, are more likely to do nothing relative to using health services or self-
medicating than urban non-migrants (Nguyen, 2004). Findings from the 2008 MIS data provide 
Figure 6: Health seeking behavior
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further insights into the use of health services among temporary migrants. As presented in Figure 
6, more than a half of the migrants who experienced sickness at the cities did not go to get health 
care service but self-medicated. One reason is because many may not find their sickness serious 
enough to be treated by professionals (reported by 69 percent of those who did not use health care 
services). But also the migrants cannot get services because of the high costs that they are likely 
unable to pay (reported by one third of the migrants). There is a clear gap in terms of service use. 
While about 28 percent of the migrants who got sick were able to go to public hospital, only 7 
percent went to community health care centers. Services at these clinics are often poor, and 
patients are often local residents. Quite few migrants used private health care services, mainly 
because of their high costs.     
 
Education of children 
 
49.2 percent are boys and 50.8 percent are girls. Of them 89.2 percent aged 18 years old or less. 
58.9 percent are living together with the KT4 migrants. Of them only 42.6 percent are going to 
schools. 
 
Ho khau in social policies and institutionalized practices 
 
At the highest level, the first Constitution in Vietnam in 1946 confirmed, among various rights, 
the freedom of all the citizens to move and reside anywhere within and outside the country's 
territory (Article 10). It also stated the equal economic, social and political rights of all citizens 
(Article 6)  Subsequent revisions of the Constitution in 1959, 1980 and 1992 also reconfirmed 
the rights to move and reside (Article 28 in the Constitution 1959 for example)1, while improving 
other rights that are relevant to migrants. Specifically, the Constitution in 1959, while 
reconfirming the state commitment to compulsary free-of-charge primary education, emphasized 
the rights to education of all the people (Article 33). It also added others rights entitled to all, 
notably the rights to work (Article 30) and to welfare (Article 31).  
 
The Constitution endorsed by the National Assembly in 1980 reiterated freedom to move and 
reside 'in accordance to the Laws' (Article 71). Other relevant rights such as rights to work, skill 
upgrading, safe working conditions (Article 58), welfare (rest, convalesce, social insurance) 
(Article 59), education (Article 60) were reconfirmed and expanded. In addition, the Constitution 
stated the rights to free-of-charge health care to all the citizens (Article 61), and rights to housing 
(Article 62). 
 
The Constitution in 1992 is considered to be most comprehensive in which rights of migrants 
were made more deliberately. Again, the rights to migrate and reside of the people was 
mentioned (Article 68).2 Others rights mentioned in the previous Constitution were reconfirmed 
and detailed with some new rights and obligations. Article 52 confirms equal rights of every 
citizen; Article 55 - rights to work; Article 56 - working conditions and welfare; Article 57 - 
freedom to do business; Article 59 - rights to education; primary education is compulsary and 
                                                
1 The difference between the Constitutions 1946 and 1959 regarding migration is that while the former stated the 
rights to mover and to reside within and outside Vietnam,  the later excluded movement outside  of the country.  
2 Migration abroad from Vietnam and to Vietnam was allowed 'in accordance to the Laws'.  
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free of charge; Article 61 - rights to health care; Article 63 - gender equality rights; Rights 65 - 
care and protection of children.   
 
Yet, at the lower level, different laws, ordinances, decrees, circulars, and instructions issued by 
the government create barriers to rural-urban migrants to realize their rights protected in the 
Constitutions. These barriers and their impact on migrants with some details are presented below.  
 
Household registration 
 The most serious policy is the Decree 108/2005/ND-CP dated on August 19, 2005 which 
denies spontaneous migrants to cities to have permanent household registration as long as 
they have not resided continuously for at least three years. Without permanent household 
registration, migrants are barred from other rights granted to them by the Constitution and 
other laws.  
 
Employment 
 The rights to work is among the basic rights of every citizen as confirmed by the 
Constitution. The Labour Code also provides that rights to work is delinked from having 
a permanent household registration. Yet in cities like Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city, 
recruitment practices of the state authorities and public organizations continue the 
requirement of permanent household registration. Enterprises also give priority to local 
labor force. In fact, sometimes pressure comes from city authorites who want to address 
the problems of redundacy of labor who are permanent residents. Labor recruitment of 
enteprises with foreign investment is often undertaken through Department of Labor, 
Invalids and Social Welfare (DOLISA) which is likely to introduce only local laborers. 
Since 2003, however, these enterprises have rights to directly recruit laborers, as 
provided by the Laws of Enterprises and the admendments of the Labour Code. Still, high 
requirements on labor skills prevent the majority of migrants to access to employment at 
these enterprises.      
 
 Other local policies and practices also negatively impact access to the formal labor 
market of migrants. For example, in 1998, the People's Committee in Ho Chi Minh City 
drafted a “Proposal on Management of Migrants" requiring migrant workers to have 
some minimum skills in order to be legally accepted; and firms employing migrant 
workers should make a contribution of 5% of wages paid to migrant workers to the so-
called “welfare funds” of the City; the bearing of this  cost was ultimately passed on to 
migrants themselves. In fact, many employers also tried to avoid signing a long-term 
contract with migrants as required by law, in order to save costs on social and medical 
insurance paid for employees. (Nguyen Thang, 2002).  
 
 In Hanoi, the People's Committee of the city issued the “Temporary Regulation on 
Restoring the Order and Managing Migrant Workers Coming to Hanoi in Search of Jobs” 
attached to Decision No. 3189 dated 26 August 1995. The regulation requires that labor 
migrants to Hanoi should have a letter of reference from the authority of place of origin, a 
temporary work permit valid for 3 months and renewable to be paid every time it is 
issued or renewed; and identification card (Nguyen Thang, 2002).  
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 The Decree 103/2003/ND-CP issued on September 12, 2003 by the government 
regarding the issuance of work permit for health care professionals and pharmacists does 
not require applicants to have permanent household registration. Yet at the large urban 
centers of Hanoi, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City, only local residents are able to apply 
for this work permit in health care and pharmacy. 
 
Loan and credit 
 As holders of temporary registration status, migrants are barred from access to loans of 
the national fund supporting employment. As clearly defined in the Joint Circular 
13/1999/TTLT-BLDTBXH-BTC-BKHDT issued on May 8, 1999, the Joint Circular 
06/2002/TTLT-BLDTBXH-BTC-BKHDT issued on April 10, 2002 by MOLISA, 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning and Investment, and recently the Decision 
71/2005/QD-TTg issued by the Prime Minister, households applying for loans should 
have a permanent household registration as a precondition.  
 
 Similarly, the Decision 475/NHCT-QD issued on january 30, 1991 by the General 
Director of the Bank of Industry and Commerce states that only families having 
permanent household registration at districts/provincial centers where the Bank located 
can get access to credits provided by the Bank for enterprises and households. This 
provision effectively excludes all migrants who do not have KT1 and KT2 status. 
 
Education 
 The Circular 22/2005/TTLT-BLDTBXH-BTC-BGDDT was issued on August 10, 2005 
by MOLISA, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Education and Training in order to 
guide the implementation of the Decision 62/2005/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on 
August 8, 2005 regarding universalization of primary education nationwide. For poor and 
disadvantaged pupils, the government provides financial support to cover textbook and 
learning aids. Yet one requirement is that those pupils should have permanent household 
registration, making temporary migrants falling short from the category of policy 
beneficials. 
 
 Toward universalization of lower secondary education, a new advancement objective of 
education progress in Vietnam, the Circular 17/2003/TT-BGDDT issued on April 28, 
2003 by the Ministry of Education and Training to guide the implementation of the 
Decree 88/2001/ND-CP issued on November 22, 2001 by the government defines that all 
pupils successfully completed primary education should be accepted to lower secondarty 
schools at localities where they have permanent household registration or temporary 
registration from 6 months and above. Migrants with KT4 status are therefore not eligible 
to enroll at local public schools, with an exception that when those schools do not have 
enough students according to the class-size norms of the Ministry of Education and 
Training. The present situation of over-crowded schools at urban centers means that 
almost all migrant students are not able to enroll. 
 
 Some related policies designed for education development are also excluding temporary 
migrants. The Decision 1134/2001/QD-NHNN issued on September 26, 2001 by the 
Governor of the State Bank on loans for students of colleges and universities, vocational 
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and technical schools allows only students with permanent household registration 
(provided that their performance meets average scores). The Decision 26/2001/QD-
BGDDT issued on July 5, 2001 by the Minister of the Ministry of Education and Training 
defines clearly that target group of students for universalization of lower secondary 
education should include those aged between 11 and 18 who have completed primary 
education, having permanent or long-term temporary household registration at the 
locality. 
 
 For students who want to go for vocational schools, colleges and universities, they can 
register to take entry exams only at localities where they have permanent household 
registration, according to the provisions of the Decision 07/2005/QD-BGDDT issued on 
March 4, 2005 and the Decision 05/1999/QD-BGDDT issued on February 23, 1999 by 
the Minister of the Ministry of Education and Training.       
 
Health care 
 On May 16, 2005, the government issued the Decree 63/2005/ND-CP on health insurance. 
The Article 17 defines that people having health insurance have rights to select one of 
primary health care establishments at place wheres they permanently reside or places 
designated by their employer. Beyond these places, their health insurance is not valid. 
 
 The Circular 02/2005/TT-UBDSGDTE issued on June 10, 2005 by the National 
Committee of Population, Family and Children allows the exemption of health check and 
treatment of children aged below 6 with perrmament household registration or who 
actually reside at the locality. Yet, in practice, for children with no permament household 
regisatrtion, birth certificate of children and certification from the local authority that 
those children are actual reside in the area must be presented in order to get the 
exemption.    
 
Others social and political rights 
 Temporary migrants of KT3 and KT4 status are paying much higher prices for electricity 
and pipe water consumption compared to local residents. It is a requirement that when 
apply for electricity and pipe water services, permanent household registration should be 
presented to receive normal price services. However, this practice varies according to 
localities. 
 
 In Hanoi, the People Committee of the city allows only residents with permanent 
household registration to buy and sell land and housing in the city territory and to have 
land/house ownership sertificates. Temporary migrants with KT3 and KT4 status are not 
allowed to have these rights. 
 
 Household registration is required in order to have birth cirtification for newborns in 
addition to marriage license of parents (Decree 83/1998/ND-CP). Without birth 
certificate, children are not able to register for schooling at public schools in the city, free 
health check and treatment at place of residence.  
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 Similarly, at many localities, permanent household registration is required for marrying 
couples to get marriage certificate.  
 
 The laws require that citizen aged 17-27 should register to local authority at place of 
residence for military service, with or without household registration. Yet, asking for 
household registration remain a practice at many locality, preventing temporary migrants 
to claim this rights. 
 
In short, the design and execution of social policies and programs in Vietnam remain residence-
based, leaving mobile or unregistered residents out of access to services and resource allocation. 
Without having a permanent household registration, migrants face real problems of accessing to 
certain services.   
 
Policy lessons and program recommendations 
 
The above analyses suggest a number of policy and programme implications to help reducing 
their risks and vulnerabilities at place of destination through providing a social protectio 
1. Spontaneous migrants should be a target of social policies, employment and social 
service programs. The government should introduce social security systems to manage 
the new and growing risks attached to work-related incidents, unemployment and public 
health hazards; 
2. Social protection for mobile population is urgently needed to turn migration into a 
positive factor in poverty reduction and development; 
3. National poverty alleviation and social protection programs should provide access to care 
and services regardless of where a person live; 
4. The government should allocate resources based on where services are used, rather than 
where a person is supposed to live, thus realigning social protection programs with the 
reality of new market flexibility; 
5. The current household registration system, if not to be abolished, should be changed from 
its purpose of monitoring movement and restricting access to services to one that 
encourage participation in national and local development programs; 
6. There should be a government agency responsible for coordinating activities of ministries 
dealing with social protection for migrants; 
7. There should be a nexus between programs supporting migrants and poverty 
alleviation/rural development; 
8. There should be a system of labor market information system accessible to all migrants. 
9. Social facilities and services such as housing, sanitation and transport must be improved 
to accommodate population growth and in-migration; 
10. Small and intermediate urban centers which can attract migrants should be preferable to 
unrestricted growth of large cities to the point where the issue of migration becomes 
difficult to manage; 
11. Policies must reflect different types of migrants and address varying needs; 
12. Migrants must be given a voice.      
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The mobility patterns of rural-urban migrants and their social protection in 
China: Beyond the extension of urban-based approaches 
 
Yu Zhu and Liyue Lin 
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Introduction  
 
Rural-urban migration has been one of the major aspects of socioeconomic transformation in 
China since the late 1970s. At the time of the 2005 1 per cent population sample survey, the 
number of migrants in China reached the enormous size of 147 million, most of whom worked 
and lived in the cities. While such massive migration flows have played important roles in 
poverty reduction for migrants and their families in China, migrants may easily fall into new 
poverty again given many risks they face in the migration process (Wang 2005; Lin and Zhu 
2009). Thus, the establishment and promotion of social protection for rural-urban migrants 
should be regarded as an integrated part of general poverty reduction efforts, and paid more 
attention in theoretical exploration and policy making. 
 
However, the conventional practices of social protection in China are not well prepared to meet 
the newly arising needs of social protection for rural-urban migrants. On the one hand, these 
migrants are not entitled to the social benefits and security only provided to a small proportion of 
privileged people under the conventional urban Hukou- (household registration) based social 
welfare system (Cook 2002); on the other hand, the highly mobile nature of rural-urban migrants 
makes it difficult for their needs for social protection to be met by the simplistic approach of 
extending the residence-based old social welfare system. Furthermore, the socioeconomic 
characteristics of rural-urban migrants are rather different from those of local residents of the 
destination areas. Migrants often have unstable jobs and low income, leave some of their family 
members behind in their places of origin, and therefore have different needs of social protection 
from those of local residents of the destination cities. All this poses more challenges to the 
conventional policies and practices of social protection in China, and calls for new policies and 
measures to tackle the challenges. 
 
Based on review of relevant literature and a survey of 600 rural-urban migrants and subsequent 
in-depth interviews with them, their employers and officials of relevant government departments 
in early 2009 in Fuzhou, the capital city of Fujian Province, this paper tries to contribute to the 
understanding of the complexity of mobility patterns of rural-urban migration and its 
implications for social protection of rural-urban migrants in China. The survey covered 600 
rural-urban migrants, half of whom worked in industrial, trade and service enterprises with more 
than 100 employees in Fuzhou’s major industrial zones and commercial areas, and half of whom 
worked in informal sectors as street vendors, motor-bike-taxi drivers, porters, day labourers, and 
informal employees in small enterprises. The quota-sampling method was used for the selection 
of the respondents for both formal and informal sectors, and a sampling framework with 
stratification across major occupational categories of migrants’ employment was developed to 
guide the sampling process. The in-depth interviews covered 6 government officials in relevant 
government departments, including Departments for Labour and Social Insurance of Fujian 
Province, Department of Education of Fuzhou Municipality, Department of Construction of 
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Fujian Province, and 3 migrant employers and 18 migrants in both formal and informal sectors. 
The paper will analyze the characteristics of rural-urban migrants and their migration process 
and the complex and diversified needs of social protection arising from such characteristics, 
assess the current approaches of social protection for rural-urban migrants in such context, 
explore the theoretical and policy implications of the analysis, and put forward some policy 
recommendations to improve social protection for rural-urban migrants in China.  
 
Social protection for rural-urban migrants in China: the extension of urban-based 
approaches 
 
The needs of rural-urban migrants and their families for social protection manifest in many 
aspects of their work and life, especially in their employment and income, social insurance, 
housing security, and children’s education. As widely documented in the literature, the 
employment of migrants is typically insecure and unstable, and their access to employment 
opportunities is still unequal to local residents of the destination cities (Wang and Zhang 2006; 
Cook 2008; Du and others. 2008). Their income levels are generally lower compared to local 
urban residents, and they often have to work excessively overtime (Zhu 2007). The coverage of 
social insurance for rural-urban migrants is still rather low, as confirmed by numerous studies 
(NBS 2006; Project team of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2006b; Zhu 2007), and 
they are excluded from almost all sources of government subsidized housing provision. They 
have very few choices in meeting their housing needs in the destination cities, and their housing 
conditions are generally poor in terms of both size and quality (e.g. Wu 2002; Lin and Zhu 2008). 
Furthermore, migrant children often do not enjoy equal access to and equal treatment in the 
public education system of the destination cities (Zhao 2003; Xie and Zhu 2004; Liang and Chen 
2007). Children left behind by their migrating parents also face great difficulties and are in great 
need of social protection too (Duan and Yang 2008; Xiang 2007). 
 
These needs of social protection for rural-urban migrants and their families have been 
increasingly recognised by the whole society in China, and various efforts in the forms of 
policies, insurance programmes, and other practices have been made to meet such needs. So far, 
extending the coverage of the conventional urban-Hukou- and residence-based social welfare 
system or its post reform variation to rural-urban migrants is the dominant approach. In a way, 
migrants are regarded as newly added members of the urban society, and various efforts have 
been made to integrate them into the urban society so that they can enjoy the same rights and 
benefits of local urban residents. 
 
Thus in terms of employment and income, there have been gradual policy changes from 
restricting and controlling rural-urban migration and migrant employment in the cities to 
encouraging rural-urban migration and treating rural-urban migrants equally in urban 
employment, through the release and implementation of various government documents (Song 
and others 2002; General Office of the State Council 2003; Liu 2005; The State Council 2006; 
Song and Hou 2007). These documents undermine the institutional basis for the discriminatory 
treatment of rural-urban migrants in urban employment, and have significantly improved migrant 
access to employment opportunities in many migrant destination cities (Drafting group of the 
final report on rural-urban migrant workers 2006). The promulgation of the minimum wage 
standards, and the promulgation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Employment 
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Contracts at the beginning of 2008, provides further protection for rural-urban migrants in terms 
of minimum wages, overtime work, working contracts, etc. (Hong 2003; Liu 2007; Standing 
Committee of the People Congress, PRC 2007). Governments at various levels have taken 
measures to abolish unreasonable fees imposed on rural-urban migrants, and directly intervened 
to solve the problems of delayed payment and payment in arrears to rural-urban migrant workers 
(National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Finance 2001; General Office 
of the State Council 2003; National Development and Reform Commission and others 2004; Liu 
and Zhou 2007). All this has led to the effects of migrants enjoying increasingly more rights in 
terms of employment and income, which used to be limited to local residents in the destination 
cities. Furthermore, various policies have been made and measures have been taken to ensure 
that children of rural-urban migrants have equal access to education opportunities and are treated 
equally in the destination cities, and great progress has indeed been made in this regards (Zhu 
and others 2005; The State Council 2006), although less has been done to solve the problems of 
the left-behind children of rural-urban migrants (Duan and Yang 2008). 
 
Similar approach has been taken to extend the coverage of the existing urban social insurance 
system to rural-urban migrants, so that they can be directly included into the system (Peng and 
Qiao 2005). The social insurance programmes of this kind mainly cover the areas of old-age 
insurance, and insurance against work-related injuries and major diseases, and have only limited 
coverage for general medical insurance and unemployment insurance (Zhu and Chen  
forthcoming). In recent years, attempts have been also made in some migrants’ destination cities, 
including Fuzhou and Xiamen in Fujian, to include rural-urban migrants into the existing urban 
housing security system, so that they can enjoy the benefits of various housing benefits provided 
to local urban residents, such as low-rent housing, affordable housing, and the public reserve 
fund for housing (e.g. Lai 2007). Although there have been efforts to provide social insurance 
and housing security for rural-urban migrants by establishing relatively independent programmes 
tailored for the needs of rural-urban migrants, they have been implemented only on a trial basis 
in a few places (Peng and Qiao 2005; Du and others 2008; Luo 2008).  
 
An important step in the above efforts has been the gradual establishment of institutional bases 
for social protection of rural-urban migrants. This has enabled rural-urban migrants, who would 
otherwise be excluded from the pre-reform Hukou-based rural-urban dichotomous social welfare 
system, obtain rights and entitlements to work and live in their destination cities. Significant 
progress has been made in this regard, especially since the new century; and this is particularly 
evident in migrants’ equal access to urban employment. As demonstrated by our data from the 
survey in Fuzhou, the proportions of our respondents who thought that their non-local Hukou 
status did not affect their employment opportunities, affected their employment opportunities 
slightly, and affected their employment opportunities serious were 81.16%, 17.68% and 1.16% 
respectively, suggesting that discrimination against migrants in terms of employment is no 
longer a major issues, although 14.33% and 19.33% of the respondents still though that they 
were in disadvantaged position when looking for employment opportunities in government 
departments and institutional units respectively. Our in-depth interview of officials from 
Departments for Labour and Social Insurance of Fujian Province confirms the above survey 
results from a different angle. According to the officials, all the regulations treating rural-urban 
migrants differently in terms of employment, even that in government departments and 
institutional units, have now been abolished. In reality there may still be some discrimination 
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against migrants at the local level due to protectionism, however there is now no institutional and 
legal basis for such discrimination (In-depth interview record of the authors No.1, May 2009). 
 
However, as we will see below, the above efforts are not an adequate response to the needs of 
rural-urban migrants for social protection. Data from Fuzhou survey suggest that rural-urban 
migrants are still not well protected in some important aspects of their work and life. In terms of 
employment, only 35.67% of our respondents signed contracts with their employers. Even if 
respondents in the informal sectors are excluded, this proportion is still only 62.00%. 
Furthermore, the coverage of our respondents by old-age insurance, medical insurance, 
unemployment insurance and insurance against work related injuries were only 21.67%, 60.17%, 
8.17% and 14.33% respectively. 91.33% of our respondents did not enjoy any government 
subsidized housing benefits, and 47.13% of the respondents’ children who migrated with their 
migrants were not able to be admitted to public schools in the destination cities, and 54.35% of 
those who were able to be admitted to the public schools in the destination cities needed to pay 
extra fees. All this suggests that more still needs to be done to strengthen the efforts of social 
protection for rural-urban migrants. 
 
Further extension of the urban-based social welfare system or its post-reform variations into 
rural-urban migrants is certainly one way to go, and there is indeed potential to be tapped in this 
regard. However, the mere extension of urban-based social protection programmes cannot fully 
meet the needs of rural-urban migrants. As mentioned in the introduction section, the highly 
mobile nature of rural-urban migrants, and their distinctive socioeconomic characteristics, create 
needs of social protection that are different from local urban residents of their destination cities, 
and this can only be met by new social protection programmes. In fact, the aforementioned 
inadequacy of social protection for rural-urban migrants reflected in the Fuzhou survey is closely 
related to migrants’ needs for new approaches of social protection, and better understanding of 
their mobility patterns is crucial for the exploration of such new approaches. In the following 
section we will first examine the mobility patterns of rural-urban migrants, and then explore their 
implications for the needs of rural-urban migrants for social protection. 
    
Understanding mobility patterns of rural-urban migrants: implications for social 
protection 
 
Conventionally, rural-urban migration has been often conceptualized as a one-way flow from 
rural places of origin to urban places of destinations (Zhu and Chen forthcoming). In the case of 
China, although there has been a long recognition of the circular nature of rural-urban migration, 
this is often attributed to the hindrance caused by China’s Hukou system, which makes it almost 
impossible, or at least difficult, for rural-urban migrants to settle down in the cities (e.g. Chan 
and Zhang 1999; Solinger 1999; Liang 2001). In other words, without the hurdles caused by the 
Hukou system, most rural-urban migrants would settle down in the cities, and an implicit 
implication of such understanding of rural-urban migration is that rural-urban migrants’ 
integration into the destination urban society, including its social benefits and security system, 
would be the solution to their needs for social protection. 
 
However, such simplistic conceptualization of rural-urban migration in China has been 
increasingly challenged by recent studies. Recent evidence suggests that the one-way process of 
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leaving rural areas and settling down in the cities does not conform to not only the migration 
reality, but most migrants’ intention in China. In fact, a substantial proportion of rural-urban 
migrants choose to return to their hometowns or remain in circulation for a prolonged period of 
time, even without hurdles like the Hukou system, and their final destinations are not always the 
cities where they are currently living and working (Zhu 2007; Zhu and Chen forthcoming; Ren 
2007; Fan 2008). Furthermore, the migration patterns and settlement intentions of rural-urban 
migrants are determined not only by their Hukou status, but also by other factors at both the 
demand (employer) and supply (migrant) sides of the labour market, and certain conditions 
associated with China’s current stage of development (Zhu 2007; Zhu and Chen forthcoming). 
Our 2009 Fuzhou survey provides further evidence confirming such new understanding of 
mobility patterns of rural-urban migrants.  
 
Mobility patterns of rural-urban migrants: beyond the conceptualization of rural-urban one-way 
flows 
 
Examining the Fuzhou data from the 2009 survey and in-depth interviews under the conceptual 
framework treating rural-urban migration as a multi-directional process, several important points 
can be made concerning the mobility patterns of rural-urban migrants in China. 
 
First, as can be seen from Table 1, the diversification of the migration flows was an important 
feature of the rural-urban migrants covered in the survey. When answering the question ‘if you 
have free choices, what is your long-term plan?’, 42.17% of the respondents chose to continue to 
work in their current destination cities for a while and then return to the hometowns, 19.17% of 
the respondents chose to settle down in their current destination cities, 8.83% of the respondents 
chose to continue to work in their current destination cities for a while and then move to other 
cities, 7.83% of the respondents chose the answer ‘others’, and 22.00% of the respondents felt 
difficult to make decision. This suggests a multi-way diversification process of the respondents’ 
migration flow, and it is noticeable that instead of settling down in the destination cities, going 
back to their hometowns was still the most common choice for the respondents. It is also 
noticeable that 22.00% of the respondents, which was the second largest group of them, did not 
make up their mind, suggesting that it is not an easy decision to make regarding the future of 
their migration. These figures confirm the necessity of going beyond the simplistic analytical 
framework that conceptualizes the migration process as an origin (rural) to destination (urban) 
one-way process. 
 
Table 1 The settlement intention of the respondents  (%) 
The respondents’ settlement 
intention 
Migrants from the 
formal sector 
(N=300) 
Migrants from the 
informal sector 
(N=300) 
All 
migrants 
(N=600) 
Settling down in the current 
destination city 22.67 15.67 19.17 
Continuing to work in the 
current destination city for a 
while and then move to 
another city 
11.00 6.67 8.83 
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Continuing to work in the 
current destination city for a 
while and then return to the 
hometowns 
33.00 51.33 42.17 
Continuing to circulate 
between places of origin and 
destination 
9.00 6.66 7.83 
Difficult to make decision 24.33 19.67 22.00 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: the 2009 Fuzhou survey of the authors. 
 
Question may be raised as to whether the above low settlement intention of the respondents in 
their current or future destination cities is caused by the hindrance of the Hukou system and other 
related institutional constraints, and this question can be answered by our second point 
concerning the respondents’ choices on Hukou transfer. As can be seen in Table 2, when 
answering the question in the Fuzhou survey ‘if you are qualified (allowed) to transfer the Hukou 
of your family to the destination, what would be your choice?’, the proportions of those who 
chose to transfer the Hukou of the whole family to the destination or to transfer only their own 
Hukou to the destination accounted for 24.03% and 7.83% of the respondents respectively, and 
the majority of the respondents chose to keep the Hukou at the place of origin. When the 
question was changed to ‘if having the destination’s Hukou is conditional on giving up the land 
at the place of origin, what would be your choice?’, both the proportion of those choosing to 
transfer the Hukou of the whole family to the destination and that of those choosing to transfer 
only their own Hukou to the destination declined significantly (see Table 3), while those 
choosing to keep the Hukou at the place of destination increased correspondingly. It is also 
noticeable that some respondents felt difficult to make decision on this issue, and the proportion 
of them also increased when the decision was conditional on giving up the land at the places of 
origin. Since Hukou is widely regarded as the biggest hurdle for rural-urban migrants to settle 
down in their destination cities, the reluctance of our respondents to transfer it from rural places 
of origin to urban places of destination, especially when this is conditional on abandoning their 
land, suggests that apart from settling down in the cities, the decision of our respondents to keep 
circulation or return to hometowns were also out of their own choices, reflecting their migration 
and settlement intentions according to their own will and conditions. In fact, it is understandable 
that the majority of the respondents were reluctant to transfer their Hukou and move completely 
to the cities, since transferring Hukou from the place of origin to the place of destination, 
especially when this is conditional on giving up land at the place of origin, implies a complete 
abandonment (often irreversibly) of the migrant’s bilocal status, which has enabled them to 
benefit from the best of both the rural and the urban worlds (Zhu and Chen forthcoming). 
 
Table 2 The respondents’ choices on Hukou transfer  (%) 
The respondents’ choices on 
Hukou transfer 
Migrants from the 
formal sector 
(N=300) 
Migrants from the 
informal sector 
(N=300) 
All 
migrants 
(N=600) 
Transfer the Hukou of the 
whole family to the 21.00 27.00 24.00 
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destination city 
Transfer only the Hukou of 
the respondent to the 
destination city 
10.00 5.67 7.83 
Keep Hukou at the place of 
origin 49.33 56.00 52.67 
Difficult to make decision 19.67 11.33 15.50 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: the 2009 Fuzhou survey of the authors. 
 
Table 3 The respondents’ choices on Hukou transfer conditional on giving up the land  (%) 
The respondents’ choices on 
Hukou transfer 
Migrants from the 
formal sector 
(N=300) 
Migrants from the 
informal sector 
(N=300) 
All 
migrants 
(N=600) 
Transfer the Hukou of the 
whole family to the 
destination city 
12.67 18.33 15.67 
Transfer only the Hukou of 
the respondent to the 
destination city 
5.00 2.33 3.67 
Keep Hukou at the place of 
origin 59.33 62.34 60.83 
Difficult to make decision 23.00 17.00 19.83 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: the 2009 Fuzhou survey of the authors. 
 
Apart from the above two points regarding the diversified decisions of rural-urban migrants on 
their final migration destinations and Hukou transfer, another important point concerning their 
mobility patterns is their job instability. Among our respondents, most of them had the 
experiences of changing work units and places. In fact, 14.33% and 17.33% of them had the 
experience of changing their jobs for three times and more than four times respectively since 
they started the migration process. Their job instability is also reflected in the status of their 
working contract. As already mentioned, only 35.67% of our respondents had signed contracts 
with their employers, suggesting that the jobs of most respondents were insecure. Futhermore, as 
can be seen from Table 4, among those respondents who did signed a contract, only a very small 
proportion of them had a contract on a long-term basis, suggesting the temporary nature of their 
jobs. As we have argued elsewhere (Zhu 2007), although the fact that most rural-urban migrants 
do not have local Hukou status of their destination cities may contribute to their unstable and 
temporary nature of employment, it is mainly caused by the instability of the labour market per 
se, which cannot be changed easily in the near future. Our in-depth interviews with two factory 
owners and subsequent field observation in Fuzhou further confirmed such argument. In factory 
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A, the number of employees had reached 1600-1700 before the financial crisis; however at the 
height of the financial crisis in February 2009, this number dropped to 1000. When we 
conducted the interview in July 2009, the factory was in the process of recovering from the 
effects of the financial crisis and the number of its employees was increasing again (In-depth 
interview record of the authors No.11, July, 2009). In Factory B, the minimum wage was 1500 
Yuan per month before the financial crisis, but it dropped to only 1000 Yuan per month in early 
2009 (In-depth interview record of the authors No. 4, May, 2009). Such job and income 
instability makes it necessary for rural-urban migrants to move frequently, and this makes it even 
more difficult for them to settle down in the destination cities.  
 
Table 4 Length of the respondents’ working contracts (%) 
Length of the 
working contracts 
Migrants from the 
formal sector 
(N=300) 
Migrants from the 
informal sector 
(N=300) 
All 
migrants 
(N=600) 
Less than 3 months  0.54 0.00 0.47 
3-6months 3.76 0.00 3.27 
6-12 months 27.96 57.14 31.78 
1-3 years 52.15 25.01 48.60 
3-5 years 8.60 7.14 8.40 
More than 5 years 2.15 0.00 1.87 
Casual contracts 4.84 10.71 5.61 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: the 2009 Fuzhou survey of the authors. 
 
 
All the above evidence from the Fuzhou survey and in-depth interviews demonstrate that the 
mobility patterns of rural-urban migrants in China are much more complicated than the one 
conventionally perceived, and that migrants’ multi-local status, their differentiation in the 
direction of their migration flows, and their job instability feature strongly in their migration 
process. It may be noted in the above tables that there are differences in mobility patterns 
between migrants from the formal sector and those from the informal sector, which can not be 
analyzed in detail in this paper due to the limit of space; however, their general patterns are 
similar, and their differences are consistent with the fact that migrants from the informal sector 
are in even more unstable conditions and more inclined to return home in the long run. Clearly, 
the current urban- and residence-based approach of social protection for rural-urban migrants, 
which is based on the conceptualization of rural-urban migration as a one-way flow, is not 
compatible with the above mobility patterns. As we will see from below, such mobility patterns 
of rural-urban migrants have important implications for their social protection. 
 
The needs of rural-urban migrants for social protection reexamined: inadequacies of current 
approaches 
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The above mobility patterns of rural-urban migrants provide a new context in which migrants’ 
needs for social protection can be reexamined. As we will see below, the needs of rural-urban 
migrants for social protection are much more complicated than commonly perceived, and the 
current urban- and residence-based approaches are rather inadequate, in such a context. This is 
mainly reflected in the following aspects. 
 
First, the most serious limitation of current urban- and residence-based approaches of social 
protection is their incompatibility with the highly mobile nature of rural-urban migrants. This is 
particularly evident in migrants’ social insurance status. As we have seen earlier, apart from 
medical insurance, the coverage rates of our respondents in the survey by various social 
insurance programs were rather low. In fact, the surprisingly high coverage rate of our 
respondents by medical insurance cannot be taken at the face value either, because it was very 
much contributed by the fact that 44.67% of those covered by medical insurance participated in 
new rural corporative medical insurance. If they had been excluded, then the proportion of those 
who participated in urban-based medical insurance programs would have accounted for only 
16.00% of the respondents. In general, the current urban- and residence-based approaches can 
only offer social protection in the form of various social insurance programmes to a small 
proportion of rural-urban migrants.  
 
While the above limitation of social insurance programmes for rural-urban migrants can be 
attributed to many factors, including the low income level of migrants, their lack of awareness 
for the necessity of social insurance, and the fact that the premium level of current social 
insurance programmes is too high in relation to migrant income and the benefit level of these 
programmes is too low and insignificant for their later life (Cao and Su 2007), another key factor 
contributing to the limitation is the non-portable nature of these programmes. As pointed out in 
the literature and confirmed by our interviews with migrants, their employers and relevant 
government officials, under current arrangement, migrants cannot take the insurance benefits 
with them when they move from one place to another, making the insurance invalid in their later 
life. Furthermore, when they withdraw from the insurance programmes, they can only take away 
their own contribution to the insurance funds; however the contribution of their employers will 
remain in the funds of the cities they used to work (Gao 2006; Li and Yang 2007). As we will 
demonstrate later, this issue is being actively addressed by governments at various levels in 
China; however, before a satisfactory solution is offered to migrants, it has significant negative 
effects on migrants’ participation in various social insurance programmes. In fact, many migrants 
who had joined the programmes subsequently withdrew from them, and it is widely reported that 
the non-portable nature of the social insurance programmes were very much responsible for such 
situation (Song 2007). In our interview with the manager of the factory A mentioned earlier, she 
told us that she tried to persuade migrant workers in her factory to participate in social insurance 
programmes on the assumption that the portability issue will be resolved in the future, but 
achieved little success because migrant workers were obviously not convinced (In-depth 
interview record of the authors No.11, July, 2009). Clearly, portability is an issue of top priority 
among those to be resolved to meet the needs of rural-urban migrants for social protection. 
 
The second related limitation of current urban- and residence-based approaches of social 
protection is their neglect of migrants’ distinctive needs of social protection, which arises from 
their unsettled nature and is different from those for local urban residents. This is particularly 
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evident in migrants’ needs for housing security. China’s current urban-based housing security 
system is basically composed of the components of affordable housing, low-rent housing, and 
the public reserve fund for housing, which are provided to local urban residents meeting certain 
socioeconomic conditions. As our survey in Fuzhou shows, 91.33% of our respondents had no 
access to any of the above components of the housing security system, suggesting that they were 
in a greatly disadvantaged position in their destination cities. However, this cannot lead to the 
simplistic inference that extending the existing urban housing security system to rural-urban 
migrants is the answer. As we can see from Table 5, according to the answers of our respondents 
to the question ‘what are the most important measures that the governments and /or your 
employers can take to protect the housing security of rural-urban migrants’, providing rental 
subsidy, providing low rent housing, and providing free accommodation by employers ranked 
the first, second and third respectively, followed by providing loans and preferential treatment in 
taxation, providing entitlement to ‘affordable housing’, providing entitlement to the public 
reserve fund for housing, setting up housing standards for migrant dormitories, and providing 
housing for migrant couples by employers. Again there were some differences between migrants 
from the formal sector and those from the informal sector, but the general patterns of their 
selections were similar, although understandably housing benefits available to local urban 
residents were more attractive to those from the formal sector. These results suggest that among 
the three main components of the conventional urban-based housing security system, only low-
rent housing is what rural-urban migrants most need, and more housing security measures 
specifically targeting rural-urban migrants need to be developed. As we have demonstrated 
elsewhere (Lin and Zhu 2008), the housing needs of rural-urban migrants are different from local 
urban residents of their destination cities. To most rural-urban migrants, due to their unsettled 
nature and bilocal status, reducing the costs of housing is the top-priority; and they have little 
incentive in investing in stable, high quality housing in the destination cities, which is the 
priority of local urban residents. Therefore, exploring new approaches suitable for the distinctive 
needs of rural-urban migrants caused by their mobility is an important aspect of improving social 
protection for them. 
 
Table 5 Needs of the respondents for social protection in housing security (%) 
 Measure for protecting housing 
security of rural-urban migrants  
Migrants from 
the formal 
sector (N=300) 
Migrants from 
the informal 
sector (N=300) 
All 
migrants 
(N=600) 
Providing free accommodation by 
employers 37.67 23.67 30.67 
Providing housing for migrant 
couples by employers 14.33 12.33 13.33 
Providing low rent housing 31.00 45.00 38.00 
Providing rental subsidy 61.00 68.33 64.67 
Providing entitlement to 
‘affordable housing’ 26.00 14.00 20.00 
Providing entitlement to the public 
reserve fund for housing 23.67 12.67 18.17 
Providing loans and preferential 
treatment in taxation 25.33 19.67 22.50 
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Setting up housing standards for 
migrant dormitories 10.33 20.67 15.50 
Source: the 2009 Fuzhou survey of the authors. 
Note: more than one answer can be chosen by the respondents. 
 
The third limitation of current urban- and residence-based approaches of social protection is their 
neglect of migrants’ diversified needs caused by their differentiation in their final migration 
destinations. As revealed early, migrants do not always want to settle down in their destination 
cities; consequently, urban- and residence-based approaches of social protection do not suit those 
migrants who choose to remain circulating between the places of origin and destination for 
prolonged period of time, or have the intention of going back to hometowns. This is reflected in 
Table 6 showing our respondents’ selection of the types of social insurance programmes. 
Contrary to the common perception, when asked ‘what are the best type of social insurance 
programmes you would like to choose so that your future life will be secured’, only 33.17% of 
our respondents chose to join the existing urban social insurance programmes; however 24.83% 
and 34.33% of the respondents chose to join the social insurance programmes designed 
according to the characteristics of migrants, and the social insurance programmes designed for 
rural residents at their hometowns respectively. It is noticeable that the proportion of migrants 
from the formal sector choosing to join the existing urban social insurance programmes is higher 
than that of those from the informal sector. This indicates indirectly that increasing job security 
may increase the effectiveness of urban- and residence-based social insurance programmes for 
rural-urban migrants; however, given the fact that job insecurity and high mobility are still 
unavoidable in most migrants’ foreseeable future (Zhu 2007), developing non-urban and 
residence-based social insurance programmes is an important aspect in improving social 
protection for rural-urban migrants in China. 
 
Table 6 The respondents’ selection of the types of social insurance programmes (%) 
Types of social 
insurance programmes 
Migrants from the 
formal sector 
(N=300) 
Migrants from the 
informal sector 
(N=300) 
All migrants 
(N=600) 
Joining the existing 
urban social insurance 
programmes  
42.00 24.33 33.17 
Joining the social 
insurance programmes 
designed according to 
the characteristics of 
migrants 
27.00 22.67 24.83 
Joining the social 
insurance programmes 
designed for rural 
residents at their 
hometowns  
24.00 44.67 34.33 
Going back to 
hometowns if having 
great difficulties at the 
7.00 8.33 7.67 
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places of destination 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: the 2009 Fuzhou survey of the authors. 
 
The necessity of developing non-urban and residence-based social protection programmes is also 
reflected in the flowing tables showing our respondents’ selection of the types of old-age 
insurance programmes and medical insurance programmes. As can be seen in Table 7, when 
asked ‘what is your preferred way of old-age support’, the proportion of those who chose to 
participate in the urban-based old insurance programmes was rather low, although such 
proportion is higher for migrants from the formal sector. In fact, many respondents still 
envisaged to rely on their children or their savings for their life when they get old, and one third 
of them simply did not have any plan for their old-age life. In Table 8, it is noticeable that when 
asked ‘what is the preferred way of medical insurance if the premium is paid partly by your 
employer and partly by yourself’, the proportion of those from the informal sector choosing to 
join the new rural corporative medical insurance programmes was close to 50%. The proportion 
of those from the formal sector choosing to join the new rural corporative medical insurance 
programmes was much lower, however there was still nearly half of them who did not choose to 
join the medical insurance programmes for urban employees. These results demonstrate not only 
the inadequacy of current urban-based social insurance programmes and the necessity of 
developing non-urban and non-residence based social insurance programmes, but also the 
important role of the places of origin in the design of social insurance programmes for rural-
urban migrants. In fact, as 42.22% of our respondents chose their hometowns as the final 
destination of their migration, it is not surprising that a large proportion of rural-urban migrants 
would prefer to join social insurance programmes based in their hometowns. Such needs have 
been often ignored under the conceptual framework treating rural-urban migration as a one-way 
process, however our survey results in Fuzhou and the related previous studies show that they 
should no longer be neglected and be paid more attention. 
 
Table 7 The respondents selection of ways of old-age support (%) 
Types of old-age 
support 
Migrants from the 
formal sector 
(N=300) 
Migrants from the 
informal sector 
(N=300) 
All migrants 
(N=600) 
Participating in the 
urban-based old 
insurance programmes 25.00 8.00 16.50 
Participating in new 
rural old-age insurance 
programmes 10.33 12.67 11.50 
Relying on children 12.00 18.66 15.34 
Relying on savings 20.67 27.00 23.83 
No plan for the time 
being 32.00 33.67 32.83 
Total  100 100 100 
Source: the 2009 Fuzhou survey of the authors. 
 
Table 8  The respondents selection of types of medical insurance (%) 
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Types of medical 
insurance 
Migrants from the 
formal sector 
(N=300) 
Migrants from the 
informal sector 
(N=300) 
All migrants 
(N=600) 
Joining the medical 
insurance programmes 
for urban employees 
54.33 28.33 41.33 
Joining new rural 
corporative medical 
insurance programmes 
26.00 48.33 37.17 
No plan for the time 
being 19.67 23.33 21.50 
Total  100 100 100 
Source: the 2009 Fuzhou survey of the authors. 
 
The necessity of developing hometown-based social protection programmes for rural-urban 
migrants is also reflected in the educational needs of migrant children’s. As our data suggest, 
while 57.36% of our respondents had children migrating with them to the destination city, almost 
equal proportion of migrants (56.82%) had children left behind in their hometowns. It is 
important to note that when asked why they left children at their hometowns, the three most 
important reasons were ‘no capability to afford the too high tuition fees at the destination city’
（40.68%）, ‘no economic capability to afford the too high living costs in the city（36.44%）’, 
and ‘job instability’ （29.66%） 1 . While the first reason can be attributed to the lack of 
resources and migrants’ unequal access to them at the destination cities, the other two reasons are 
mainly related to migrants’ socioeconomic characteristics, which make it necessary for them to 
rely on their resources at their hometowns, and desirable to leave some family members at the 
places of origin. Such need is in turn reflected in the fact that the majority of our respondents 
(57.83%) were not willing to give up their land at their hometowns in exchange of various urban-
based social insurance programmes. Therefore, keeping some part of family members and 
resources at the places of origin is a rational choice of many rural-urban migrants in China, and 
new hometown-based approaches of social protection should be developed to meet such needs. 
 
Seeking new approaches for social protection of rural-urban migrants: some theoretical 
consideration and policy recommendations  
 
In recent years, the disadvantaged situation of rural-urban migrants has attracted great attention 
in China. Governments at various levels, and other circles of society, have made great efforts to 
improve migrants’ working and living conditions and provide social protection to them, and 
significant progress has indeed been made in this regards. However, as we have seen from 
previous sections, these efforts have often been made under the conceptual framework treating 
rural-urban migration as a one-way flow; in accordance with such a conceptual framework, much 
of the  theoretical exploration concerning rural-urban migrants’ social protection has been based 
on the theoretical framework of social integration and exclusion, focusing on the role of the 
Hukou system in hindering the integration of migrants into the destination cities(e.g. Solinger 
1999; Zheng and Huang Li 2007). Correspondingly, policies concerning social protection of 
                                                
1 The respondents could give 3 reasons 
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rural-urban migrants have been mostly developed along the line of extending the entitlements to 
the urban- and residence-based social welfare system and its post-reform variations to rural-
urban migrants. As demonstrated in previous sections, the above conceptual and theoretical 
framework and policy orientation are inadequate bases for developing the best practices of social 
protection for rural-urban migrants. Such inadequacies suggest that more solid theoretical basis 
and better policy making are needed in providing social protection to rural-urban migrants in 
China. 
 
In terms of the more solid theoretical basis for social protection of rural-urban migrants, one 
important implication of our research results is that the theoretical framework of social 
integration and exclusion at its current form can only capture the situation of a limited group of 
rural-urban migrants in terms of their social protection. Under such a theoretical framework, the 
lack of social protection for rural-urban migrants is attributed to the Hukou system and the 
related institutional arrangements, which exclude migrants from the entitlements to urban-based 
social welfare system (Ren and Wu 2006). Thus the experience of China’s rural-urban migrants 
is described by Solinger (1999) as a process of ‘contesting citizenship in urban China’; and as the 
catch word Shiminhua (citizenization) in the recent Chinese literature suggests, migrants should 
be granted the urban citizenship (mostly in the form of local urban Hukou status) in their 
destination areas, so that the urban-based social welfare system and its post-reform variations can 
be extended to them.  
 
However, as we have seen earlier, such a theoretical framework neglects the diversified nature of 
the migration flows of rural-urban migrants, and can only be the theoretical basis for social 
protection of rural-urban migrants who intend and are capable to settle down in the cities. For 
those migrants who need to circulate between rural places of origin and urban places of 
destinations, and those who will eventually return to their home towns, complete relocation to 
the cities is not in their best interests. In fact, contrary to the conventional wisdom, our study 
suggests that portability and non-urban-based programmes feature strongly in the needs of social 
protection of rural-urban migrants. Such needs cannot be met by the integration of rural-urban 
migrants into the destination cities, and therefore a more adequate theoretical framework serving 
as the basis for the exploration of social protection of rural-urban migrants should be developed 
to take into account the effects of the migration process, and the factors at both its urban and 
rural ends, on social protection of rural-urban migrants. Developing such a theoretical framework 
requires much more empirical and theoretical exploration and is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however, a possible starting point is to incorporate issues relating to rural-urban integration into 
the current theoretical framework, so that migrants’ diversified migration flows and the 
corresponding needs in social protection can be covered. Under such a theoretical framework, 
the society bears the responsibility for providing social protection for rural-urban migrants, no 
matter where they are, and efforts need to be made not only to extend the urban-based social 
welfare system to rural-urban migrants, but also to gradually equalize social protection between 
urban and rural areas, and to make the entitlement to social protection no-residence based. In this 
sense, social integration of rural-urban migrants should be viewed as a process in relation to the 
whole society, rather than their destination cities, as commonly perceived so far.  
 
If the above new theoretical framework can serve as a guidance, then the following policy 
suggestions can be made in practical policy making regarding social protection of rural-urban 
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migrants in China. First, providing portable social protection programmes to rural-urban 
migrants without relying on the old residence-based mechanism such as the Hukou system 
should be a priority in making further progress in social protection for rural-urban migrants in 
China. So far, portable old-age social insurance programs for rural-urban migrants have already 
been provided at the provincial level, which is a significant progress; however, given the fact that 
a large number of migrants move between the boundaries at the provincial level, this is not 
enough. Recently, there has been progress in the design of a new and portable social insurance 
programme unified at the national level, and this is a welcome development and should be 
closely followed and assessed (Yang 2008). Besides, so far the portability issue has been paid 
much attention only in the design of old-age social insurance programmes, and there has been 
little discussion about the portability issues of other social insurance such as unemployment 
insurance and medical insurance. As we mentioned earlier, many rural-urban migrants 
participate in new rural cooperative medical insurance based in their hometown, however such 
insurance program only allow migrants to get a very small proportion of medical expenses 
occurred outside their hometown to be reimbursed (In-depth interview record of the authors No. 
5, June, 2009). Much needs to be done so that rural-urban migrants can make use of their 
hometown-based insurance programmes. 
 
Second, a clear legal and institutional framework defining the rights of rural-urban migrants and 
obligations of governments at various levels and other social institutions should be developed at 
the national level to ensure the provision of social protection to rural-urban migrants. As 
demonstrated by our survey results, the highly mobile and unsettled nature of rural-urban 
migrants make it ambiguous whether it is necessary, and whose responsibility it is, to provide 
social protection for rural-urban migrants, when they are way from their places of origin where 
they have their Hukou registration. Since the reform era, especially the new century, significant 
progress has been made to establish institutional and legal framework so that the rights and 
entitlements of rural-urban migrants for social protection can be recognised; however, such bases 
are still not solid and complete. Policies and measures of social protection for rural-urban 
migrants are often given in the form of ‘opinions’ or ‘guidelines’; they are not as enforceable as 
laws, often presented in general terms, and could be easily compromised at local level. This is 
evidenced by our interview with a government official, in which we were told that providing 
housing security to rural-urban migrants is not their routine duty, and is done on an optional 
rather than compulsory basis (In-depth interview record of the authors No. 10, July, 2009). To 
solve these problems, the notion that social protection for rural-urban migrants is a duty of the 
whole society rather than that of certain places where rural-urban migrants are affiliated to 
should be firmly established, and a clear legal and institutional framework should be developed 
accordingly. 
 
Finally, establishing new financing mechanism for the portable and non-residence-based social 
protection programmes is another crucial issue Recently, there have been several cases of failure 
in the efforts of some migrant destination cities trying to grant local household registration and 
the related social welfare to migrants, due to the lack of capability to cover the budget. This is 
not surprising, as the fund allocation mechanisms, which are inherited from the era of planned 
economy and do not take rural-urban migrants into consideration, still play a role, and the 
contributory social protection programmes are not well developed. Thus, it is unrealistic to rely 
on the conventional state financial sources and financing mechanisms to fund social insurance 
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programmes for rural-urban migrants, and new ways of financing are needed (Lan and Ren 
2004). This involves both the financing mechanisms for the coverage of rural-urban migrants by 
universal benefits or services and means-tested benefits, such as those relating to migrant 
children’s education and minimum income protection; and the financing and benefit-payment 
mechanisms of contributory programmes, such as various insurance programmes. As migration 
is a cross-region phenomenon, the central government, and the government at superior levels, 
should gradually bear more responsibility in this regards. This is supported by our interview with 
a government officials in Fuzhou, who told us that although the central government stipulates 
that migrants’ children should have equal access to the public schools of their destination cities, 
recently migrants in Fuzhou were still persuaded to send their children back home if they could 
be taken care of in the home towns, because the classes would be too big if migrants’ children 
were admitted due to the shortage of educational resources. (In-depth interview record of the 
authors No. 9, June, 2009). To solve this problem, more financial allocation from the central or 
superior governments is needed, and a new financing system taking into consideration of 
migrants’ needs should be developed to meet such needs. The new financing mechanisms should 
be designed in connection with the aforementioned re-defining the rights and obligations of the 
various parties involved, and well informed by solid knowledge about rural-urban migrants and 
their needs.   
   51
 
References: 
 
Chan, K.W. and Zhang L. (1999). “The Hukou System and rural-urban migration in China: 
Processes and changes”,The China Quarterly, No. 160, pp. 818-855. 
 
Cao, Z.M. and Su, Y. (2007). “Public policy thinking on the problems of floating population’s 
social security” (in Chinese), Xibei Renkou (Northwest Population Journal), vol. 28, No. 5, pp. 
100-105,110. 
 
Cook, S. (2002). “From rice bowl to safety net: Insecurity and social protection during China’s 
transition”, Development and Policy Review, vol. 20, No. 5, pp. 615-635. 
 
Cook, S. (2008). “The challenge of informality: Perspectives on China’s changing labour 
market”, IDS Bulletin, vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 48-56.  
 
Du, P. , Li,Y.N. , Wang, P., H. and Lin, W. (2008). “The employment and social integration of 
rural-urban migrant workers in the cities” (in Chinese), Renkou Xuekan (Population Journal), No. 
1, pp. 3-9. 
 
Drafting group of the final report on rural-urban migrant workers (2006). “Report on the 
problems related to rural-urban migrants workers in China”. in project team of the research 
office of the State Council (ed.), Research Report on Rural-urban Migrant Workers in China (in 
Chinese), pp.1-61. (Beijing, Zhongguo yanshi chubanshe).  
 
Duan, C.R. and Yang, G. (2008). “The left-behind children of migrants in rural China”(in 
Chinese), Renkou Yanjiu (Population Research), vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 15-25. 
 
Fan, C.C. (2008). China on the Move: Migration, the State, and the Household (London, 
Routledge). 
 
Gao, Shusheng (2006). Social Security Reform: What Course to Follow (in Chinese) (Beijing, 
Renmin University of China Press). 
 
General Office of the State Council (2003). “Circular on effectively accomplishing the work in 
the administration of and service for farmers employed in the cities” (in Chinese), No.1, accessed 
from http://www.51labour.com/lawcenter/lawshow-21170.html on 20 July 2008. 
 
Hong, D.Y. (2003). “A correlation analysis on the minimum living standard security system for 
urban residents” (in Chinese), Beijing Xingzheng Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Beijing 
Administrate College), No. 3, pp. 59-65. 
 
Liang, Z. (2001). “The age of migration in China”, Population and Development Review, No. 27, 
pp. 499-524. 
 
   52
Lan, C.D. and Ren, B.P. (2004). “Some thoughts on the issues of social security for rural-urban 
migrant workers”(in Chinese). Shehui Kexue Yanjiu (Social Science Research), No. 5, pp. 106-
111. 
 
Liu, Huailian (2005). Problems of Rural-urban Migrant Workers in China (Beijing, People's 
Publishing House). 
 
Liang, Z. and Chen Y.P. (2007). “The educational consequences of migration for children in 
China”, Social Science Research, No. 36, pp. 28-47. 
 
Liu, Y.Y. (2007). “Two measures of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security on resolving the 
issue of low payment for rural-urban migrant workers” (in Chinese), accessed from 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-01/26/content_509855.htm on 20 August 2008. 
 
Lin, L.Y. and Zhu, Y. (2008). “Living status of the floating population and its determinants in 
China: A case study of Fujian Province”(in Chinese), Renkou Yanjiu (Population Research), vol. 
32, No.3, pp. 48-56. 
 
Liu, Z. and Zhou, T.Y. (2007) . “Sun Baoshu (Vice-minister of Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security): Government of China helps rural-urban migrant workers recover more than 433 billion 
Yuan in overdue wages” (in Chinese), accessed from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-12/26/content_7318733.htm. on 20 August 2008. 
 
Lai, J.Q. (2007). “Labors of Fuzhou and Xiamen have been covered by the housing security 
system” (in Chinese), accessed from http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/guonei/2007/10-
18/021@082929.htm on 8 July 2008. 
 
Li, X.Y. and Yang, L.B. (2007). “Thoughts about the problems of social security for rural-urban 
migrant workers”(in Chinese), Shichang Yu Renkou Fenxi (Market and Demographic Analysis), 
vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 49-55. 
 
Luo, Q. (2008). “Rural-urban migrant workers of Fujian province can also apply for welfare 
housing” (in Chinese), accessed from http://www.clr.cn/bao/read.asp?ID=133261 on 10 
September 2008. 
 
 
Lin, L.Y. and Zhu,Y. (2009). “A multi-level analysis on the determinants of social insurance 
participation of China’s rural-urban migrants: A case study in Fujian Province” (in Chinese), 
Renkou Yu Jingji (Population and Economics), No.3, pp. 89-95. 
 
National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Finance (2001). “Circular on 
comprehensively reviewing and cleaning up fees collected from outgoing or incoming migrant 
workers” (in Chinese), No. 2220, accessed from http://www.51labour.com/lawcenter/lawshow-
20753.html on 20 July 2008. 
 
   53
National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Agriculture, etc. (2004). “Circular on further reviewing and abolishing the discriminatory 
provisions and irrational fees on famers for their inter-regional employment and employment in 
the cities” (in Chinese), No. 1405, accessed from http://www.51labour.com/lawcenter/lawshow-
35684.html on 20 July 2008. 
 
Peng, Z.W. and Qiao, L.B. (2005). “Dilemma and outlet of migrant workers’ social security: A 
perspective of social policy” (in Chinese), Gansu Shehui Kexue (Gansu Social Science), No. 6, 
pp. 173-177. 
 
Ren, Y. and Wu, M.L. (2006). “Social integration of floating population in urban China : A 
literature review”(in Chinese), Renkou Yanjiu (Population Research), vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 87-94. 
 
Ren, Y. (2007). “Changes in the patterns of the floating population’s settlement and urban 
management”(in Chinese), Renkou Yanjiu (Population Research), vol.31, No. 3, pp. 71-78. 
 
Solinger, D.J. (1999). Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and 
the Logic of the Marke (Berkeley, University of California Press.). 
 
Song, H.Y., Huang, H.P. and Liu, G.M. (2002). “An analysis on the problems of relevant social 
policies for rural-urban migration”(in Chinese), Guanli Shijie (Management World), No 5, pp. 
55-65, 87. 
 
Song, J. and Hou, J.W. (2007). “Management of the floating population in Beijing: Seen from 
the perspective of policies and regulations” (in Chinese), Shichang Yu Renkou Fenxi (Market and 
Demographic Analysis), vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 14-23. 
 
Standing Committee of the People Congress, PRC (2007). “Law of the People's Republic of 
China on employment contracts” (in Chinese), Order of the President of the People's Republic of 
China, No. 65, accessed from http://www.51labour.com/lawcenter/lawshow-48436.html on 20 
August 2008. 
 
Song, M.M. (2007). “A comparative research on the models of old-age insurance for rural-urban 
migrant workers”(in Chinese), Nongcun Jingji (Rural Economy), No. 7,  
pp. 71-73. 
 
The State Council (2006). “A few opinions on resolving the issues of rural-urban migrant 
workers” (in Chinese), No.5, accessed from http://www.51labour.com/lawcenter/lawshow-
44300.html on 20 July 2008. 
 
Wu, W.P. (2002). “Migrant housing in urban China: Choices and constraints”, Urban Affairs 
Review, September, pp. 90-119. 
 
Wang, Guixin (2005). Migration and Development: Evidence from China since the Reform 
andOopening-up (in Chinese) (Beijing, Science Press). 
 
   54
Wang, G.X. and Zhang, D.Z. (2006). “A research on the living conditions and social inclusion of 
rural-urban migrant workers in Shanghai Municipality” (in Chinese), Shichang yu Renkou Fenxi 
(Market and Demographic Analysis), vol. 12, No.5, pp. 1-12. 
 
Xie, Y.T. and Zhu, L.Y. (2004). “Charges too high for rural-urban migrants to afford: Secret 
inquiries into school charging in Hangzhou” (in Chinese), accessed from http://www.ep-
china.net/content/academia/e/20040221003433.htm on 19 September 2008. 
 
Xiang, B. (2007). “How far are the left-behind left behind? A preliminary study in rural China”, 
Population, Space and Place, vol. 13, No. 6, pp. 179-191. 
 
Yang, H.Y. (2008). “A solution for the transfer of old-age insurance has been found and is 
expected to be applied at the end of the year or the next year” (in Chinese), accessed from 
http://bjyouth.ynet.com/view.jsp?oid=43387449 on 30 September 2008. 
 
Zhao, J. (2003). “A survey on the status of migrant children’s family education in Nanjing”(in 
Chinese), Shanghai Jiaoyu Keyan (Education Research in Shanghai),  
No. 8, pp. 38-40. 
 
Zheng, G.C. and Huang Li, R.L. (2007). Rural-urban Migrant Workers in China: Issues and 
Social Protection (Beijing, People's Press). 
 
Zhu, Y., Yang, Y.Y., Wang, G..X., Duan, C.R., Gui, S.X., Li, R.J., and Liu, C.J. (2005). “Rural-
urban migrant workers in China: Spanning rural and urban areas” (in Chinese), Renkou Yanjiu 
(Population Research), vol 29, No. 4, pp. 36-52. 
 
Zhu, Y. (2007). “China’s floating population and their settlement intention in the cities: Beyond 
the Hukou reform”, Habitat International, vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 65-76. 
 
Zhu,Y. and Chen,W.Z. (forthcoming). “The settlement intention of China’s floating population 
in the cities: Recent changes and multi-faceted individual-level determinants”, Population, Space 
and Place. 
   55
State-funded training of Dibao recipients: information and subject wellbeing 
and informal employment in China — a case study of Tianjin 
 
Bingqin Li 
London School of Economics 
 
 
Poverty and unemployment in China 
According to Xue (2005), in China, households trapped in poverty were nearly three times more 
likely to come from families with unemployed members than from families without unemployed 
members. In the 1990s, with the reform of the state owned enterprises, the number of laid-off 
workers increased. These were workers who lost their jobs because the enterprises they worked 
in decided to reduce the number of workers in order to remain competitive in the market. The 
reason that these people were labelled as “laid-offs” rather than unemployed was because they 
still kept some connections with the state owned enterprises, usually with the latter promising to 
offer some welfare support in the future years. However, as greater numbers of state owned 
enterprises became less prosperous, laid-off workers were in essence unemployed and did not 
always receive the promised compensation or welfare benefits (Pan 2007). For quite a few years 
in the 1990s, being laid-off or unemployed had become a main reason that led to urban poverty. 
According to a survey carried out in Wuhan where Dibao was piloted, by the end of 1998, 65 
percent of the people receiving Minimum Income Guarantee (Dibao) were laid-off workers. 
There have been a number of reforms to address the difficult life faced by laid-off workers. The 
first is to reduce the shock of unemployment by encouraging employers to provide 
unemployment packages. State enterprises that wish to lay off workers are supposed to “buy off” 
the rest of the working years of the workers to be laid off (maiduan gongling), i.e. to pay the 
workers a lump sum of money that is equivalent to the basic salaries they could have received if 
they had not lost their jobs. This solution is helpful for the unemployed workers who are out of 
jobs for a while. However, its ability to sustain a worker’s life is very limited. Usually, in a 
worker’s salary package, there are a number of elements: basic salary was only part of the total 
pay. Though the actual amount a worker receives when they are fired may appear to be a quite 
large sum at the time the deal is made, it is only a small proportion of the amount they would 
have received if they continued to work, not to mention the social security contribution they 
would receive. Given the fast growing urban income level, the buy-off money quickly becomes 
less valuable. Therefore, it is at most a short term support for the unemployed.  
The urban Minimum Living Standard Guarantee (Dibao) is another policy to help the 
unemployed who are not able to find jobs and whose household income drops below the local 
poverty line. With the recent reform in the social security system, Dibiao recipients could also 
enjoy a number of favourable treatments regarding schooling, healthcare, housing and irregular 
cash benefits and food subsidies. As a result, some Dibao recipients found it more attractive to 
stay unemployed. The willingness of Dibao recipients to return to work is very low. According 
to a survey carried out in four districts in Beijing, only 20 percent of the Dibao recipients were 
willing to work even if they had the opportunity and ability to work (Civil Affairs Bureau of 
Tongzhou District, Beijing, 2009). Facing this situation, many cities try to introduce various 
incentives for workers to return to work and make it worthwhile to work. Some city governments, 
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such as Chongqing, offer wage related bonuses to the re-employed Dibao recipients to avoid the 
scenario that re-employed workers earning a minimum income end up being worse off than 
being a Dibao recipients. Some other city governments allow Dibao recipients to continue to 
receive Dibao benefits even after they start working.  Also, at the community level, there are 
quite a few measures to introduce jobs to Dibao recipients.  
Apart from the disincentives generated by the Dibao system, there are also other factors that have 
affected the ability and willingness of Dibao recipients to return to work. One of the most 
important factors is that it is not very easy for them to find new jobs, especially for those who are 
approaching retirement age. They are not considered to be competitive in the labour market 
(Solinger 2002).  Therefore, unless receiving some external support, it is very difficult for people 
to find jobs once they are Dibao receivers. 
In general, as the economy is doing well, people who are relatively young and have good 
education would not find it too difficult to get re-employed if they are willing to work. It is 
estimated that around 80 percent of the people younger than 35 and around 80 percent of people 
with college degrees can find new jobs after they became unemployed. However, people in the 
older age groups and have less education find it very difficult to get back to work. In Beijing, by 
the end of 2008, more than 80 percent of the unemployed people explicitly expressed their 
willingness to work formally, but the overall re-employment rate is below 50 percent (Beijing 
Daily, 25/11/2008). Of course, it is important to note that the willingness of re-employment 
mentioned here is jobs that are formal and employers agree to contribute on behalf of the 
employees the social insurances items. Therefore, there is an element of whether the Dibao 
receivers might find it not “worthwhile” to work. 
Considering that people living on Dibao may not be totally left alone as in the past, then why it is 
still relevant to help them to return to work at all? Even if we do not think about the problems 
they may face in a society where social insurance system is still undergone major reforms and 
the benefits they can enjoy today may not be as generous in the future, there are also other 
concerns. The main concern for the people who count on the Dibao system is about the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty and social exclusion to the younger generation (Meng, 
2003; Wang, 2008). What is also important is that Dibao recipients who can work but do not 
work may send a strong negative signal to the rest of the society and damage the work ethics. 
From the government’s perspective, pushing the Dibao recipients back to work is not only 
beneficial to the unemployed to become independent and socially active, but also useful to 
reduce the negative externalities their private decisions would have imposed on the next 
generation.  One of the main policies adopted by the state to help people to return to the labour 
market is training. The idea behind the state funded training programs is, according to Chengping 
Tian (2006), the Minister of Labour and Social Security, to help the urban laid-off workers to 
gain the necessary skills so that they are able to work in different jobs in different sectors of the 
economy. 
State funded training programs  
Reemployment training was introduced in China in the late 1990s. The reform has undergone 
several stages. The first stage was from 1998 to 2000 and then from 2001-2003(Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security PRC, 2002). The target for this stage was to train 30 million laid-off 
workers and offer them entrepreneurial support. The targeted industries included textile, railway, 
military and coal industries. These industries suffered the most during the reform of state 
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enterprises (Ministry of Labour, 1998). As a result, about 20 million people were trained and 
about 16.80 million people were reported to have returned to the labour market (Hong and Zhang 
2009). However, the high post-training re-employment rate can be misleading, as there is little 
information regarding the types of jobs that people got into and to what extent they can keep 
their jobs. In the second stage starting from 2005, the state announced that it would use skills 
training to reduce unemployment (State Council PRC, 2005). As part of this strategy, the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security published ‘The plan to use skills trainings to help 
reemployment in cities and towns’. The target was to offer skills training to 20 million laid-off 
workers and make sure post reemployment rate reaches 60 per cent from 2006 to 2010. At the 
same time, the government wanted to set up a skills verification system in 300 cities so that 
trainees’ skills can be recognized by employers (Ministry of Labour and Social Security PRC, 
2005). 
 
There were different opinions about the performances of the training programs. According to 
Wan and Zhang (2008), based on a population survey carried out in Jilin Province in 2005, 
labour participation rate was improved by the state-run reemployment programs. They argue that 
training has enhanced unemployed people’s competitiveness in the labour market. The results of 
Zhao’s (2003) analyses based on data collected in Wuhan led to a similar conclusion. However, 
the participation rate of reemployment training programs was low. In Wuhan, the participation 
rate was 5 per cent in 2000 and 14 per cent in 2003 (Hou and Zhao, 1997). What is more, user 
surveys suggested that unemployed workers tended to report that training programs were not 
very useful in terms of helping them to find jobs (Qiu 2007). Also, the result could be different 
for different cities. Bidani et al (2004) found that training dampened reemployment prospects in 
Shenyang but improved them in Wuhan.  
 
Training, employability, information dissemination and subjective wellbeing in the context 
of informal employment 
One important characteristics of the Chinese labour market is the lack of respect for informal 
employment. Many people, especially those who used to work in the state sector, would not 
consider informal employment that does not come with formal contracts and social insurance 
contributions as working (Beijing Daily, 25/11/2008). Although the economic reform since the 
1979 helped to establish the status of private sector and more recent reforms required private 
employers to offer equal social protection to the employees, informal employment, such as 
temporary jobs without permanent contract or jobs in the informal sectors, such as street vendors, 
was not recognised as proper sources of employment. This was also reflected in the state 
employment statistics and the setting of policy targets (Qiu, 2006). The reality is, informal 
employment has become an increasing important source of income (Kumar and Li 2007). 
Although more attention was paid to the role of informal employment in helping urban 
unemployed workers to resume earning activities, the assessment of training programs rarely 
paid special attention to its impact on informal employment1. Therefore, there is little incentive 
for the training programs to target skills that are particularly useful for informal employment. 
 
Bearing this in mind, it is not difficult to tell that except for people who are very entrepreneurial, 
getting into a formal job is a priority for most people and those who have ended up in informal 
                                                
1 In the past several years, some cities introduced courses of “starting small businesses” (entrepreneurial skills) to 
their training programs, but it was still in the piloting stage during our survey. 
   58
sector were desperate at the time when they started to look for jobs. Therefore, it becomes 
relevant in the context of poverty reduction to look at to what extent training programs have 
facilitated informal employment. This can potentially help us to gain better understanding of how 
training programs have affected Dibao recipients’ life and wellbeing. In the following sections of 
this chapter, we will first review the relevant literature and history of training in China and then 
discuss the framework to be used for the analyses. In the case study, we use a survey dataset with 
724 officially registered long term unemployed workers in Tianjin in 20061.  
 
Previous studies can offer some insight on the role of skills training. Training is not only about 
providing occupational skills to enhance employability. The mechanisms that training can help 
people to return to work can have several dimensions. The first is information dissemination 
which improves awareness of new employment or business opportunities (Ogbonna and Noon, 
1999). The second is to provide job searching techniques, such as the training of interviewing 
skills, resume writing and networking (Davy et al, 1995). The third is the psychological impact. 
The psychological well-being of the trainees can be improved either through resilience and social 
skills training (Mitchell and Trickett, 1980; Steensma et al, 2006) or through social participation 
via taking training courses (Stolte, 2004).  The last is the possibility of training to increase 
people’s earning ability. However, whether training can improve the trainees’ earning ability is 
not always clear (Finn, Simmonds and Department for Work, 2003). If we take into 
consideration the possibility of the unemployed returning to employment after training, it can be 
practically treated as an augment in the earning ability (Lund, 2002; Maree and Mokhuane, 
2007). 
 
Given the characteristics of informal employment, training can be particularly useful in many 
ways. For example, people who used to work in stable and formal jobs may not be aware that 
informal employment can be an alternative. Training may be able to open doors for them. 
Another example is that informal employment opportunities are often presented to the potential 
workers through informal networks, which may not be actively sought by the unemployed. 
Therefore, bringing the unemployed people out of their home and helping them to build up social 
networks can be a very important first step. In this sense, training can often be useful in 
facilitating this goal. Attending classes and meeting teachers and fellow students regularly can be 
a good way of social participation and may even lead to employment opportunities. Also, 
informal employment often requires a different set of skills such as entrepreneurial spirit, 
management, accounting and administration skills, knowledge and research skills of the markets 
and certain social skills to deal with street level authorities and other business owners. These 
skills may not be a must for employees in the formal sector. 
 
In terms of subjective wellbeing, obviously returning to the job market and engaging in income 
generating activities can give people a sense of achievement. However, before these happen, 
keeping people motivated and maintaining hope and confidence in themselves is equally 
important. Whether good subjective wellbeing can be ultimately translated into employment is 
difficult to tell. However, not losing hope is certainly a prerequisite for job searching. If this is 
                                                
1 Some of the findings in this paper will draw on some of our previous publications (Li and Peng, 2008) and (Li and 
Peng, 2010, forthcoming). Most of the sampling procedures and background discussion of this paper are taken 
directly from the earlier texts with minor additions to give full information about the background this research. 
However, the analyses are adapted for the specific discussions in this paper. 
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the case, then training programs can play a much bigger role in helping people to return to work 
than just offering job skills. 
 
The research of Tianjin 
In this chapter, I will study Dibao recipients only. These people have registered with the state for 
being unemployed for more than six months. To avoid confusion, we exclude the small number 
of people who have successfully returned to formal employment and had not yet bothered to take 
their names off the unemployment registration. There are several considerations for selecting this 
group for our study. First, not all unemployed people are registered in China. The reasons behind 
the people who are not registered can range from completely giving up, lack of information, to 
inclination to rely on self-help. However, the people who actually registered for unemployment 
share a common feature. They are willing to find jobs and obtain official support at the 
beginning of unemployment.  Second, since they are registered with the local authorities, their 
entitlement to state funded training is confirmed. Third, the relatively longer period of 
unemployment means that it is difficult for these people to find formal jobs in the labour market. 
Because they remain to be unemployed, the ‘success’ of the state reemployment programs to 
help people getting back to formal employment is not applicable for this particular group. Finally, 
the local authorities find it difficult to help this group of people to return to employment (Tian, 
2006). Therefore, examining the barriers for these people to return to work and the roles existing 
policies become very important.  
 
Tianjin is one of the four municipalities directly under the control of the central government. The 
total registered population is 11 million. The city is a main industrial and business centre and 
acted as the largest seaport in North China during the era of centrally planned economy. During 
the economic reform, it suffered from massive unemployment. Some unemployed people found 
it difficult to return to the labour market and became long-term unemployed. As the local 
economy became better, the local authorities targeted reemployment and the number of 
registered long-term unemployed people reduced over time, but it became increasingly difficult 
to further reduce that number (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 Unemployment rate and number of long-term unemployed in urban Tianjin 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Urban unemployment rate (%) 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 
No. of long-term unemployed (thousands) 102.6 109.1 48.1 52.0 --- --- 
Source: Tianjin Statistical Yearbook (various years). 
 
Sampling  
 
The survey was carried out between May and June 2006. The interviewees came from six inner 
city areas: Heping, Nankai, Hedong, Hexi, Hebei and Hongqiao districts. There are several 
neighbourhoods in each district. We selected two neighbourhoods each that had the largest 
numbers of registered unemployed people in the six districts. The committees of each 
neighbourhood held a registration list of the unemployed. We used these lists to carry out 
sampling. We selected 83 to 85 people who had been unemployed for more than six months from 
the twelve neighbourhoods. In total, 1,000 people (500 women and 500 men) were selected, and 
831 valid interviewees were obtained.  For the purpose of this particular paper, we do not include 
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the following respondents: 1) people who were working formally but did not report to the local 
authorities; 2) people who participated in private training. Therefore, the total number of 
respondents used for the analyses is 724. 
 
The survey took place at the interviewees’ homes. They were presented with a questionnaire to 
fill out in the interviewer’s presence. The interviewer would give clarifying answers to the 
interviewees’ inquiries. The questionnaire had seven parts: personal and family details, before 
unemployment, during unemployment and job searching, current living and earnings, social 
security coverage, social support and assistance received for reemployment. 
 
Background of the respondents 
 
As shown in Table 2, the interviewees were on average 43.5 years’ old. The youngest was 23 and 
the oldest 60. There were 363 men and 361 women. Most of the respondents were married or had 
partners. Only 7.7 per cent did not have a partner. They were single, divorced or widowed. Most 
respondents had high school education or less. About one third completed secondary school or 
less. 55.5 per cent graduated from high school. About one in eight had higher education. 71 per 
cent of the respondents did not have officially recognized skills. 81.2 per cent considered 
themselves to be healthy. Among 18 per cent who had health problems, 36 people suffered from 
disabilities 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
 Count Mean S. D.     
Age 724 43.6 6.8 Age by group    
 Count %  Age≤40 206 28.5 28.5 
Age>50    40<Age≤44 184 25.4 53.9 
No 588 81.2  44<Age≤48 152 21.0 74.9 
Yes 136 18.8  Age>48 182 25.1 100.0 
Sex    Marriage status    
Male 363 50.1  married or cohabit 668 92.3 92.3 
Female 361 49.9  Single, divorced or widowed 56 7.7 100.0 
Educational 
level    Skills level    
Secondary 
school+ 230 31.8 31.8 Medium+ 114 15.8 15.8 
High 
/vocational 
school 
402 55.5 87.3 Primary   97 13.4 28.2 
Higher 
education   92 12.7 100.0 No skill 513 70.9 100.0 
Health    Disability    
No health 
problems 587 81.2 81.2  No disability 688 95.0 95.0 
In poor health 136 18.8 100.0 Has disability   36 5.0 100.0 
Parents living 
together    Children in education    
Yes 190 26.2 26.2 No 258 35.6 35.6 
No 534 73.8 100.0 Yes 466 64.4 100.0 
Have working    Have unemployed children    
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children 
No 634 87.6 87.6 No 652 90.1 90.1 
Yes   90 12.4 100.0 Yes   72 9.9 100.0 
Partner in 
employment    Owe money to others    
No 472 65.2 65.2 No 476 65.8 65.8 
Yes 252 34.8 100.0 Yes 248 34.3 100.0 
Sector     Previous salary ≥1000 Yuan    
Public sector 419 57.9 100.0 No 463 64.0 64.0 
Other sectors 305 42.1 42.1 Yes 261 36.1 100.0 
Large 
company 
(>1000 
employees) 
   Quit or fired    
No 589 81.4 81.4 Fired 680 93.9 93.9 
Yes 135 18.7 100.0 Quit   44 6.1 100.0 
Unemployme
nt 
compensation 
   Family member’s income (Yuan/month)    
No 221 30.5  X =0 184 25.4 25.4 
Yes 503 69.5  0<X≤500 192 26.5 51.9 
Contract type    500<X≤1000 280 38.7 90.6 
Formal 
(permanent) 502 69.3  X>1000   68 9.4 100.0 
Termed 
contract/ 
temporary 
222 30.7      
 Count Mean S. D.  Count Mean S.D. 
Respondent’s 
current 
income 
724 241.0 528.6 Family members’ current income 724 583.0 596.8 
 Years worked 
for pervious 
employer 
722 19.0 8.5 Income before unemployed 722 601.9 850.5 
Length of 
unemploymen
t (months) 
724 14.7 9.4     
Source: 2006 survey 
 
About 26.2 per cent interviewees lived together with their elderly parents. About 35.6 per cent 
households had one or more children in education. About 12.4 per cent had working children and 
9.9 per cent whose children were also unemployed at the time of the interviews. About 25.1 per 
cent of the respondents’ partners were also unemployed in employment. The average income of 
the respondents per month is less than 250 Yuan per month. Their family members’ average 
income was more than 580 Yuan per month. The income of other family members is divided into 
four groups (zero, under 500 Yuan, between 500 to 1,000 Yuan and over 1,000 Yuan), the 
distribution is shown in Table 2.  
 
Before the respondents lost their job, the mean income was 602 Yuan per month. The 
interviewees came from all different sectors of the economy. However, a large proportion for the 
public sector (57.9 per cent) before they lost their jobs. 69.3 per cent worked as permanent 
employees before they lost their jobs.  
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The respondents had on average left their previous job 14.7 months ago. About 65 per cent of the 
respondents had participated in state run reemployment training programs. As expected, most 
respondents tried to look for jobs in the past year. As time moves on, fewer people continued to 
search. This could be because that they found a job, started their own business, or simply gave up. 
About 20 per cent of the respondents relied on the state or their previous work units to find new 
jobs. The rest would not follow these organized channels.  
 
The unemployment training system in Tianjin 
 
In the city of Tianjin, a series of training policies have been adopted to respond to the national 
training guideline. According to the ‘Regulations on Offering Subsidies to Free Reemployment 
Training Programs in Tianjin’ (Tianjin Training Centre, 2006), training schools/institutes would 
receive subsidies from the government. Prospective trainees should be laid-off workers from the 
state sector and the urban unemployed. Trainees should have registered with the local authorities 
and not yet received licences for self-employment. Each person is entitled to one free training 
course.  
 
Training programs have several categorises. There are financial incentives attached to each 
program to make sure that the training programs can achieve reemployment results. The first 
category of training is targeted training, in which the trainees or training schools and future 
employers sign up agreements. Once a trainee completes the training and has passed exams, the 
employer will hire them. Training can be offered either by the employers directly to the trainees 
or by a training school. The total number of hours of each training program is longer than 80 
hours. The student who wants to pass the exams should attend no less than 80 per cent of the 
total number of classes. If after a training program ends, the reemployment rate is higher than 60 
per cent, the government will pay 300 Yuan per trainee to the school.  
 
The second category is general training, in which neither the training school nor the trainees have 
the employers’ guarantee before the program starts. The courses have to be on the state 
designated set of skills. If a training program is longer than 100 hours, the attendance rate is 
higher than 80 per cent, and more than 50 per cent of the trainees pass the exams, the school can 
receive a subsidy of 300 Yuan for each trainee. If within half a year, more than 50 per cent of the 
trainees become employed, the government will give 200 Yuan to the training institute for each 
person who finds a job.  
 
The third category of training, which is relatively new, is the entrepreneurship training. The 
program is designed to help people who want to become self-employed. The training program 
should be more than 100 hours and if the attendance rate is higher than 90 per cent, at the end of 
the program, the training institute can receive 300 Yuan per trainee. At least within one month 
after the program is completed, the training school is required to continue providing consultative 
services to the trainees. If more than 60 per cent of the trainees start their own businesses and 
registered as being self-employed with the necessary licences, the government will give 700 
Yuan for each successfully self-employed trainee. 
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Several characteristics can be observed regarding the various dimensions of training policies. 
First, the focus of training programs is on vocational skills. The financial rewards attached to the 
reemployment outcomes generate incentives for schools to offer training programs that are more 
suitable to the demand in the job market. However, what would be counted as being re-employed 
is a gray area. Whether a short-term temporary job is a case of successful reemployment is not 
spelt out in the national policies. In practice, it is very difficult for the state to trace the 
employment status of a former student once he/she graduates from the school. Therefore, though 
there is no specific policy trying to use training programs to boost informal employment, the 
built-in financial incentive mechanism almost certainly generates better incentives for the 
schools to push students into any jobs that are available in the market. Second, there is a shortage 
of training program aiming at providing basic information and guidelines to help the unemployed 
be better prepared for the life after unemployment and understand the scenario for reemployment. 
Third, though participation of training programs can generate a sense of social participation, 
there is no training program that tries to address the psychological needs of the unemployed. 
Lastly, there is no specific target about the earning ability of the trainees. Therefore, it is difficult 
to tell by looking at the policies only. 
 
Take up of reemployment training 
 
The unemployed people in Tianjin are entitled to a 15-day free training course if they are able to 
prove eligibility. They can select from a wide range of courses, which have to be in the skills 
training list published by the state (Table 3). Twenty-six types of training courses are reported by 
the interviewees. The most popular courses are computer, flower arrangement, domestic helping 
and cooking. It is important to note that though the local state did not deliberately arranging 
courses for the informal sector, a number of training courses such as flower arrangement and 
domestic helping, cook, knitting are also suitable for self-employment and informal employment 
in the labour market. 
 
 
Table 3 Courses offered by the state-funded training  
Course Count % Course Count % 
Computer 219 30.3 Storage Management 1 0.1 
Flower Arrangement 97 13.4 Sales 1 0.1 
Domestic Helping 39 5.4 Mobile Phone Repair 1 0.1 
Cook 32 4.4 
Machinery 
Maintenance 1 0.1 
Electrician 13 1.8 Knitting 1 0.1 
Electronic Appliance 
Repair 11 1.5 Interior Decoration 1 0.1 
Nutritionist 10 1.4 Hairdressing 1 0.1 
Welding 4 0.6 Estate Management 1 0.1 
Car Maintenance 4 0.6 Entrepreneurship 1 0.1 
Massage 3 0.4 Driving 1 0.1 
Beauty Treatment 3 0.4 Computer Maintenance 1 0.1 
Security Guard 2 0.3 Chinese Medicine 1 0.1 
Waiter 1 0.1 NA 274 37.9 
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Total 724 100.0    
Source: Tianjin survey 2006 
 
As shown in Table 4, 64.5 per cent of the respondents participated in the state funded 
reemployment programs. Women have a higher rate of participation rate than men. People with 
higher educational levels are more likely to participate in the reemployment programs. 
 
 
Table 4 State reemployment training participation 
 Total Sex Education 
 No. % Female % Male % High school+ % Secondary school- % 
No 257 35.5 109 30.0 148 41.0 166 33.6 91 39.6 
Yes 467 64.5 254 70.0 213 59.0 328 66.4 139 60.4 
Total 724 100.0 363 100.0 361 100.0 694 100.0 230 100.0 
Note: “Higher school+” includes high school. “Secondary school-“includes secondary school. 
Source: Tianjin survey 2006. 
 
Factors that are related to the take up of state funded training 
 
We used a logistic regression model to examine the take up of state-funded training and its 
relation to other factors. The regression results are reported in Table 5.  
 
Among the social demographic variables, age played a very important role. People who are over 
50 are almost twice more likely to take the state run training course than the younger people1. 
Women were much more likely to participate in training than men.  
 
Human capitals have worked differently. Our findings do not support the results suggested in the 
data from other research based on developed countries (Galasso, Ravallion and Salvia 2004; 
Tatmolem and Warwicensis 2000, McKenzie and Long, 1995) which suggest that people with 
higher prior education attainment are more likely to participate in training. This is probably 
because there was no official requirement on the education background of the prospective 
trainees. In Tianjin, however, people with primary skills levels are much more likely to take up 
training than people with no officially recognized skills. This is probably because the people 
with some skills are more aware of the importance of suitable skills in the labour market. 
However, people with higher skills are less likely to participate. This might have to do with the 
fact that they may find the training courses too easy. As expected, disability also affects training 
participation. However, because of the small sample size, the result is not statistically significant.  
 
The history of employment can be relevant. People who quitted from the previous jobs are more 
likely to take up training, though it is not significant statistically. A possible explanation for the 
active participation of people having quitted their jobs in the past is probably because that 
instead of waiting to be fired, they tend to take a more proactive approach to their life than others.  
 
                                                
1 In Li and Peng (2010), we used the quartile division of age group which shows similar results but were not 
significant statistically.  
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Intuitively, when a person becomes unemployed for a longer period, he/she may be more 
desperate and are more willing to try different means to help them to find jobs. The result in our 
dataset shows a marginal relationship between the two but indeed positive. 
 
 
Table 5 Binary logistic regression for training with state funded programs (dependent 
variable = 1. trained; 0. Not Trained) 
 
Training Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Age (1.age>50; 0. age<=50) 1.94 0.49 2.64 0.01 1.19 3.18 
Sex (1. M; 0. F.) 0.54 0.10 -3.43 0.00 0.38 0.77 
School age child (1.yes; 0.no) 1.26 0.23 1.3 0.20 0.89 1.79 
Disability (1. yes; 0. no) 0.45 0.16 -2.24 0.03 0.22 0.90 
Education (high school)a 1.05 0.20 0.24 0.81 0.72 1.54 
Education (higher)a 0.99 0.27 -0.06 0.96 0.58 1.67 
Skill level (primary)b 2.05 0.56 2.64 0.01 1.20 3.51 
Skill level (medium)b 0.88 0.29 -0.39 0.70 0.46 1.67 
Quit/fired (1. Quit; 0. fired) 1.05 0.02 3.02 0.00 1.02 1.08 
No. of months unemployed 1.94 0.78 1.65 0.10 0.88 4.28 
Note:        
Number of obs.=724 LR chi2(10)=49.19       
Prob. > chi2=0.00 Pseudo R2=0.052       
Log likelihood = -446.34594       
 Source: 2006 survey 
 
Informal employment and training 
 
We ask the interviewees who actually participate in the training courses whether they think the 
courses have been useful to them. We deliberately phrase the question somewhat vaguely so that 
the idea of usefulness would not be limited to job matching only. About half interviewees report 
that the free courses are indeed somewhat useful to them. Seventeen percent are indifferent. 
Another thirty percent are negative. If we further examine the response by the original skills 
level of the interviewees, as shown in Table 6, people at all different skills levels might find the 
courses useful for them. Larger proportions of people with medium or lower skill report that the 
courses are useful to them. However, instead of remaining indifferent, larger proportions of 
people with medium or lower skill also report that the courses are not useful to them at all.  
 
 
Table 6 Reported usefulness of training by skill levels 
 High %  Medium % Primary % No % Total % 
Useful 7 43.8 37 54.4 44 60.3 159 52.1 247 53.5 
Indifferent 6 37.5 12 17.6 14 19.2 45 14.8 77 16.7 
Not useful 3 18.8 19 27.9 15 20.5 101 33.1 138 29.9 
Total 16 100.0 68 100.0 73 100.0 305 100.0 462 100.0 
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Source: 2006 survey 
 
Intuitively, people with high skill levels are overqualified for the basic skills trainings. The 
research does not find strong evidence that they are much less happy about the courses on offer 
than other trainees. On the contrary, people without any skills have the largest proportion of 
unsatisfied trainees. If we look at the reported usefulness by working status, people who are 
working informally report a greater satisfaction rate with the courses (Table 7). It means that 
they have really benefited from the courses. However, it is still difficult to tell whether the 
courses are useful to them because of the content of the training or because of the social network 
that turns out to be useful. 
 
 
Table 7 Reported usefulness of training by working status (working informally and not 
working) 
 Not working % Working informally % Total % 
Useful 96 47.5 151 58.1 247 53.5 
No preference 40 19.8 37 14.2 77 16.7 
Not very useful 66 32.7 72 27.7 138 29.9 
Total 202 100.0 260 100.0 462 100.0 
Source: 2006 survey 
 
Regarding the reasons for non-participation, 240 people respond to this question. The results are 
shown in Table 8. A large proportion of the respondents are not aware that the training courses 
are free and say that they cannot afford the training. About twenty per cent of the respondents are 
not sure what they can study. Another group clearly show a sign of lacking in confidence in their 
learning ability, either using age, intelligence or bad mood as excuses for not studying. There is 
also an element of distrust in the intention of the training schools.  
 
 
Table 8 Why did you decide not to take training courses? 
 Count Percent 
I want to study, but I have no money. 74 30.8 
I do not know what to study. 48 20.0 
Even if I had studied, I would still not be 
able to find a job. 43 17.9 
I am too old. I do not want to learn new 
things again. 25 10.4 
I am too slow. I cannot understand 
anything they teach. 22 9.2 
I have no time to study. 16 6.7 
The schools only want to make money. I 
do not think I will be able to learn 
anything. 7 2.9 
I am suffering from health problem and 
cannot study. 2 0.8 
The schools are at inconvenient location. 2 0.8 
I am depressed and do not want to study. 1 0.4 
Total 240 100.0 
Source: 2006 survey 
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Putting these results together, we can see that the information about the courses and the 
potentials of the unemployed people are not always well communicated to the Dibao recipients. 
What is more, it is not enough just to offer skills training. It is equally important to attract people 
with low confidence or little understanding of the prospect of their future to step into the 
classroom before they can really benefit from the skills on offer.  
 
The employability outcomes of training  
 
User evaluation of the training programs are important, however it is also important to examine 
whether trainees are more likely to be able to find jobs in the informal market than the non-
trainees. We use a binary logistic regression to examine the relationship between participation in 
informal employment and five sets of variables. They are demographic variables, household 
characteristics, characteristics of the previous jobs, benefit received, and job searching variables.  
The selection of variables are based on the hypothesis that decision to work informally can be a 
result of financial desperation, willingness to work and the attitudinal acceptance of informal 
employment as an alternative to formal employment.  
 
As shown in Table 9, what are relevant to whether a person is working informally or not are 
related to age group, gender, health condition, children and past and expected income levels.  
The directions of the correlations are as expected. Training is positively related to informal 
employment participation, though in this model it is not statistically significant after other 
variables are controlled. 
 
Table 9 Binary logistic regression for informal employment (dependent variable = 1 for 
information employment) 
 Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z 
Social demographic     
Age>=50 (1. yes; 0. no) 0.52 0.17 -2.01 0.05 
Sex (1. male; 0. female) 0.27 0.64 4.74 0.00 
Education (high school)a 1.86 0.38 2.08 0.04 
Education (higher)a 1.03 0.23 -1.07 0.28 
Skill level (primary)b 0.37 0.45 1.67 0.10 
Skill level (medium)b 0.92 0.25 -0.88 0.38 
Poor health (1. poor health; 0. not poor health) 0.38 0.17 -1.84 0.07 
Disability (1. with disability; 2 without disability) 0.34 0.26 -1.35 0.18 
Household characteristics        
Have school age children (1. yes; 0. no) 3.87 1.42 3.67 0.00 
Have working children (1. yes; 0. no) 1.88 1.98 3.14 0.00 
Have unemployed children (1. yes; 0. no) 1.73 1.72 2.91 0.00 
Partner in employment (1. yes; 0. no) 1.54 0.38 3.19 0.00 
Income of family members (500<x<=1000)c 1.28 0.23 0.30 0.76 
Income of family members (x>1000) c 0.70 0.28 -0.74 0.46 
Owe money to others (1. yes; 0. no) 0.36 0.16 -0.92 0.36 
Previous employment        
Working in public sector in the past (1. yes; 0. no) 1.17 0.23 0.81 0.42 
Formal employee (1. yes; 0. no) 0.80 0.26 0.62 0.54 
Earned more than 1000yuan (1. yes; 0. no) 0.74 0.11 -2.99 0.00 
No. of years in previous job 0.35 0.01 -1.31 0.19 
Worked for a large company (>=1000 people) (1. yes; 0.96 0.19 -1.20 0.23 
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0. no) 
Unemployment        
Unemployment compensation (1. yes; 0. no) 0.98 0.01 -1.27 0.20 
Reemployment        
Training (1. Yes; 0. No) 1.11 0.22 0.51 0.61 
Using organised job searching (1. Yes; 0. No) 0.75 0.38 2.18 0.03 
Expectation        
Expected income (500<x<=1000)d 1.49 0.32 1.85 0.06 
Expected income (x>1000)d 0.98 0.42 1.40 0.16 
Note: 
1. Number of obs = 721; LR chi2(25)  = 99.42;  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -
361.93096; Pseudo R2 = 0.1208     
2.  a. Education (Secondary) is the reference category. 
b. Skill level (No officially recognized skill) is the reference category. 
c. “Income of family members =0” is the reference category. 
d. “Expected income=0” is the reference category. 
Source: 2006 survey 
 
 
Gaining in earning ability after training 
 
So far we have grouped the respondents by training participation and informal employment. Not 
all the informally employed have participated in training. In this part of the analyses, we only 
examine people who were informally employed. A series of independent variables are used in a 
regression model of log income. Training is included as a repressor to see whether it can help to 
boost the earnings of the informally employed. 
 
Apart from demographic variables, we mainly include human capital and social capital variables 
in the analyses. The hypothesis is that higher education and skills level and social network may 
contribute to the earning ability of the informally employed. Given that the state funded training 
is set out to enhance employability and earning ability, we want to see whether it is the case in 
reality. 
 
The income model cannot demonstrate that there is a significant correlation between state-funded 
training and informal income. What really mattered are age, sex, health and social networking. 
Interviewees older than 48 earn less than the younger interviewees do. Men on average earn 
more than women. This confirms the claims made by researchers on women’s unequal position 
in the labour market. Li and Peng (2009) have carried out more detailed analyses of the gender 
differences using the same dataset. People who perceive that they are in poorer health conditions 
also earn less than people who are less pessimistic about their health conditions. It is important to 
note that this is different from the usual claims that poor health is one of the most serious causes 
of poverty in China(Liu, Hsiao and Eggleston 1999). What is striking is the impact of socializing. 
People who are socially withdrawn since they become unemployed are earning less in the 
informal jobs.  
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Table 10 Multiple variable regression (dependent variable is log income) 
 Co-efficient Std. Err. t significance 
Age40-44a -0.061 0.081 -0.760 0.448 
Age44-48a -0.129 0.086 -1.500 0.134 
Age>48a -0.227 0.094 -2.410 0.016 
Sex (1. Male; 0. Female) 0.300 0.065 4.630 0.000 
Training (1. Yes; 0. No) 0.097 0.063 1.550 0.123 
Education (high school)b 0.118 0.073 1.610 0.108 
Education (higher)b 0.135 0.109 1.240 0.216 
Skill level (primary)c -0.094 0.082 -1.140 0.255 
Skill level (medium)c 0.128 0.089 1.430 0.154 
Poor health (1. Yes; 0. No)  -0.197 0.094 -2.110 0.036 
Socialising  
(1. Not less than before; 0. Less than before) 0.270 0.062 4.310 0.000 
Constant 5.901 0.103 57.480 0.000 
R-square: 0.186; Adjusted R-square: 0.153 
Note: 
a. Age<=40 is the reference category. 
b. Education (Secondary) is the reference category. 
c. Skill level (No officially recognised skill) is the reference category. 
Source: 2006 survey 
 
Psychological wellbeing of the Dibao recipients 
 
In this section, we try to look at the role of training in improving the psychological wellbeing of 
the underemployed. The psychological wellbeing is observed in three ways: reported life 
satisfaction; and job searching efforts. The reason that we include job searching efforts as an 
indicator for subjective wellbeing is that we consider lack of search effort can be a result of 
mental health issues or poor life satisfaction. This has been discussed in Vansteenkiste et al 
(2005) and Vansteenkiste et al (2004).  
 
Table 11 shows the factors that may affect life satisfaction. We included the variables that show 
training participation, reported health conditions (poor health and good health), anticipation of 
future employment (not working, possible, and definitely working), family relationship (worse 
since job loss, not worse since job loss), socialising (socialising more, socialising less). We also 
control the reported mood at the time of the interview to screen out the possible impact of 
moment of unhappiness on the interviewees perception of their life satisfaction. The results of 
the regression model show that people who have participated in trainings are much more 
satisfied with their life than people who have not participated. People who feel that they are in 
good health are significantly more likely to be satisfied with their life. Steady or better family 
relationship helps to maintain higher level of life satisfaction. Also, people who are certain that 
they will be able to find a job and work in the future are more likely to be satisfied with their life 
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than people who have totally lost hope. Finally, people who socialise more since they lost their 
jobs are more likely to be satisfied about their life than otherwise. 
 
 
Table 11 Multivariable regression for life satisfaction (dependent variable: life satisfaction 
1-10) 
 
 
Co-
efficient Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
Training (1. 
trained; 0. Not 
Trained) 0.296 0.155 1.910 0.057 -0.009 0.600 
Mood (1-10) 0.546 0.026 21.020 0.000 0.495 0.597 
Poor health 
(good health 
omitted) -0.336 0.196 -1.710 0.088 -0.721 0.050 
Future 
working 
(possible) 0.278 0.246 1.130 0.260 -0.206 0.761 
Future 
working 
(definitely 
working) 0.549 0.228 2.410 0.016 0.102 0.995 
Worse family 
relationship 
since job loss -0.639 0.155 -4.130 0.000 -0.944 -0.335 
Socialising 
(more since 
job loss) 0.470 0.085 5.530 0.000 0.303 0.637 
Constant 1.065 0.327 3.260 0.001 0.424 1.707 
Note:  
Source SS df MS Number of obs. = 723.00 
    F(  7,   715) = 98.63 
Model 2699.8 7.00 385.68 Prob > F = 0.00 
Residual 2795.8 715.00 3.91 R-squared = 0.49 
    Adj R-squared = 0.49 
Total 5495.6 722 7.61 Root MSE = 1.98 
Source: 2006 survey 
 
We only look at the job searching efforts of those who are not working at the time of the 
interview.  Some interviewees have participated in training and some have not. We ask whether 
they have looked for a job in the past two weeks, one month, three months and one year. The 
cross-tabulation suggests that in all the different periods listed, people who have participated in 
training are significantly more active in job searching than the rest (Table 12).  
 
Table 12 Job searching by training participation 
Training Participation 
In 1 Yeara In 3 Monthsb In 1 Monthc In 2 Weeksd Job  
Search No Yes Total No Yes Total No Yes Total No Yes Total 
No  69 83 152 99 134 233 107 157 264 113 175 288 
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% 44.8 30.4 35.6 64.3 49.1 54.6 69.5 57.5 61.8 73.4 64.1 67.5 
Yes         85 190 275 55 139 194 47 116 163 41 98 139 
% 55.2 69.6 64.4 35.7 50.9 45.4 30.5 42.5 38.2 26.6 35.9 32.6 
154 273 427 154 273 427 154 273 427 154 273 427 Total 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: 
a. Pearson chi2(1) =   8.9083   Pr = 0.003 
b. Pearson chi2(1) =   9.1775   Pr = 0.002  
c. Pearson chi2(1) =   5.9787   Pr = 0.014  
d. Pearson chi2(1) =   3.8569   Pr = 0.050 
Source: 2006 survey 
 
Conclusion and policy suggestions 
 
This research provides important evidence regarding the role of state-funded training on the 
circumstances and behaviour of the Dibao recipients. We argue that the role of training in 
reemployment should be examined in several dimensions: information dissemination and 
guidance to reemployment, outcome of reemployment, earning ability and the subjective well-
being of the unemployed. This is particularly relevant for the study of informal employment. 
 
Winkelmann (2009) used data of Germany showing that social capital is an important predictor 
of well-being levels of the unemployed, but there is no evidence that it moderates the effect of 
unemployment on well-being. In this paper, we try to examine the relationship between training, 
wellbeing and informal employment.  
 
Our analyses do not support that the employability and earning ability of the trainees have been 
significantly enhanced by the training programs. It is important to highlight that this result is 
about informal employment. However, it is not a surprising result. These training courses are not 
designed to help people to get into informal employment anyway. Also we do not have data to 
show the proportion of people that have been able to get into formal employment. However, 
informal employment has indeed opened up new channels of self help and coping. Therefore, 
there is certainly room for further policy changes to provide the necessary skills for people to 
become self-employed. The piloting courses on how to start small businesses may be able to 
serve this purpose. 
 
People who have participated in training are more likely to work informally and have reported 
better results in terms of psychological wellbeing. However, we need to be more cautious about 
the interpretation of the results. It is difficult to tell in which direction the causal relationship 
goes. Is it because people who are happier in nature are more likely to participate in the training 
programs or is it because training programs facilitate better social participation that make the life 
after unemployment less miserable? Certainly more research is needed in this respect.  
 
This research offers several insights on the future reform of the training system in China. First, 
the focus on vocational skills training might be more useful for people who have a clear view 
about the sector they want to enter in the future. However, a lot of Dibao recipients (57.9 per 
cent) used to work for the state sector are used to stable employment and are not always 
comfortable with the fact that they need to take a more proactive approach in job hunting. As a 
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result, they do not know where to start and what might be most suitable for themselves 
personally. As shown in our dataset, some Dibao recipients have a strong sense of failure and do 
not think that they are able to find a job again and they are not confident in their ability to take 
up a new skill. Without being able to attract these people out of their home, there is little hope to 
improve the employability of these people. Therefore, supplementary training programs or 
tutoring services to guide the potential trainees about the prospect in their life, advice on what 
kinds of training may be suitable for what purposes and what they may expect to get out of the 
trainings can be valuable. This needs to be done when they first get registered as being 
unemployed. Second, the horizon of training courses can be broadened. As shown in our 
research, even if the training courses are not always useful. Participation in training courses is 
associated with greater life satisfaction. Some methods to help them improve the subjective 
wellbeing such as training courses or counselling services to encourage them to gain confidence 
and social capital can be useful.  
 
The newly offered training program to help people to start their own businesses is an important 
step to recognize the importance of self employment as an alternative to formal employment. 
This may be the first step. Informal employment is in various forms. Unregistered self-
employment, such as street businesses is only one of them. There may also be jobs that are 
temporarily available in the formal sector, in other informal businesses and in communities. So 
far, most of these informal employment opportunities are open to potential employees through 
personal contacts. Training programs have the potential to be transformed into useful networks. 
This has been achieved with the training programs related to formal employment through signing 
up agreements with employers. However, with informal employment, the ability of using 
training programs to provide trainees with more stable working opportunities so as to improve 
their earning ability is yet developed.  
 
The finding that training even if not designed for people to find even informal jobs is related to 
the life satisfaction of the Dibao recipients has important implications on broadening the horizon 
of training. As shown in our regression results, subjective matters such as reported health, family 
relationship, confidence about the future, and social participation are all related to the level of 
life satisfaction. These can be important signs showing that some people might have given up. 
Some of these problems can potentially be avoided by bringing people back to the social life or 
offering training courses to teach people how to cope with these difficulties. 
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Housing for the poor in a large and growing metropolis - Karachi 
 
Haris Gazdar 
Collective for Social Science Research 
 
Planned and unplanned housing in Karachi 
 
Karachi is the largest urban metropolis of Pakistan, accounting for around 8 per cent of the 
national population, and a fifth of the country’s urban population.  Like many other cities of Asia, 
Karachi’s growth has been premised on migration from rural areas, other urban centres, and from 
beyond national boundaries.  Its diverse economic opportunities and relatively open society 
compared with the hinterland has attracted millions of migrants, refugees, and internally 
displaced persons, to seek livelihoods and security.  The importance of the city as a factor in the 
livelihood and survival strategies of individuals and communities across the country and beyond 
keeps coming up in studies of poverty in the hinterland. 
 
The diversity in the regional and ethnic backgrounds of Karachi’s population is testament to its 
openness to outsiders, including people from the poorest and most under-developed regions of 
Pakistan and beyond.  In the story of economic growth and poverty reduction in Pakistan, 
Karachi and other cities like it will certainly play a critical role.  In this regard Karachi is not 
unlike many other comparable Asian cities – even if the dynamics of migration, opportunities for 
urbanization, and costs of accessing urban labour markets might be different here compared to 
other places. 
 
Planned and unplanned localities 
 
The supply of informal housing has been an important factor in Karachi’s demographic 
expansion.  Typically, the supply of planned housing has fallen behind population growth, 
migration and settlement.  Precise estimates vary, but it can be safely surmised that well over 
half of the city’s population resides in localities that started life as informal settlements.  There 
are two main methods for estimating the prevalence of informal settlements.  One method is 
topographic.  Aerial or satellite images of inhabited areas have been used to measure the covered 
area of zones that are respectively known, a priori, to be planned or unplanned.1  Smaller 
surveys of population density in different types of zones are then used to estimate the population 
in each type of zone. 
 
A second method is to use disaggregated population census data to identify localities by their 
origins – planned or unplanned – and to count the population listed in each type of locality.  The 
most recent census (Population Census 1998) was used to carry out this exercise.  Data were 
available down to the “census charge circle” level.  There were 1,268 of these in Karachi with an 
average current population of around 10,000 people.  Out of these it was possible classify around 
84 per cent by their origin.  It was found that among these under two-fifth were planned, and a 
similar proportion were unplanned (Table 1).  Another 17 per cent were thought to be mix of 
                                                
1 Hasan (1997). 
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planned and unplanned.  The population ratios were in close correspondence with the proportion 
of localities. 
 
Table 1 
 Localities Population
Planned 39.0 38.9
Unplanned 43.9 43.8
Mixed 17.2 17.3
Source: Author’s calculations based on analysis of Population Census 1998 data 
 
The division of the city into originally planned and unplanned zones requires further explanation.  
It is obvious, for example, that the classification of a zone as “planned” is premised on a prior 
definition of planni1ng and a reference period of time.  Much of Karachi is relatively “new” in 
the sense that current occupants or their immediate predecessors can claim with some 
justification that they were the first inhabitants on the land that they presently occupy.  Even so, 
ancient claims, often backed up with proof of continuous residence or documentary evidence, are 
also active. 
 
Path to unplanned housing and informality 
 
A reasonable cut-off date is 1947 when Pakistan gained its independence, and Karachi 
underwent a major demographic transformation.  It can be argued that localities that existed 
legally in 1947 – either because they occupied land which was specifically acquired for planned 
development, or because government authorities agreed to recognize and regularize existing 
inhabitations – can be treated as the original stock of land or housing.  Subsequent additions to 
the land or housing stock could be classified exclusively as planned or unplanned.  As will be 
shown further below, this binary classification still leaves out many interested and important 
cases – but it can nevertheless be used as a practical starting point. 
 
The generic story of housing development in Karachi since 1947 is that of the expansion of legal 
and planned settlements alongside irregular and unplanned localities.  In the initial period after 
1947 when Karachi witnessed a trebling of its population within a matter of a few years was 
marked by a proliferation of irregular settlements – even refugee camps – springing up on 
unoccupied public and private land.  While a sub-set of the displaced people who arrived in 
Karachi were housed in planned or semi-planned zones of the city, a large number were left to 
fend for themselves. 
 
This pattern continued over the decades – and still continues – with some variations.  Successive 
waves of migration and displacement were accommodated in a similar manner through a mix of 
planned and unplanned responses.  In fact, efforts at planning housing infrastructure were 
constantly lagging behind the steady flow of migration into the city.  Zoning laws and housing 
regulations which had been set aside as a temporary and emergency measure morphed into a 
permanent arrangement. 
 
While Karachi is bounded by the coast in one direction, its immediate hinterland consisted of 
semi-arid and sparsely populated areas.  Local communities of pastoralist with ancient claims of 
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usufruct were brushed aside and the newly-formed Karachi Development Authority (KDA) 
became the prime municipal body for acquiring and developing land for urban use. Of the land 
that developed by the KDA for housing purposes however, 52.5 per cent was set aside for 
housing schemes. Out of this the land allocated for low income settlements comprised a mere 
9.15 per cent.1  In the meanwhile, temporary squatter settlements of displaced people started 
acquiring traits of permanency through successful applications for public utilities.  This pattern 
continued to be repeated much after 1947 as further land was brought into urban use from 
surrounding areas, and new waves of migrants put down roots.  
 
Unplanned origins, poverty and residential insecurity 
 
There is a close correlation between unplanned or informally supplied land or housing and 
poverty.  In principle this might be illustrated using statistical data on type of settlement and 
social and economic indicators of its residents.  In fact, such data are not readily available.  Some 
observations are relevant. 
 
First, it is unambiguously clear that the top and bottom of income or wealth distribution are to be 
found, respectively, in planned and unplanned settlements.  There are some exceptions.  Parts of 
the old city of Karachi are congested but nevertheless attractive places of residence for segments 
of the mercantile elite.  Some of these zones owe their origins to unplanned developments which 
were subsequently regularized.  There are also some low-income housing schemes that were 
planned by municipal or central government to accommodate particular workers.  At least when 
they were first settled these zones would have housed people from low-income brackets – though 
not perhaps the poorest. 
 
Second, the key operational difference between different types of housing, land or settlements is 
the security of contract.  In elite planned housing colonies as well as non-elite planned housing 
title is considered to be secure and is backed up with legal and political guarantees.  The most 
prolific high-income housing developments have emerged from the military establishment which 
acquired land in order to allot residential plots to members of the armed services.  Contractual 
security in these “defense societies” is premised, ultimately, on guarantees vested with the 
politically powerful military leadership.  Other elite housing schemes are also protected against 
arbitrary contractual violations through being embedded in the formal legal system.  At the far 
end of the spectrum, the poorest reside in make-shift housing which is vulnerable to contractual 
violations as well as state action for eviction. 
 
Third, the actual market in housing and land is highly responsive to contractual security of 
ownership and tenure.  Housing colonies and schemes that are thought to have strong contractual 
guarantees attract a significant premium.  This means that over time there is a sorting of people 
of various income and wealth classes into housing or land of different types.  There are 
exceptions, of course, but in general the poorer and the socially marginalized live in more 
insecure irregular settlements or even in the more insecure segments of relatively secure 
regularized settlements. 
 
                                                
1 Raza, Jamil and Kazmi, (undated) 
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Fourth, the distinction between planned and unplanned, or regular, regularized and irregular is 
not discrete, but continuous.  The division in the city is not a binary one between planned and 
unplanned, or regular/regularized and irregular settlements or housing types.  There are many 
shades of difference in the level of regularity and security depending upon history, legal status 
and political backing. 
 
Housing and social protection 
 
Distinct outlook on rural and urban areas 
 
There is a close but under-emphasized connection between housing and social protection.  The 
lack of attention to housing as an explicit concern for social protection in developing countries is 
surprising given that housing was and remains one of the central features of social protection in 
most developed countries.  In many of the Asian countries including Pakistan, rural housing 
tends to be examined, if at all, within the framework of land reforms.  There is an underlying 
assumption that there are distinctive rural institutions through which access to housing is 
organized at the community level.  The role of policy is often under-emphasized. 
 
In contrast with rural areas, urban housing is explicitly viewed as a poverty-related issue.  The 
main focus is on slums, shanty towns and migration – in other words with the living conditions 
of people who move into cities in the search of livelihood or security.  It is true, of course, that 
the issues of shelter, residential security, and housing in urban areas do appear to be quite 
distinctive from rural areas in most developing Asian economies.  Part of the distinction is, 
indeed, the close association of urban housing issues with migration.  It is also clear that by the 
virtue of higher levels of concentration urban housing issues differ qualitatively distinct from 
rural areas where it is common to rely on individual or local community-level initiatives for key 
amenities and services.1 
 
Social protection linkages 
 
There are two broad (non-exclusive) ways of looking at housing and social protection, both of 
which are present in the context of Karachi.  First, housing conditions are or ought to be of direct 
concern to social protection policies.  Even if social protection is seen in its conventional form as 
the amelioration or mitigation of the effects of adverse economic shock, housing would be a key 
component.  In broader views of social protection that incorporate the guaranteeing of certain 
basic minimum standards of living, the security and adequacy of housing should be regarded as 
central concerns.  In rights-based approaches too residential security and adequacy ought to be 
near the top of the policy agenda. 
 
The other linkage between housing and social protection is an instrumental one.  Nearly all 
modern social protection instruments operationally identify their beneficiaries with reference 
territorial jurisdiction, and thus through fixed abode.  Entitlements are almost invariably linked 
to an individual or family’s address or place of residence.  A fixed abode is a necessary pre-
                                                
1 Typically, self-help or local initiatives suffice for the provision of water, sanitation, fuel, and even land.  None of 
this generally possible in urban areas where there are natural limits to self or local-community provisioning. 
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condition for participation in virtually all formal economic, political and social activities and not 
just for gaining access to health, education, unemployment or pension benefits. 
 
Karachi’s contribution to broader understanding 
 
The way in which urban housing will manifest itself as a social protection issue will vary 
between countries and over time.  In cities like Karachi with a recent history of large-scale 
migration – indeed ongoing processes of migration – combined with a relatively permissive 
policy attitude towards informal provisioning of land, residential security is a precondition for 
the adequacy and quality of housing conditions.  By contrast, cities where regulations concerning 
land use have remained firm in the face of migration, displacement and population growth, social 
protection policy will be more concerned about the provision of affordable housing of a 
minimum acceptable standard. 
 
Karachi’s experience is significant in its own right, of course, given the size and importance of 
the metropolis.  As a point of comparison it is of value in at least three ways.  The conditions that 
exist in Karachi are also seen to be replicated on a smaller scale in other parts of Pakistan.  Much 
could be learnt about the future demands on social protection policy in an urbanizing Pakistan by 
paying attention to what happened, or is currently happening, in Karachi.  The same holds true 
for other cities in Asia and elsewhere urban growth took a trajectory similar to that of Karachi.  
For other more firmly regulated cities too Karachi’s experience holds relevance, as it offers a 
perspective on alternative historical and institutional routes to developing more inclusive cities. 
 
In the context of Karachi, the regularization of existing unplanned housing stock, and a policy 
framework for the regularization of future unplanned housing, takes precedence over other issues 
relating to the adequacy and quality of housing conditions.  As pointed out above, over half the 
population of the city, and an overwhelming proportion of the poor live in housing that was 
initially unplanned.  This implies that a large part of the asset base of the poor in the city consists 
of property that has uncertain legal or regulatory backing.  In principle this exposes the poor and 
the socially marginalized to two types of vulnerability.  They are vulnerable to dispossession on 
the part of government authorities.  They are also vulnerable to exploitative conditions in the 
housing rental and ownership transactions, since there is little legal protection for their presumed 
entitlements. 
 
Paradoxically, the existence of a large unplanned and irregular sector in Karachi is itself 
indicative of the fact that informally acquired rights of possession or tenure do enjoy some level 
of protection and security.  Government schemes for regularization are described in Section 3 
below, and the actual process through which individuals and communities from socially 
marginalized groups have gained residential security are examined in Section 4. 
 
Government schemes for regularization 
 
Policy and political trajectory 
 
The first major national initiative with regard to irregular settlements or katchi abadis came in 
1972, when the government initiated the Katchi Abadis Improvement and Regularization 
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Programme (KAIRP).  KAIRP aimed to regularize 2,320 katchi abadis across the country, with a 
total population of 5.5 million and to provide residents with water, sanitation, electricity, road 
paving and other social facilities in lieu of the payment of development charges (referred to as 
“lease charges”).1  The impetus for this programme had come from populist slogans of the first-
ever elected government of the country. 
 
The idea of improving and regularizing katchi abadis as a solution for the low income housing 
shortage was incorporated in the UNDP Master Plan for Karachi which was to run from 1974 to 
1985.2  As a result, the Karachi Metropolitan Programme (KMP) was set up by the Master Plan 
Department and assigned responsibility for providing housing for low income groups.  Some 
large irregular settlements in Karachi – notably the working-class Lyari quarter in the old part of 
the city – were regularized and formally leased under this initiative. 
 
There were further announcements – such as one by the president in January 1978 – promising 
the regularization of unplanned settlements.3  KAIRP had developed a list of 198 settlements 
(that existed on or before 1st January 1978) that were to be regularized. Of these, the settlements 
in Baldia Township (24,500 plots), Gulbahar, Old Golimar, Bhutta Village and Orangi Town 
became regularized Katchi Abadis, and were leased to their occupants by 1982. 
 
The main watershed, however, was the Sindh Katchi Abadi Act of 1987 which provided a 
comprehensive legal and administrative framework for the process of katchi abadi regularization.  
This provincial law (which was mirrored by corresponding legislation in other provinces) came 
as a buttress to a political announcement on 23 March 1985 that all unplanned settlements of at 
least forty households that were in existence on that day would be regularized.  The law led to 
the formation of the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) which was mandated to notify, 
regularize and upgrade all existing katchi abadis  in the province within five years (from 1987 
till 1992).  
 
Process of regularizing a katchi abadi 
 
The SKAA process of regularization requires residents of a katchi abadi to make an application 
with the authority submitting documents that provide proof of residence.4  The authority then 
verifies these documents and in particular the claim that at least forty households resided at the 
locality on or before the amnesty date (initially 23 March 1985).  The SKAA also commissions a 
site survey which results in the mapping and demarcation of the land area, and the identification 
of the legal owner.  In most cases the legal owners are government agencies and departments. 
 
The feasibility report for the issuance of notification of a katchi abadi includes details such as a 
physical survey plan illustrating the exact area and boundaries of the katchi abadi; and a list of 
occupants, together with documentary proof that they had been occupants of the land before the 
                                                
1 Hasan (1997). 
2 The government of Pakistan and KDA set up the Master Plan Department (MPD) with the help of the United 
Nations (particularly UNDP). 
3 This announcement was later covered by Martial Law Orders (MLOs) 110 and 183 of 1978 
4 Such as National Identity Card (NIC), voter list, electric, gas or telephone bill, ration card, area school 
certificate, any license (for arms, driving etc), death certificate, birth certificate of the occupant born prior 
to the date fixed by the Act, or any other document(s) as required by the authority. 
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designated date. If approved for regularization by the Director General of the authority, 
development and upgrading are supposed to follow. 
 
When all these processes are completed the locality is officially declared as a regularized katchi 
abadi.  At this stage householders have the option of applying for individual lease documents for 
their property and are notified by the SKAA of the lease payment schedule. The payment 
schedule varies with the size as well as the category or ‘zone’ of the plot. Plots are categorized 
into five zones: residential, residential/commercial, commercial, amenities, and those for 
religious uses. 1   Under the regulations only leased individual possession is protected, and 
unleased plots can be evicted and demolished without compensation.  
 
Coverage 
 
The SKAA data of 2005 identified 539 katchi abadis in Sindh, of which 483 qualified for 
regularization. Out of these 278 of these were located on city government land and of these 274 
were regularized by the municipal authority.  In addition, the provincial government departments 
regularized 105 settlements which were located on land formally owned by the province. In all 
over 120,000 individual leases were granted up to around 2006.2   This number is a small 
proportion of the total number of homes in katchi abadis that have been qualified for 
regularization.  Once a settlement has been recognized its residents see little additional need for 
paying lease fee for individual title, as they are assured that the settlement as a whole would not 
be evicted or demolished.  The recognition of a settlement also sets off processes of upgradation 
and development, regardless of whether individual plots are leased or not. 
 
Regularization, mobility and marginalization 
 
The description of the evolution of government schemes for regularization focuses on the macro 
level political and institutional changes since the 1970s when housing policy was first brought 
into what might be called a transformative social protection framework.  The actual progress of 
regularization and its effect on mobility and marginalization can be better understood with 
reference to community-level observations.  In this section a number of community and 
individual cases based on fieldwork in Karachi are summarized in order to draw out some salient 
lessons. 
 
Dimensions of social marginalization 
 
Before describing community and individual cases it is necessary to say something about the 
dimensions of social marginalization that are thought, a priori, to be significant in Karachi and 
Pakistan.  Five broad dimensions – patriarchy, citizenship, caste/kinship, class/occupation, and 
ethnicity/religion - are known to be important.  While inter-connections between these do need to 
be understood, they also require distinct treatment.  It has widely acknowledged that these 
dimensions of social marginalization severally and jointly condition individuals’, families’ and 
entire communities’ access to the formal economic and political institutions. 
                                                
1 Ali and Ali (2005) 
2  Improvement of Katchi Abadis and other Low Income Housing. (Karachi Mega City Sustainable Development 
Program). Asian Development Bank. [Draft] 
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Patriarchy - systematic social norms and institutions that place women (and children) in a 
subservient position to men - cuts across regions, classes and other social structures.  Patriarchy 
is often seen in conjunction with other sources of social, political and economic disadvantage, 
and magnifies their impact.  Its impact is not only societal but also permeates formal and legal 
institutions of the state.  The legal system, for example, discriminates against women in many 
ways, notably with respect to property ownership. 
 
Citizenship is relatively simple form of social marginalization at one level.  There are significant 
numbers of residents of Pakistan, particularly in Karachi, who are not citizens of the state.  Entire 
communities have lived and worked in the city under conditions of semi-legality for decades.  
The most conspicuous are people whose origins are traced back to Afghanistan, Bangladesh and 
Myanmar.  There social hierarchies across and within non-citizens too.  Some migrants or 
displaced persons of Afghan or Bangladeshi origins have found it easier to forge social and 
political connections with “indigenous” Pakistanis and have therefore established a more secure 
base for themselves.  Others subsist on the margins of urban life in perpetual fear of eviction, 
detention and even deportation. 
 
Caste and kinship are often used interchangeable in Pakistan to signify communities based on 
kinship bonds that are reproduced through norms of endogamy.  While hierarchical caste 
relations are also present – as in other parts of South Asia – these are often sustained not through 
religious ideology but societal norms and political alignments.  While precise forms of social 
organization vary across Pakistan – and by virtue of being a migrant city within Karachi – the 
kinship bond is an important glue that holds things together. 
 
Many of the caste groups in Karachi trace their identity to class and occupation.  The village 
society of the rural hinterland, particularly that of Punjab but not of Punjab alone, continues to 
order caste groups in relation to their class and occupation.  Traditional menial and service castes 
face labour market segmentation and thus barriers to economic mobility.  The process of 
migration to Karachi opens new economic opportunities but even in the urban economy there 
remains a tendency for labour market segmentation.  Then there are numerous groups that are 
traditionally regarded as itinerant – or people without fixed abode – who are found on the 
margins of the economy in activities such as begging and sex work. 
 
Finally, broader identity markers such as ethnicity and religion are important dimensions of 
social mainstreaming and marginalization.  The state privileges Muslim citizens, and in the 
process marginalizes citizens belonging to other faiths.  Pakistan is a multi-ethnic state where 
ethnic social and political networks play an important role in institutional access.  In some cases 
ethnicity is linked to caste and kinship – with ethnic groups acting like supra-kinship coalitions.  
In other instances ethnicity and religion allow people to cut across barriers such as citizenship to 
have access to viable networks. 
 
Irregularity and insecurity 
 
Micro-level perspectives for this paper are provided by fieldwork carried out in two large katchi 
abadis – or settlements that started life as unplanned localities.  Both are predominantly made up 
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of migrant individuals and communities from outside Karachi and even out of Pakistan, even 
though there is some presence also of “indigenous” communities.  One of the two settlements is 
in the north of the city and will called “North Colony”, while the second which is in the south-
west of the city close to the coast will be denoted as “South Colony”. 
 
North Colony is part of a union council (UC) – which is the smallest unit of urban governance – 
with a population of around 58,000 in the 1998 population census.  The other segments of this 
UC are all planned settlements with a predominantly upper-middle class population.  The 
population of North Colony was found to be around 21,000, or over a third of the total 
population of the UC, even though it is estimated to cover only around a tenth of the land area of 
the UC.  South Colony consists of an UC with a reported population of around 41,000 in 1998. 
 
Both colonies were first settled around the early 1960s, even though there are traces of 
“indigenous” communities with continuous residence nearby going back much further.  The land 
in both colonies is affected by specific geographical features which played a role in the 
settlement.  North Colony is a narrow strip of land adjacent to a natural flood drain which was 
left unutilized when the area was brought under the city master-plan.  South Colony occupies 
land left vacant between a railway line and mangrove marshes that lead out to the sea.  In both 
cases the land was considered unfit for development and residence under normal town planning 
conditions. 
 
The first major group to set up residence in the North Colony was a group of laundry workers 
and their families - traditionally from the dhobi menial caste.  They were allowed by the city 
authorities to establish their work premises and living quarters along the drain, in order to serve 
the incoming middle class residents of the planned colony.  In this way the settlement already 
had weak regulatory sanction, even though the residents did not possess legal title.  South 
Colony got its first inhabitants when “indigenous” families from a neighbouring old city quarter 
moved their temporarily in order to escape flooding in their own area.  They were soon evicted 
by the police, but then returned in larger numbers with their relatives, and began to establish 
make-shift homes. 
 
In the North Colony the main legal claimant of the land was the KDA, while in the South Colony 
the port authorities (Karachi Port Trust or KPT), and the railways were the main official 
claimants due to the proximity of the port and railway lines.  From around the mid-1960s new 
migrants arrived in both colonies – mostly people from northern parts of Pakistan who had come 
to Karachi to take up low-tier government jobs.  They encouraged their relatives from their home 
areas and also began to establish makeshift homes.  This was happening at a time when a 
populist government at the national level had announced – but not legislated – protection for 
squatter and irregular settlements.  A 1972 programme for katchi abadi regularization and 
improvement provided a further impetus to community-level initiatives to occupy and settle land. 
 
There was a rapid expansion in the occupied area in both colonies, as well as an increase in 
transactions of plots of land.  These transactions were, obviously, not being conducted within a 
legal framework, but were informal purchases of actual possession.  In each area there were 
identifiable leaders who were known for their ability to enforce contracts (using strong arm 
means) and their connections within government departments and agencies.  The leaders who 
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controlled land transactions in both colonies happened to be ethnic Pashtuns who could quickly 
mobilize large numbers of people (including armed men) at times of conflict or when faced with 
the threat of eviction.  The police generally treated members of this ethnic group with deference 
and did not generally interfere in their activities within the communities. 
 
The North and South Colonies followed distinct trajectories from the late 1970s onwards, when 
the main land agent in the North Colony was able to get some level of protection from city 
authorities through his connection with a federal government minister.  Although they still faced 
threats of eviction, the North Colony residents had acquired greater security in their possession 
of residential land compared with their South Colony counterparts.  Residents of South Colony, 
particularly the ethnic Bengal and Burmese residents, were vulnerable to harassment and 
extortion on the part of police, port authority officials and other government agents.  The ethnic 
Punjabi and Pashtun segments of South Colony were less vulnerable to such threats – the former 
due to their links within the police and the latter because of their reputation for the use of armed 
force. Although there were still instances of eviction in the North Colony after the process of 
regularization, the two colonies nevertheless represent clearly different levels of residential 
security. 
 
The threat of eviction by the police or city authorities is not the only source of residential 
insecurity.  In the early period of settlement – lasting some two decades from the 1960s to the 
late 1980s – the land agents and their allies were a constant source of contractual insecurity for 
the poorer residents of North Colony.  There were many cases where transactions would not be 
honoured and people would lose their investments and their homes. 
 
The situation was and remained acute for residents of the South Colony where land agents 
remained powerful.  Insecurity in this colony had manifested itself in the geographic division of 
the colony between predominantly Pashtun and predominantly Bengali segments.  The “sorting” 
had happened mostly as Bengali residents were dispossessed of their homes – often in return for 
nominal amounts – and forced to move into cheaper and less inhabitable parts of the settlements 
nearer the mangrove swamps.  Ethnic consolidation of the Bengali quarter, however, had led to a 
greater sense of security.  Residential insecurity was closely correlated with physical insecurity.  
There were frequent complaints of women facing sexual harassment if they ventured out of their 
quarter.  It was also believe by many that petty crimes in the Bengali area were often patronized 
by the relatively powerful Pashtun land agents and their allies. 
 
Although the North Colony was generally better off and more secure than South Colony, there 
were segments within it which were clearly marginalized.  There had been an eviction of several 
hundred homes in 2005 in which the evicted people were mainly “low” caste migrants from poor 
districts of southern Punjab.1  They were unable to save their part of the settlement from eviction 
and demolition despite the fact that the process of regularization had been in place for two 
decades.  There were also two segments within the North Colony where the residents faced 
problems of access.  Both of these happened to have been predominantly inhabited by socially 
                                                
1 There were households of the Bagri caste which is thought to be semi-nomadic and often found in marginal 
economic activities such as begging, road-side vending and sex work. 
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marginalized groups – or groups at the extreme margins.1  One of this group consisted of “low” 
caste Christian migrants from Punjab who are traditionally employed as sanitation workers.  The 
other was a group of ethnic Bengali families, who like their counterparts in the South Colony 
faced the extra insecurity of being treated as non-citizens.  These two groups had found that the 
more gentrified segments of North Colony had blocked their access to the main road on the plea 
of crime prevention. 
 
Processes of regularization 
 
The first major interaction between the residents of North Colony and state authorities occurred 
in 1975, when the municipality attempted to evict and demolish the settlement.  The local 
Pashtun land agents and their allies, however, had already made linkages in political parties 
whom they approached for support.  They reestablished the settlement soon after it was evicted.  
In 1978 a similar cycle of demolition and reestablishment was reenacted.  Around twenty people 
from the colony were arrested but the court case went in their favour.  In the meanwhile the 
Pashtun land agents began to “sell” possession rights to plots of land to people from other 
communities.  The new entrants were almost exclusively from socially marginalized groups in 
rural areas. 
 
It was only in 1990 that SKAA commissioned a survey of the North Colony.  The initial 
approach to SKAA was made by the very individuals – notably a Pashtun land agent – who had 
led the establishment of the settlement in the first instance.  According to local residents, the 
SKAA was cooperative and proactive in facilitating the regularization process.  The formal 
recognition of the settlement within demarcated boundaries meant that the threat of eviction – 
which has already receding by virtue of continuous occupation – was removed altogether.  This 
also marked a turning point, paradoxically, in the political fortunes of the original Pashtun land 
agent.  People who had bought possession rights from him and then had them regularized 
through the SKAA were no longer beholden to him or his allies.  They were also no longer 
dependent on his ability to confront the police. 
 
Although much of the settlement was regularized, there were some segments that were left out of 
the SKAA demarcation.  There are conflicting accounts about these.  Some local residents claim 
that the unsurveyed segments were also on public land, and ought to have been regularized.  
Others hold that these were settled subsequent to the original survey and were therefore not 
included in the SKAA maps.  In the event, these were evicted and demolished without 
compensation when the city authorities allotted land to a property developer.  Residents evicted 
from this segment – mostly low caste recent migrants from southern Punjab – had taken up 
rented housing within the North Colony. 
 
The South Colony has not yet undergone the formal process of regularization.  The older more 
established parts of the colony are mostly inhabited by ethnic Pashtuns and Punjabis who enjoy 
relative freedom from extortion on the part of government officials.  The poorer ethnic Bengali 
segments too, however, have incrementally acquired informal rights of possession through the 
provision of some public services, notably electricity. 
                                                
1 This latter qualification is necessary because other residents of the North Colony would be classified as socially 
marginalized in the broader landscape of Karachi urban society. 
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Case of group mobility 
 
Abid is a middle-aged transport worker whose father arrived in Karachi in the 1960s from a rural 
area in Punjab.  He belongs to the Muslim Shaikh kinship group which is at the bottom of the 
rural caste hierarchy.  Abid has been living in North Colony since his childhood.  He and 
members of his extended community have renamed themselves as “Lava” in reference to the 
name of their region of origin.  The have made an attempt to shed their “Muslim Shaikh” identity 
in favour of a regional marker.  This group acquired plots from the Pashtun land agents and 
developed a small cluster of homes within North Colony.  They encouraged the migration and 
settlement of other Muslim Shaikhs from their own and surrounding villages in Punjab.  In their 
home villages these families are vulnerable to bonded labour.  In North Colony, under the new 
identity marker of Lava, these families have been able to come together as a group to assert their 
collective rights.  Abid is now recognized as a leader of the Lava community – a coherent group 
identity with recognized leadership would not have been possible in their home villages.  Even 
though he is the community leader, Abid cannot afford to apply for an individual lease for his 
own home.  He and other Lava feel secure, however, that after the recognition of North Colony 
by SKAA they cannot be dispossessed of their homes. 
 
Case of individual mobility 
 
Meraj is a young man of mixed Bengali and Burmese parentage.  His father emerged as a 
community and religious leader within a segment of the Bengali-Burmese community in South 
Colony.  Meraj’s father bought possession of a plot of land from a Pashtun land agent called 
Irfan in the 1980s.  This land was in a low-lying area and they spent about the same amount of 
cash for landfill.  Once this investment had been made another Pashtun land agent called Aslam 
arrived and claimed ownership of the plot.  This man threatened them with the use of armed 
force.  The original vendor of the plot had earlier proposed the marriage of Meraj’s sister to yet 
another Pashtun man called Nawaz.  Nawaz then interceded with Aslam on Meraj’s behalf and 
secured the latter’s possession of his plot.  Meraj’s family has become a focal point of the 
Bengali and Burmese communities in their segment of North Colony and is looked upon for 
leadership and collective action.  The marriage contract with Nawaz appeared to have played a 
critical role in both securing residential security and some measure of protection vis-à-vis the 
Pashtun land agents in general. 
 
Conclusion and policy conundrum - regulation or regularization 
 
The relatively permissive policy posture towards housing regulation in Karachi was a 
contributory factor in migration to the city from other (rural) parts of the country, and from other 
neighbouring countries.  The permissive policy posture was in part due to the influx of displaced 
persons at a historical moment of political importance – that is, independence and partition 
related migration from India.  It was also helped along by Karachi’s geographical conditions and 
the existence of apparently unused public land in the immediate hinterland.  These specific 
conditions cannot be replicated elsewhere, and hence Karachi’s experience with unregulated 
settlement needs to be read with the requisite qualification.  Many aspects of this experience, 
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however, do apply to other parts of Pakistan and South Asia, and to other Asian and developing 
countries. 
 
The consequences for the poor and the socially marginalized of this relative permissiveness were 
undoubtedly a lowering of the transactions costs of migration.  Migration to the big city brought 
people closer to economic opportunities and also held the potential for them to escape some of 
the socially-mediated labour market segmentation and political exclusion they faced in their 
regions of origin.  The natural corollary of meager social provisioning and weak regulation, 
however, is that migrants and others faced varying degrees of insecurity in their access to land 
and housing.  The level of insecurity was often correlated with the prior social status and 
political power of the individual or group in question. 
 
For many of the poor and marginalized groups the move to Karachi – even with its attendant 
insecurity of tenure or contract – implied an improvement over the conditions they faced in their 
places of origin.  For some those conditions were reproduced or even magnified.  The workings 
of the unplanned sector, left to itself, resulted in highly differentiated outcomes across and within 
poor and socially marginalized groups.  A key factor that contributed to a degree of 
empowerment was the ability of individuals and families to come together into networks and 
undertake collective action for public goods and utilities.  Mobilisation around residential 
security was a recurrent theme in stories of collective action and group mobility. 
 
Regularization of unplanned housing has been an important factor in providing residential 
security to the socially marginalized.  It can be seen quite clearly that settlements, communities 
and individuals that have gained protection through government programmes and laws for 
regularization have acquired secure assets.  Their sense of security extends beyond freedom from 
the threat of eviction by public authorities.  They also gain leverage in their interactions with 
other individual or groups who might have enjoyed greater political or social power.  In 
settlements where government schemes have been implemented socially marginalized groups 
appear to have acquired a range of other rights and entitlements.  In settlements where such 
schemes did not function the level of residential insecurity and even physical vulnerability 
remains high. 
 
The routes through which regularization processes actually work can be varied and complex.  
The first beneficiaries are typically those who are already somewhat socially or politically 
connected with formal institutions of government and the economy.  There are large premiums to 
realized for mobilizing groups for regularization of settlements.  At the far end of the spectrum it 
is also possible to observe groups that have been virtually completely excluded from the benefits 
of regularization due to their uncertain citizenship status, or because they belong to extremely 
marginalized groups within society.  For many in-between groups and individuals within these 
groups, government schemes offer incentives for mobilization and collective action.  Such 
groups have been observed in the context of Karachi to even reinvent their social identities in 
order to strengthen their relative positions.  Over time the presence of government schemes for 
regularization have an equalizing impact – at least for many of the in-between groups. 
 
The regularization of unplanned settlements has a number of natural boundary points as an 
instrument of asset transfer or indeed as a measure for social protection.  First, regularization by 
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its very nature is a one-off asset transfer.  Second, the supply of unused land in general, and 
publicly-owned unused land in particular, is not unlimited.  In the case of Karachi there is 
already a saturation point within the well-defined geographic limits of the city.  Third, in the 
course of urban development, regularization must at a certain stage make place for regulation. 
 
There are good reasons for believing that Karachi and Pakistan are yet at a distance from 
reaching the boundary point of regulation.  There is still a large backlog of residential insecurity 
despite the existence of the SKAA and other corresponding programmes for over two decades.  
The supply of land in the periphery of the city is also far from exhausted, as formally rural areas 
are brought into urban use, with all of the attendant familiar issues of uncertain ownership and 
vulnerability.  It is found, in fact, that the poorest and most marginalized move further away 
from established settlements where property values and rents become unaffordable.  These same 
people are used by the next generation of land agents to settle new land before it starts its journey 
along the long path of regularization.  Karachi’s lessons are also relevant because property rights 
in the rural housing are often even more heavily mediated through social networks than they are 
in urban katchi abadis.  Regularization of urban as well as rural housing, therefore, can remain 
on the policy agenda far into the future. 
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Introduction 
 
Indian urbanization is characterized by low level (27.5 per cent in 2001 and estimated to be 30 
per cent by mid-200), and low rate (of 2.75 per cent per annum during 1991-2001 decade), on 
account of low rural-urban migration (just 35 per cent of the urbanization rate is explained by the 
migration; see Sivaramakrishnan et al 2005), but high level of absolute poverty at 25.7 per cent 
(80 million urban population is below poverty line) and high multiple deprivations1. Scholars in 
India have argued that low rate of rural-urban migration in India is attributed to lack of 
employment opportunities in urban areas (Kundu 2003), excluding urban planning regimes 
(Kundu 2003, Mahadevia 2008a), and like in other developing countries, to anti-migrant bias in 
the development policy (UNFPA 2007). High urban poverty cannot be attributed to migration to 
the cities but to the economic structures of the cities (Hashim 2009), capital intensive growth and 
informalization of urban employment (Unni 2009) and to lack of social security. Lastly, there are 
institutional inadequacies in the urban areas for reducing deprivations and addressing 
vulnerabilities. 
 
The urban deprivations emanate from the urban development paradigm, which is modernist one, 
currently located within neo-liberal idea of ‘Cities as Engines of Growth’. The urban 
development processes (see Hall 1988, Watson 2009, Mahadevia 2008a, Miraftab 2009), have 
resulted in what Al-Sayyad and Roy (2003) call exploding informalities, or Planet of Slums 
(Davis 2004) or Shadow Cities (Neuwirth 2006). Besides these, urban land markets are 
speculative excluding a large section of urban population (for India see Mahadevia 2009a). The 
state is more often than not highly rent seeking, imposing high transaction costs in the land 
market. Those who cannot negotiate the land market on account of low affordability, no or low 
political connections and lack of proof of their urban citizenship, stake claim on the city through 
finding a place in the informal city. They persist, subvert and sustain in the city, facing multiple 
demolitions and displacements and negotiating with the political classes in an electoral 
democracy such as India. In due course of time, they move up in urban hierarchy to attain full 
urban citizenship. This is a long process, found to span a generation or so. 
 
Urban citizenship is defined through proof of urban residency, which could be any one of these 
documents: (i) A ration card, either the Below Poverty Line (BPL) Card or Above Poverty Line 
(APL) Card – A BPL Card ensures access to all available subsidies; (ii) Photo Identity (ID) Card 
given to slum dwellers at a certain date declared as cut-off date which is 1976 in Ahmedabad; (iii) 
Electricity bill and receipt of its payment, (iv) voter registration card and (v) now the property 
tax payment receipt. Households may not have all these proofs. For example, a household may 
be paying electricity charges and would have a proof of residence established through electricity 
bill payment receipt but may not have a Photo ID Card given in 1976 at the time of enlisting of 
all slum households. The local government may take a decision to not provide rehabilitation to 
                                                
1  For the data on urban deprivations in India, see Mahadevia (2009). 
   91
those project affected household who do not hold a Photo ID given in 1976. In short, urban 
citizenship is tied to an address in the city, even though in India, the Constitution gives all Indian 
citizens a right to move freely in the country. 
 
This story is of those who move into the city and have a chance to settle down. There are other 
categories of urban residents who come to the city seasonally (called the seasonal migrants) or 
for temporary period of time (called temporary migrants). The former come to the cities to tide 
over lean agriculture seasons while the latter come to the city attached to a labour contractor in 
most instances. They certainly do not have a ‘legal’ address in the city. These two set of urban 
residents are considered rural citizens and the cities refuse to take their responsibility at all. Thus, 
the question of their access to subsidized public health care facilities, public food distribution 
and subsidized shelter programmes1 and their children’s access to public schools does not arise. 
 
Attaining a legal status or permanency in urban areas is termed as attaining tenure. Thus, tenure 
is defined in the cities in India through possession of some of the documents mentioned above. 
Tenure is guaranteed through public policy, namely a tenure regularization policy, as the case of 
Pakistan in a chapter in this book illustrates. Ahmedabad and Surat, two case study cities, do not 
have any tenure regularization policy. Thus, the tenure status of the informal settlements in these 
two cities ranges from insecure (prone to eviction) to de facto security (acquired through 
possession of the above mentioned documents along with an institutional support) to guarantee 
of occupancy rights. Section 4 discusses at length the levels of tenure security observed in the 
informal settlements in the two cities, including innovations in tenure security. It also presents 
the comparative levels of development in the six slum settlements in Ahmedabad and Surat each 
to illustrated the link between level of tenure security and level of living. 
 
Urban development, according to the Constitution of India, is the responsibility of the state 
government. Urban development includes provision of urban sanitation – water supply, sewerage, 
storm water drainage and solid waste management – housing (including slum redevelopment), 
footpaths and roads, number of other urban services with the exception of education and health 
among the major ones and urban planning – organizing these activities in the urban space. The 
urban governments, called the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) in India, are finally responsible for 
carrying out the functions of urban development2. The state governments directly are responsible 
for education, primary health care, employment guarantee and possibly the social security system, 
as an when it becomes functional3. In times of shocks, the state governments step in for relief 
and rehabilitation. The institutional arrangements for comprehensive and universal social 
protection are as the section 3 illustrates, limited and fragmented. Section 2 introduces the two 
cities. Section 5, concludes by reflection on policies for social protection in urban India. 
 
                                                
1  Subsidized housing is now being constructed under a major urban development initiative called the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) 
2  The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA), enacted in 1992, lists 18 functions as urban development 
functions to be performed by the ULBs. In most states in India, however, many of these 18 functions are performed 
by the state governments, with exception of Gujarat and Maharashtra, where all these 18 functions are with the 
ULBs. 
3  The national government has passed the Social Security Bill. But, it has to be implemented by the state 
governments, and the latter have to adopt it and make provision in their respective budgets for social security 
schemes. 
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This paper postulates that in absence of universal social protection policies in urban India and 
difficulties of defining urban citizenship, tenure security is important for reducing vulnerabilities 
in urban India. The research question addressed by this paper is: does land tenure security, 
henceforth referred as tenure security, enhance access to social protection measures in Indian 
cities? A supportive question is do different levels of tenure security have different impacts on 
access to social protection measures? 
 
 
2.0 Introducing Case Studies 
 
Ahmedabad and Surat, two metropolitan cities located in the state of Gujarat, are the locales for 
the research. Ahmedabad, with a population of 4.5 million population and an area of 466 sq km1 
and Surat with a population of 3.8 million and an area of 324 sq km2,3, are the seventh and the 
tenth largest metropolises of India. While the former has transformed from being a cotton textile 
manufacturing centre into a service city, the latter is still the largest manufacturing centre of the 
state4. 
 
Both the cities have inherited the development characteristics of Gujarat, which, with an 
urbanization level of 37.75 per cent in 2001, is the third most urbanized large state of India 
(Sivaramakrishnan et al 2005: 6). The state is the second most industrialized state of India, fourth 
richest state in terms of per capita income and has remained in top two over the period of 
economic reforms in terms of industrial investments. But, the state’s development path is 
imbalanced: (i) industrialization is capital intensive, (ii) agriculture sector that employs half the 
population has stagnated since early 1980s, with exception of now last few years, (iii) large parts 
of the state are drought prone, (iv) there is high urban-rural inequality, (v) there is high inequality 
between the metropolitan cities and small and medium towns with respect to municipal incomes 
(Mahadevia 2006), and above all, (vi) the state lags behind in human and gender development – 
ranking 6th in Human Development Index (HDI) and in Gender Development Index (GDI) in 
20015. Since 2001, the state’s standing in health indicators, particularly with regards to infant 
and child health, have deteriorated. The state is in alarming category in the hunger index, at 13th 
position among the 17 large states (Menon et al 2008: 5-6). This skewed economic growth path 
of the state further justifies the location of the study of inclusive urbanization in the state of 
Gujarat. 
 
Ahmedabad entered a phase of severe crises from late 1980s to late 1990s during which her main 
economic base, cotton textile mills closed down and a large section of labour force was displaced 
from organized to unorganized sector (Mahadevia 2002a). The retrenched labour shifted to the 
powerloom industries at almost half the salaries and to self employment - 37 per cent of males 
                                                
1  From the AMC budget of 2009-10, see http://www.egovamc.com/amc_budget/Budget_2009-2010.pdf, 
accessed on March 16, 2009. 
2  As per the data from the SMC. 
3  The limits of both the cities was expanded in 2006, through a state government order, in which the city 
government had very little role to play. 
4  A study by Mahadevia (1998) showed that the Choryasi taluka adjacent to Surat city had the highest 
investment density in the state in the mid-1990s. A tauka is an administrative unit below district and the latter is the 
administrative sub-divisions of a state. 
5  Data in this paragraph are from Hirway and Mahadevia (2005) unless specified. 
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and 65 per cent of the females were self-employed in 1999-00 (Mahadevia 2008b) without any 
social security. Regularly employed (a large section among them have some social security) 
workers among the males decreased from about 45 per cent in 1987 to 33 per cent in 1999, over 
a 12 year period and that among the females also decreased from 30 per cent to 20 per cent 
(Mahadevia 2008b). A survey of 1000 households in 1998-99 in Ahmedabad estimated that 
around 75.3 per cent of the total workers were in informal employment, which included 70.2 per 
cent employed in the informal sector and 5.1 per cent employed in the registered industrial units 
but having no social or employment security (Unni 1999). 
 
The city, however, has remarkable presence and participation of civil society groups, working as 
either charity or developmental organizations. The latter have their antecedents in the Gandhian 
movement and philosophy of volunteerism, whereas the former is attributed to the philosophy of 
philanthropy that emerges from early capitalism. In fact, the early capitalism of Ahmedabad was 
entirely indigenous and the capitalist class was forward looking. Ahmedabad’s early institutional 
development is attributed to the indigenous capitalist class, Gandhian philosophy and decisions 
taken by the leaders of the Indian National Congress (INC) before the independence (Spodek 
2002). The elected wing of the city government also had representation of the working class 
before independence (Spodek 2002). 
 
The city also had many firsts (Mahadevia 2002b). Among them is a partnership-based slum 
improvement programme named the Slum Networking Programme (SNP) (See Acharya and 
Parikh 2002, Joshi 2002, Dutta 2002), which extends occupancy rights to the slum dwellers for a 
specified period of time. The city has introduced property tax in the slums since 2001 and now 
nearly all the slums, with pucca or semi-pucca structures have been assessed for property tax. 
 
In contrast, Surat’s development does not have any noticeable governance reforms or any notable 
civil society initiatives. The city is representative of early capitalism’s exploitative working and 
living conditions. In that sense the city is very much Dickensian.  For a long time in history, the 
only had some indigenous household industries such as zari (gold and silver brocade thread 
manufacturing and weaving or embroidering them on silk cloth). But, with the setting up of the 
industrial estates by the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC) around Surat, in 
attempt to push industrialization in the state after her formation in 1960, small scale industries 
developed at a very rapid pace in these estates. One of them is the power-loom industries, firstly 
located within these industrial estates and then within the residential areas the city. Another 
small-scale but labour intensive industry is diamond polishing. Power loom and diamond 
polishing industries are the largest employers of the migrant labour, former employing inter-state 
and intra-state migrants whereas the latter intra-state migrants. Many of these are single male 
migrants1. Surat’s industrial development has been mainly through small-scale industries and this 
labour is unorganized. 
 
Since economic reforms in 1991, vicinity to coast has brought large capital-intensive industries 
in the periphery of the city. One such area that houses large capital intensive industries such as 
petrochemical plant, steel mill, gas-based power plant, fertilizer plant, heavy water plant, etc. is 
Hazira industrial area, now connected through strip development along the highways. Hazira 
industrial area has developed as a major industrial area of India and has estimated total 
                                                
1  From our field work. 
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investment of about Rs. 100,000 million and employment of about 5,500 persons1. This region 
has high skilled workers employed in the industries on one hand and low-skilled and 
unorganized labour in the construction work in the area as well as casual labour in the industries. 
 
Surat and her region has important national contribution in case of industrial development. It 
has2: (i) 42 per cent of the world’s and 70 per cent of the nation’s total rough diamond cutting 
and polishing (ii) 40 per cent of the nation’s total polished diamond exports, (iii) 40 per cent of 
the nation’s total man made fabric and 12 per cent of the nation’s total fabric production, (iv) 28 
per cent of the nation’s total manmade fibre production and (vi) 18 per cent of the nation’s total 
manmade fibres export. 
 
 
3.0 Limited and Fragmented Institutional Coverage 
 
We adopt the framework of Social Protection proposed by Drèze and Sen (1991), which lays 
emphasis on promotional aspects of social protection arguing that the promotional objectives 
may make protection easier. But, addressing structural inequalities is important for addressing 
promotional aspects. In market economy such as India, even urban structural inequality is tied to 
access to land and hence land tenure is extremely important for reducing urban deprivations. 
Realising this, the Government of India enacted Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation (ULCR) Act, 
1976, to redistribute urban land. Its implications on urban land market will be discussed later in 
the paper. Access to land is also considered to have impact on transformational social protection, 
as argued in the paper on Pakistan. 
 
As already mentioned earlier, the urban local governments, henceforth referred as the ULBs, 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) and Surat Municipal Corporation (SMC) are 
responsible for basic services provisions in the two cities, except education, health and social 
security. The latter three are not the mandatory responsibilities of the ULB. Both the cities are 
strong on public provisioning of water supply and sanitation facilities to the slums. This has been 
done through using the provision of the Municipal Act of the state government3, Section 63/2, 
which provides for use of 10 per cent of the budgetary funds for low income settlements. Both 
the city governments have been pro-active on this front. Following the extension of basic 
services in the slum settlements, the city governments have begun levying property taxes on the 
dwelling units that are pucca and semi-pucca in nature. This has been seen by the slum dwellers 
as extension of de facto tenure security by the local government. 
 
Over and above this, both city governments have taken up constructing small houses through 
funds available under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission’s (JNNRUM’s) 
Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) component. Ahmedabad is expected to construct 
about 110,000 housing units4 (about 40 per cent of the existing slum households) and Surat 
                                                
1  Surat City Development Plan 
2  Surat Municipal Corporation web site - www.suratmunicipal.gov.in on 1/11/08 
3  Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act (BPMC). 
4  As per the presentation by the Municipal Commissioner of Ahmedabad, IP Gautam, at a National Level 
Workshop on Approaches to the Lands for the Urban Poor, held by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty 
Alleviation, Government of India and CEPT University, at Ahmedabad on April 17, 2009. 
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42,000 housing units1 (about 47 per cent of the existing slum households) under the BSUP. The 
allocation of BSUP units is to the existing slum dwellers, many of them expected to be displaced 
through infrastructure projects of the JNNURM. Both the cities therefore are expected to cover a 
substantial proportion of households living in the slums through the BSUP. It is likely that the 
recent migrant households are not included in the estimates of the total slum households in the 
city. There is no housing programme for them in Ahmedabad and Surat at the moment. 
 
The state government’s institutional arrangement for education and health care caters to only the 
rural areas (Hirway and Mahadevia 2005) and the ULBs are extending limited health care and 
education facilities. Thus, the urban population in general and thus even the urban poor, are 
largely dependent on the private sector for education and health care. Urban poverty alleviation, 
like human development, has been left to trickle-down theory now (Hirway and Mahadevia 2005) 
and even historically (Spodek 2002).  
 
There were some exceptions in the past when the AMC was active in primary education 
provision. But, over time, primary education has shifted to the private sector from public sector 
in the city. The number of private primary schools has increased and that of municipal primary 
schools has decreased over time. There were 906 (63% of total) private primary schools and 539 
(37% of the total) municipal primary schools in 2005-06 when a decade back (1995-96), there 
were 564 (44% of the total) municipal primary schools in the city2. 
 
Another exception is three municipal general hospitals and a state government hospital in 
Ahmedabad city. Surat has one municipal general hospital and a state government hospital, 
although health is a discretionary function of the ULB. But, these are highly inadequate. Since 
2006, Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) has started Urban Health Centres (UHC), one 
in every ward3. The slum dwellers are using this facility4 though the extent of utilization has not 
been researched. The engagement of the government in the social sector in the cities is very 
limited. 
 
National government’s self-employment programme, called the Swarna Jayanti Shaheri Rojgar 
Yojana (SJSRY – Golden Jubilee Urban Employment Programme), which entails setting up of 
Self Help Groups (SHGs) has almost no impact in the two cities. In Surat, the SHGs had saved 
with the SMC, but the system did not work as the officer in charge disappeared with the amount 
collected as savings from the SHG groups5.  
 
Urban Gujarat has large many social infrastructure facilities set up and managed by the NGO 
sector, mainly the philanthropy institutions (Hirway and Mahadevia 2005). Since last three 
decades, NGOs have been active in service delivery in many cities except Surat. Thus, 
Ahmedabad has a long history of such organizations, while Surat has only a recent history, 
                                                
1  Data from the SMC. 
2  From AMC Statistical Outline, 2006-07, from http://www.egovamc.com/amc_budget/Outline%202006-
07.pdf, accessed on May 10, 2009. 
3  As per the presentation of the Urban Health Society of the AMC at City Level Stakeholders’ Workshop 
under the project ‘Inclusive Urbanization – Social Protection for the Slum and Pavement Dwellers in India’ held on 
October 16, 2008, at CEPT University, Ahmedabad. 
4  The slum dwellers of Pravinnagar-Guptanagar told us this when we were conducting the FGDs there. 
5  Told to us by the SMC official Mr. R.P. Patel. 
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almost post-2000. Two NGOs, the Mahila Housing Trust (MHT) and Saath, have been active in 
slum housing and community development for a long time in Ahmedabad City, which would be 
discussed later. 
 
Saath, an NGO has begun the Umeed programme for training the slum youth and placing them in 
the private sector jobs and Sakhi programme for the women wanting to work as domestic help. 
Umeed programme has been adopted by the state government and has attempted to upscale the 
programme. What distinguishes this programme from the earlier ones is that Umeed is targeting 
the training for placing the youth in the globalizing economy as against the earlier attempts of 
training for low value product manufacturing at home that did not have any market. Umeed 
programme has seven training centres in Ahmedabad1. There is no assessment of the programme 
as yet. 
 
There are small initiatives by the NGOs in urban health awareness area as well as running local 
area limited health centres. Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) runs Mahila Swasthya 
Kendra (Women’s Health Centre) for primary health care and awareness programme. Together 
in Surat and Ahmedabad, the population targeted by this programme by SEWA is 1.4 million2. 
The NGO efforts mentioned here are by no means comprehensive but indicating only fragmented 
nature of the coverage. 
 
In Surat, a human rights group, Navsarjan, which is run by the Jesuist priests, has graduated from 
legal literacy and rights campaigns to assisting slum dwellers in forming associations and 
accessing micro finance and basic services. There are other small NGOs working in the city, 
however, with limited coverage of their activities. 
 
As far as the new migrants are concerned, there is nothing in the policy realm, and very limited 
efforts by the NGOs. To our knowledge, one NGO works with the construction labour and given 
that the construction labour are mainly recent or temporary migrants, the NGO is engaged in 
addressing the issues of wages and work environment of the migrant construction workers. 
Otherwise, in terms of policies there is nothing. The migrant labour are left to their own devices 
to integrate within the urban system and hence for them also, tenure matters. In times of any 
external shock, such as the economic crises now or the communal violence of 2002 in 
Ahmedabad, migrants cope by returning back to their place of origin and return back after 
normalization.  
 
Paradoxically, as we will see in the next section, the ULBs have been pro-active in extending 
basic services such as water supply, sewerage and drainage lines, paving and street lights in the 
slums, they are totally inactive in addressing other deprivations, which have been left to the 
market or non-governmental sector. Pro-active extension of basic services in the slums has led to 
extension of de facto tenure rights in these slums and hence has been discussed in the next 
section on tenure levels and innovations. 
                                                
1  From http://www.saath.org/saath/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=71&Itemid=78, 
accessed on May 10, 2009. 
2  As per presentation of Vimo SEWA at a City Level Stakeholders’ Workshop under the project ‘Inclusive 
Urbanization – Social Protection for the Slum and Pavement Dwellers in India’ held on October 16, 2008, at CEPT 
University, Ahmedabad. 
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3.1 Addressing Risks 
We have explained through a Table in Mahadevia (2009b), taking from the framework presented 
in Lustig (2001), that the public policies, which are very important for risk mitigation and more 
so for risk reduction are weak in Gujarat. In their implementation, the state has sought the help of 
non-state actors, but, the coverage of such partnerships has been weak. The urban poor 
households have been left to their own devices to cope with risks and take measures to mitigate 
risks. For coping with risks, the non-state actors, mainly the NGOs, have shown much higher 
capability than the state, as illustrated through the relief measures post 2001 earthquake and 2002 
communal violence in Ahmedabad1. 
 
3.2 Institutional Innovations for Addressing Structural Inequalities 
Two efforts are worth mentioning; one is the micro finance initiatives and other is the SNP. The 
SNP and the other efforts towards enhancing tenure security are discussed in the next section. 
SEWA Bank is the largest micro finance initiative in the state. It has members in both the cities. 
We are not going into the details of the SEWA Bank financial products and activities in this 
paper, but briefly stating the coverage of the Bank. In 2007-08, it had 307,558 savings accounts2 
and 103,679 loan accounts3, which includes loans for housing improvement. SEWA also has 
insurance programme and a micro pension scheme. The insurance coverage is for 173,331 in the 
whole of Gujarat State, including rural areas4. Besides, SEWA, Lok Vikas Nidhi (LVN), another 
Micro Finance Institution (MFI) is also working in both the cities to firstly make women save 
through the SHGs and then extend some of them housing loans. LVN has 9,000 members (all 
women) through 557 SHGs covering seven cities of the state5. Since, the lands occupied by the 
slum dwellers do not have clear and marketable title, the MFIs have to extend unsecured loans 
for housing. SEWA Bank’s upper limit of unsecured loans are Rs. 50,000 whereas the LVN’s 
loan amount starts with 2.5 times the amount saved in the first borrowing to Rs. 500,000, but, 
available for all purposes including housing. 
 
 
4.0 Tenure Security 
 
4.1 Defining Tenure Security 
Land tenure can be defined as the mode by which land is held or owned, or the set of 
relationships among people concerning land or its product (Payne 2000). It is different from 
property rights. Property rights are defined as “a recognized interest in land or property vested in 
an individual or group and can apply separately to land or development on it.” (Durand-Lasserve 
and Royston 2002). The tenure is known to be one of the most important steps leading to housing 
                                                
1  Based on author’s own participation in these efforts post the two events. The civil society has been actively 
fighting the state complacency in 2002 communal violence in the state even today. 
2  http://www.sewabank.com/savings-general.htm (accessed on September 9, 2009). 
3  http://www.sewabank.com/overview.htm (accessed on September 9, 2009). 
4  As per presentation of Vimo SEWA at a City Level Stakeholders’ Workshop under the project ‘Inclusive 
Urbanization – Social Protection for the Slum and Pavement Dwellers in India’ held on October 16, 2008, at CEPT 
University, Ahmedabad. 
5  As per presentation of Rajesh Shah of LVN, at a City Level Stakeholders’ Workshop under the project 
‘Inclusive Urbanization – Social Protection for the Slum and Pavement Dwellers in India’ held on October 16, 2008, 
at CEPT University, Ahmedabad. 
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investments in low income households. Security of tenure is derived from variety of factors 
associated with the constitutional rights and legal framework, social norms, cultural values and 
to some extent, individual preference. In simple language a person or a household can be said to 
have secure tenure when they are protected from involuntary removal from their land or 
residence, except in exceptional circumstances, and then only by means of a known and agreed 
legal procedure, which must itself be objective, equally applicable, contestable and independent 
(UNCHS 2003). Such exceptional circumstances might include situations where physical safety 
of life and property is threatened, or where the person to be evicted have themselves taken 
occupation of the property by force or intimidation (UNCHS 2003). 
 
UNCHS (2003) identifies four main factors as contributing to the protection of households from 
eviction: 
 
 Length of occupation (older settlement enjoy a much better level of legitimacy, and thus of 
protection, than new settlement) 
 Size of settlement (small settlements are more vulnerable than those with a large 
population) 
 Level of unity of community organization 
 Support from the third sector organizations like NGO’s etc. 
 
There is a debate as to whether land titles ought to be given to the poor, given the available 
evidences of gentrification when that is done. On the practical side, there are problems of giving 
clear land titles in many slums because the land transactions are without legal sale deed. In 
contrast, land rights exist as a part of other rights in society as a whole and we are calling them 
occupancy rights guaranteed by the state. Rights may cover access, use, development or transfer 
almost like having land ownership, however without legal documents. Land rights could be 
ensured through public policy. The SNP discussed below, ensures land rights / occupancy rights 
for 10 years after the completion of the project. 
 
There is an intermediate stage of tenure security, which is called de facto tenure. Some have 
argued that continuum of security in informal settlements depends less on exact legal status and 
more on the occupants’ perception of security based on the probability of evictions. This 
perceived security is attained through passage of time and availability of services in the 
settlement (Gilbert 2002), the latter made available through households’ own efforts or through 
the efforts of the local government. 
 
4.2 Issues Around Tenure Security in Two Cities 
To understand different levels of tenure security, it is essential to discuss the process of 
formation of informal settlements/ slums in the two cities. In Ahmedabad City, there are two 
types of low income settlements, majority of them categorized as informal ones: (i) chawls or 
chalis, which are one room dwelling units laid in a row and (ii) slums, which are spontaneous 
settlements developed over time. The former were developed by the textile mill owners as 
industrial workers’ housing in very much a Fordist way. While most of these industries closed 
down, displacing former workers to unorganized sector, their chawls remain and the closed 
mills’ workers and their families continue to occupy these dwelling units, paying rents frozen at 
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the time1 the chawls were constructed. The chawls have gone into disrepair because of low rents 
– as low as Rs. 7 to Rs. 15 per month; owners are not interested in even collecting the rent; some 
owners have sold off some dwelling units in a chawl to the occupants to recover as much money 
as they can. This has created a complex situation with regards to tenure. Our field studies have 
shown that there are disputes between the tenants and the chawl owners, there are disputes 
among the heirs of the original chawl owner for the ownership of the chawl, some tenants are not 
paying rent and some rental units have been sold off by the original tenants to the second 
generation tenants, through taking ‘good will’2 money. Unless, all the tenants agree to resolve 
the ownership problem, there is no tenure solution for such settlements. There 958 such chawls 
in Ahmedabad City3. Surat does not have such industrial workers’ housing. 
 
Slums, have originated through squatting on the public lands, largely local government lands and 
state government lands. Many marginal lands, such as low-lying lands, lands on the riverbank, 
on the lake-bank, under high-tension lines, etc. are squatted upon and a slum is formed. The land 
plot reservations under the Master Plan of the city are also squatted upon because the local 
government is unable to utilize these lands for the purpose they were reserved for. The first 
Master Plan of both the cities had a Green Belt around the city. This meant that the private lands 
falling under the Green belt could not carry out any development on these lands, causing loss to 
the land owners. The land owners, in such cases, organized squatting. This is true for both the 
cities. Besides, in Ahmedabad, there are ‘Trust’4 lands, which have been either given on long 
term lease – most of the times on 99-year lease – or rental basis. Some unutilized lands of the 
Trusts have been squatted upon.  
 
Since 1976, when the ULCR Act was promulgated, lands in access of ceiling were issued notice 
for acquisition. An ULC Authority was set up, whose jurisdiction was 5 km around the city 
boundary. With the expansion of city boundary, the ULC boundary would also expand. A large 
number of the ULC notified lands were therefore in the peri-urban areas, where urbanization 
took place through the expansion of the informal land markets. The ULC notified lands came 
under the informal housing sub-market (Mehta and Mehta 1989), many of them in the low-
income segment. In fact, the developers purchased the lands at low prices from the land owners 
notified for land acquisition under the Act and then circumvented the provisions of the Act to 
bring these lands in the market. The developers purchased these lands from the land owners and 
acquired a Power of Attorney from the latter to carry out land plot sale. Thus, the original 
owner’s name remains in the land documents, the power of attorney to develop it lies with 
someone else (the developer) and the buyers make an agreement with the developer to buy a plot 
of land through a stamp-paper agreement. Such lands remain locked in the informal market and 
                                                
1  Because of the Rent Control Act. 
2  Good will amount represents the market value of a rental unit. Since a rental unit cannot be sold by a tenant, 
and it being a rent control property the original tenant not interested in giving back the property to the owner, a 
system of ‘Good will’ amount has developed. It is the down payment taken by the first generation tenant from the 
second generation tenant and so on. 
3  As per presentation by Municipal Commissioner of Ahmedabad, IP Gautam, at a National Level Workshop 
on Approaches to the Lands for the Urban Poor, held by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, 
Government of India and CEPT University, at Ahmedabad on April 17, 2009. 
4  Philanthropy organizations are registered under Commissioner of Charity as Trusts and the governing 
board of a Trust is comprised of Trustees, who volunteer their time to ensure functioning of the Trust. Subsequently, 
all NGOs have been registering as a Trust. 
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extending property titles is not feasible in the present land legislation system (Mahadevia and 
Joshi 2009). 
 
Within these informal systems, there are land disputes emanating from inheritance. The original 
owners of the lands may have died in due course of time and the slums remain locked up when 
the land owner is not traceable. It has been nearly impossible to clear the land titles in case of 
slums on private lands. A slum we are studying in details for community mobilization has such a 
situation. Sanjaynagar, where MHT has organized women for SNP as well as putting up a waste 
collective, the original land owner is not traceable and the occupants believe that the AMC is the 
owner, which is not the case. The ULB could have acquired this land through a legal process but 
has not done so. The occupants want that they get legal land titles so that they could take 
securitized loan and invest in housing. 
 
Lastly, there is a case of public lands on which slums are located. Many of such slums are on 
lands reserved for Green belt, for public utilities, etc. The lands under Green belt, were kept free 
of any development. But, these being private lands, the owners did not approve of the freeze on 
their development and invited a developer (operating in the informal market) to take up sub-
plotting and sale of plots in the informal market. Pravinnagar-Guptanagar, another settlement 
where SNP has been implemented and we have undertaken primary research has developed on 
Green belt reserved land. 
 
Given these dynamics, we find different levels of tenure security in the low income settlements 
in the two cities. The level of tenure security in the two cities1 is defined by the following criteria: 
 
1) Length of occupation, through the process of incremental development and patron-client 
relationship (older settlement enjoy a much better level of legitimacy, and thus of 
protection, than new settlement). This is established through possession of a quasi-legal 
document on a stamp-paper indicating date of sale/ purchase of the land/house or both 
(called stamp paper document). This is not a registered document and hence cannot 
establish legal property title. Length of stay ensures the availability of the following 
documents by the household: 
(i) Possession of a Ration Card 
(ii) Possession of a electoral (voting card) 
(iii) Receiving property tax bill and possessing property tax payment receipt. 
 
2) Size of settlement (small settlements are more vulnerable than those with a large 
population) 
3) Public policy decisions such as: 
(i) Issuance of a Photo ID Card by the Urban Local Body (ULB), which is dependent 
on the cut-off date announce by the ULB. 
(ii) Extension of basic services - water supply, sewerage, drainage, internal road paving 
and street lights – by the Urban Local Body (ULB) 
(iii) Upgradation under SNP (the current programme) or under any other programme 
(iv) Expansion of property tax network 
                                                
1  We assume that the factors that determine level of security in other states in India will be different, given 
the local legal framework and political economies. 
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4) Facilitation by an external agency – such as the NGO 
5) Level of unity of the community or community mobilization 
 
4.3 Institutional Innovations on Tenure 
Both the cities have seen institutional innovations on the issue of land tenure, even though the 
state of Gujarat does not have Tenure regularization policy for extending property rights to the 
slum dwellers. Ahmedabad City has a Habitat award winning programmes called the SNP, which 
is a partnership between the AMC and the slum community through facilitation of an NGO. In 
its first phase, even a private sector partnered; engagement of private sector did not last long. 
Besides contributing about 80 per cent of the costs of infrastructure provision, the AMC has also 
partnered through extending 10 years occupancy rights to the SNP slum. In case the slum is on a 
private land, the permission of the land owner is sought for the same. The NGOs, MHT and 
Saath, have been active in the SNP in Ahmedabad. The SNP has reached 13,000 households in 
60 slums, covering 3.6 per cent of the total  slum households in the city.  
 
Figure 1: Process of Mobilization by MHT for SNP 
Community 
Sensitization
Start TDO 
Process Application to 
AMC
Video Film 
Display & Folk 
Media
Area Meeting
Tender process
Estimate
Mahila
Housing 
Trust
Sanction for work 
implementation
Work Order
Training for CBO 
and Comm. 
Mobiliser
Deposit of 
Community 
Contribution to 
AMCImplementation
Area Maintenance  
by CBO  
 
Note: TDO process is to get clearance for the project from the Town Development Officer, in-
charge of implementing the TP Scheme1. 
 
MHT, is a sister organization of SEWA, and the SEWA bank extends housing credit to the 
households participating in the SNP. Both, MHT and Saath have extensive community level 
processes for implementing the SNP. The process followed by the MHT is depicted in Figure 1. 
Intervention in a slum starts with assessing whether the slum can qualify for SNP. For this 
                                                
1  TP Scheme means Town Planning Scheme, which is prepared on the principal of land pooling and 
readjustment technique. 
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purpose, a survey of 710 and 958 chawls was undertaken by the MHT and AMC1. This survey 
was on some 140 parameters, of which, a few, such as on the land ownership, reservation on the 
plot of land if any, and proposed land use for the plot indicated whether the slum would qualify 
for improvement. If the slum comes under the category of any reservation of land or any land 
dispute, it would not qualify for SNP. From the list of slums qualified for SNP, MHT selected 
slums where they had an active community mobilizer. MHT assists the households to access 
SEWA bank credit for raising household contribution for the project. Some households have also 
taken credit for dwelling unit upgradation. Implementing SNP means guarantee of occupancy 
rights for 10 years from the date of completion of the project but not property rights. Since, 
property rights are not extended, the slum households can take maximum of Rs. 50,000 as 
housing loan, subject to other borrowing conditionalities of SEWA Bank. An important 
conditionality of loan from SEWA Bank is related to the savings behaviour of the household. 
 
Sanjaynagar, a settlement where MHT has implemented SNP is an interesting case. The residents 
of the settlement had gone through a bitter experience of approaching the AMC for the SNP 
through the local councillor and contributing Rs. 500 per household in 2002. This did not work 
out and the slum residents had become sceptics. The MHT approached the slum dwellers through 
active women of the settlement, contacted these self-employed women engaged in piece-rate 
work on their work site, which was an open plot of land in the settlement, convinced them to 
participate in the SNP, took their written consent and started the process with the AMC. All 
households, the owners as well as tenants contributed Rs. 2,100 for the SNP project. Eventually, 
the settlement received all basic services from the AMC and occupancy right for 10 years. MHT 
assisted the women to open accounts in SEWA Bank, get a ration card, which is a very important 
proof of residence for low income households. The schedule of payment of the households was 
decided based on its affordability. MHT continuously motivated the households to contribute 
towards gradual upgradation of the services and then the house. Today, because the slum does 
not have property rights, they have not constructed a permanent roof and gone vertically up. But, 
aspirations have risen in the slum; the dwellers are interested in getting property right but, the 
settlement is on a private land whose owner cannot be traced. Eventually a women’s association 
has been set up and this association also takes contracts for solid waste management in other 
parts of the city. This Community Based Organization (CBO) is part of a larger network of 
CBOs set up by SEWA and named Vilasini.  
 
In Pravinnagar-Gupatnagar, Saath has utilized SNP as an entry point to undertake community 
development and has gone ahead to organize an Urban Resource Centre, URC), an institution for 
local participatory governance, anchored by the local community. Antecedents of Saath’s 
intervention in this settlement goes back to 1992, when the organization conducted a survey in 
the settlement and found that the residents wanted extension of civic amenities to the settlement. 
The organization first intervened in health and nutrition area in 1993, through setting up a 
dispensary and then in education through first starting pre-school classes and then two schools. 
Saath got the AMC interested in the settlement and in 1996 begun community mobilization for 
the SNP. First of all, a women’s collective was started. The slum households had to contribute 
Rs. 2,100 as beneficiary contribution for the SNP, which they were not willing to pay given 
insecure land tenure, as the slum was on a Green belt land. Saath got an undertaking from the 
AMC for a five year de facto tenure, which was then extended for 10 years in 2001. This could 
                                                
1  Data from the MHT. 
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be done because technically, this reserved land belonged to the local government. Even this level 
of occupancy rights extension has led to the households upgrading their house quality and with it 
has also upgraded their aspirations. The dwellers now want a legal tenure, that is, extension of 
property rights. Thus, extension of occupancy rights in this slum has led to not just improvement 
in their quality of life but also upward mobility of their aspirations seeing that the change is 
possible. 
 
An outcome of these increased aspirations is now setting up an URC in this community. URC is 
a community level institution which forms a platform for opportunity and knowledge exchange 
between service users and service providers. URC is functioning to empower slum residents, 
equipping them with knowledge and confidence to negotiate their entitlements and be part of city 
planning process. The URC helps act as an information hub and knowledge base. The URC helps 
people get ration cards and electric connections and with legal matters and tax payment. The 
URC acts to ensure that the service users have increased reach, choice and efficiency in the 
delivery of services and to empower them to act as an advocate to get quality and timely services. 
URC is situated in the settlement and run by its residents only. URC was set up by Saath but in 
due course has become partner of Saath. This case illustrates a holistic transformation of 
people’s lives begun through extension of occupancy rights in an informal settlement. Along 
with it, community mobilization, NGO support, size of settlement and its long history as 
settlement has helped in upgrading the tenure security level. Next section will indicate how this 
settlement stands out in comparison to the other settlements in the ward.  
 
In Surat, institutional innovation is engagement of the MHT in assisting the local government, 
the SMC, in extending basic services in some slums. Further, as already mentioned, the SMC has 
decided to allocate 10 per cent of its budget for improving slums in the city. The SMC lays main 
trunk infrastructure in the slum settlements and the individual household bears the cost of 
individual toilet and water supply and drainage connection. For households in, what the SMC 
calls Economically Weaker Section (EWS) category – indicated through temporary roof and/or 
temporary walls, even the costs of extending the network to the individual house and 
constructing an individual toilet is borne by the SMC. In Surat city, by the end of March 2006, 
about 80 per cent of the slum households were covered by the SMC’s basic services programme1. 
But, the level of tenure is decided by whether the slum comes in the list of settlements to be 
displaced for public works and road widening. Even if these households were to be displaced, 
based on their residential proof, such as the ration card and recently issued Biometric card, they 
will be eligible for rehabilitation in the BSUP housing.  
 
Surat has a different dimension with regards to tenure. A very large proportion of slum residents 
are first generation migrants. Some of them are single male migrants and are not interested in 
any tenure security and are content with living in rental premises with access to water supply and 
sanitation. Some of them over time, settle down in the city, bring their families, and shift from 
rental to self-ownership house in an informal settlement. Even then, a section of them have an 
idea to return back to their native villages after retirement. Some do not and would therefore 
want tenure regularization. The squatters on the SMC land have expressed desire for tenure 
regularization so that they can invest in upgrading the house. 
                                                
1  Information collected from SMC Website on 29/07/2008 and from meeting with Mr. R.P.Patel (Dy. Town 
Planner), Slum Upgradation Cell, SMC 
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Both, the local government and the civil society organizations have played role to ensure at least 
de facto tenure security to the slum dwellers in both the cities. However, the local government is 
more pro-active in this in Surat whereas the civil society organizations have developed 
interesting partnership cases in Ahmedabad. But, a full tenure security will be possible only if 
legal titles are conferred, either on individual basis or collective basis. Gujarat state does not 
have this policy, but, is considering making one. 
 
4.4 Tenure Security and Level of Living 
The question of level of tenure security is assessed from the five aspects mentioned in the 
previous section. By this we have categorised four levels of tenure status: (i) occupancy right 
extended under the SNP; (ii) strong de facto tenure extended through presence of an NGO in the 
settlement and/ or community mobilization, extension of basic services by the ULB and property 
tax payment receipt; (iii) weak de facto tenure extended through provision of basic services by 
the ULB and property tax payment receipt and (iv) no security because of threat of eviction, lack 
of presence of an NGO or community organization and not receiving property tax bill. 
 
Information on six settlements in Vasna ward of Ahmedabad City is presented in Table 1. 
Settlements from one ward were selected for research purposes to reduce the differences in level 
of services and population characteristics arising from their locational parameters. Vasna ward is 
in south-west of Ahmedabad, located along an important North-South axis road called the 
Ashram road. The ward has many slum settlements. It was a peripheral ward till 2006 when the 
city boundary was expanded. Basic facilities have been extended to the slums of this ward in last 
three to four years only, with the exception of the SNP slums where the facilities were extended 
around 2000-2001. 
 
The settlements are listed in the order of their level of tenure security, from the most secure 
settlement, which is Pravinnagar-Guptanagar to the least secure, Mangal Talav na Chhapra 
(temporary dwelling units). The households in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar as well as Jadibanagar 
have attained occupancy right on account of their development under the Slum Networking 
Programme (SNP). The Table indicates that all the settlements have similar category of informal 
work. However, living conditions indicated by variables of physical infrastructure in them 
deteriorates with the decline in level of tenure security1. In short, there are more ‘Yes’ answers as 
one moves from right to left and more ‘No’ answers when one moves from left to right. 
 
Table 1: Facilities by Level of Tenure, Vasna Ward, Ahmedabad 
Settlement name Pravinnagar- 
Guptanagar 
Jadibanagar Sorainagar Omnagar Yogeshwarnagar Mangal 
Talav  
Tenure security Occupancy 
right 
Occupancy 
right 
Strong de 
facto 
Weak de facto Insecure Insecure 
Population 6,750 550 3,875 3,250 4,000 2,275 
No of Households 1317 90 710 650 900 650 
Land Ownership Private Private Private Private Private Municipal 
Age of the slum 40 35 35 45 40 55 
                                                
1  We have completed quantitative survey in these settlements, which will give us answer to how much 
difference tenure makes with regards to not just improvement in physical conditions of living but also with regards 
to reduction in other deprivations. 
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(years) 
Housing condition Pucca Semi pucca Semi pucca Pucca Semi pucca Katcha 
Occupation - Men Construction, 
shop keepers, & 
insecure private 
sector jobs 
Construction
, vegetable 
vendors 
Construction Insecure jobs 
in formal-
informal 
sectors 
Construction Jobs in 
ULB, 
waste 
pickers 
Occupation - Women Construction, 
vegetable 
vendors, 
domestic help, 
tailoring 
Vegetable 
vendors 
Domestic 
help, 
Tailoring 
Housewives Housewives, 
Domestic 
workers 
Rag 
Pickers 
Stamp paper 
agreement 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Property tax 
assessment 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
SNP Yes Yes No No No No 
No eviction guarantee 
under SNP   
10 years 10 years - -  -  -  
Demolition 
notification 
 - − − -  −  Yes 
Individual water tap Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Water supply for 
individual taps 
Yes Yes No No − Yes 
Water supply since After SNP After SNP −   − 2 years 
Handpump − − Yes   Yes - Illegal   
Quality of water Good Good Average Bad Average Good 
Individual Toilets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 50% H/H 
Scheme for toilet 
construction 
SNP SNP Individual 
latrine 
scheme* 
Individual 
latrine 
scheme* 
Individual latrine 
scheme* 
1000 Rs 
scheme 
Who provided toilets Saath MHT AMC  Households AMC Households
/ World 
Vision 
Individual bath space Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Sewer line Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Type of sewer line Underground Undergroun
d 
Underground Underground − Undergrou
nd 
Scheme for laying 
sewer line 
SNP SNP AMC AMC − AMC 
Septic well Yes       Yes- full   
Storm water drainage Yes No No No No No 
Garbage collection Yes No No Yes No No 
Internal paved roads Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Street lights Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Anganwadi** Yes No Yes No No No 
Health centre inside 
the settlement 
Yes No No No No No 
Electricity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Transportation 
Facilities 
Nearby Nearby Far Nearby Nearby Nearby 
Election Card Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ration Card Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BPL Card Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Micro finance Saath &  SEWA SEWA Bank SEWA Bank No No No 
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availability Bank 
Community 
organization 
URC***, Other 
mandals****  
Mahila****
* Mandal  
None None None None 
General Comments There are many 
2-3 story pucca 
houses 
  Problem of 
accessibility 
  Overall in a bad 
condition 
Overall in 
very bad 
condition 
* Under this scheme, the local government provides materials, namely, 2 bags of cement, door 
for toilet, pipes and water closet. Construction cost is born by the beneficiaries, through either 
sweat equity or paid labour. 
** Pre-school children centre 
*** Urban Resource Centre 
***** Collective 
***** Women  
Pucca house = with wall and roof materials of permanent nature; katch house = with wall and 
roof materials of temporary nature and semi-pucca is inbetween type. 
 
Source: Field visits 
 
Table 2 below gives similar data for the slums in Surat. However, these slums are located in 
different wards and were randomly picked up for understanding the dynamics in the city. Here 
too, there are more ‘Yes’ answers as one moves from right to left and more ‘No’ answers when 
one moves from left to right. 
 
Table 2: Facilities by Level of Tenure, Surat 
Settlement name Apexanagar Jaijawan – 
Jaikisannagar 
Rasulabad Dalit Vasahat Tadkeshwar Nikhalasnagar 
Tenure Status Strong de 
facto 
Strong de facto Weak de facto Insecure Insecure Insecure 
No of Households 970 1984 350 337 382 NA 
Land Ownership Private Private SMC SMC Partly SMC & 
partly private 
SMC 
Stamp paper available Yes Yes No No No No 
Property tax payment Yes  Yes Yes No Yes No 
Electricity bill receipt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Housing condition Permanent Semi -
permanent 
Semi -
permanent 
Temporary Semi 
permanent 
Temporary 
Individual water tap Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Individual Toilets Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Individual Bath space Yes Yes No No No No 
Sewer line Yes Yes No No No No 
Rain water Drain Yes Yes No No No No 
Garbage collection No No No No No No 
Paved Roads Yes Yes No No No On footpath 
Street lights Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Anganwadi Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Health Centre inside 
the settlement 
No No No No No No 
Electricity connection Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Source: Field visits 
 
4.5 Tenure and Social Protection 
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This will be quantitatively assessed from the findings of our household survey. However, before 
that, we have recorded some case studies, which we will present here briefly to indicate the link 
between tenure security and social protection.  
 
Case 1: This case is of workers displaced from the cotton textile mills living in the rental 
housing protected under the rent control act. Trivedi (1995) finds that the displaced textile 
workers could cope because they were not pushed on footpath after losing their formal sector 
jobs. After employment loss, their children continued to study in the schools. The only difference 
to their life was that they had stopped maintaining their house regularly as before. 
 
Case 2: This case is of the households employed in Diamond polishing industry in Ahmedabad. 
The Diamond Polishing units (called the Diamantaires) have lost their business because of the 
sharp and sudden decline in demand for diamonds since October 2008, an impact of global 
economic recession (Soni 2008a: 3). Consequently, in Ahmedabad City alone, 80,000 diamond 
polishing workers have been affected, with no work available since October 2008 (Soni 2008b: 
4). Since June 2008, 65 per cent of the business of these diamond polishing units has declined in 
the city (Soni 2008b: 4). The workers have shifted to other low wage works informal jobs. There 
are reports that their children were about to loose their school enrolment on account of their 
families’ inability to pay the school fees. But, a report states that, 45 of the 115 schools where 
their children study, has decided to waive of their school fees and other contributions till the 
family is able to meet these costs (Trivedi 2008: 4). Thus, ethos of philanthropy in Ahmedabad 
city has come to rescue of the households affected by this sudden crises. 
 
Case 3: This case is of a vice president of a women’s empowerment organization, Nari Shakti 
Mahila Mandal, set up with the assistance of Navsarjan in Surat.  Shantabhen Tukeram Chauhan, 
now lives in a pucca, that is a permanent house, in Tadkeshwar slum. She has invested in raising 
the plinth of her house to prevent water entering her house during monsoon downpours. She has 
an individual toilet, individual water supply, a kitchen, electricity connection and three pucca 
rooms of which two have been rented out. The living conditions have improved dramatically 
from 22 years back when they came to live here, from walking through a knee-high much to 
what it is now. They were dumped by the SMC on the border of an open drain, after evicting 
them from the central city. 
 
Shantabhen is an employee of Navsarjan. Her income is Rs. 3,000 per month. She has a sewing 
machine and she earns Rs. 2,000 from sewing per month. Her husband earns Rs. 7,000 per 
month through taking contracts in construction industry. Her son and daughter study, the 
daughter goes to college and the son is in 10th standard in the school. Her income from rent is Rs. 
2,000 per month, from which she pays the electricity charges of her tenants as well as the 
property tax. 
 
She is coordinating the activities of the local savings group of the LVN. There are 25 members in 
the group and they contribute Rs. 100 per month as savings. A member cannot contribute more 
than Rs. 100 in the savings group, which is the norm in the city. The savings group operates its 
own account, with sign of three women members. She is also a member of Rotating Savings and 
Credit Association (ROSCA), and contributes Rs. 3,000 per month to this Vishi (Chit fund). 
There are 24 members of Vishi and one person’s name is selected through lottery for disbursing 
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money. The person does not have to return the money. Every person’s turn to get Vishi money 
comes after 24 months, that is once in two years. When her turn came, she got Rs. 72,000 from 
this Vishi, which she used for house extension. She has taken a housing loan of Rs. 50,000 from 
the LVN and the line of credit has been extended by the Axis Bank, a private sector bank. She 
has also borrowed Rs. 20,000 from a private financing institution named Sahara India. This 
amount was also used for housing. In all, she borrowed Rs. 70,000 for housing and got another 
Rs. 72,000 from the Vishi and in all she invested Rs. 200,000 for upgrading the house. She also 
got a loan of Rs. 4,500 from LVN for buying a sewing machine. Thus, access to micro finance 
has helped changing the life of Shantabhen.  
 
Her payments every month for the micro finance activities and other borrowings are: (i) Rs. 100 
as contribution to the LVN savings groups; (ii) Rs. 3,000 to the Vishi; (iii) Rs. 2,045 as 
installment for the housing loan from LVN; and (iv) some amount for repayment of Sahara loan, 
which will not be more than Rs. 1000 per month1. This is affordable as the family’s monthly 
income is Rs. 15,000. 
 
But, the ending of this story is sad. The SMC is going to displace this slum. The slum residents 
are very worried. The name of the slum is in the list of slums to be displaced. Of the 327 slum 
settlements in the city, 111, that is about 34 per cent are to be displaced because of planned 
infrastructure projects2. Even though they will get rehabilitated under the BSUP, the household 
will have to take another loan for the purpose and this investment made will go waste. Thus, 
even if MFI institutions help in structurally transforming the living conditions of the urban poor, 
a secure tenure is more important. 
 
 
5.0 Policy Recommendations 
 
Urbanization is a continuous process of new population being added to the city. But, because of 
the urban development paradigm, historically imbibed from the Eurocentric urban planning 
practices, and now matching with the national elites occupying the cities, informality has become 
a norm rather than an exception in the cities of the developing economies. India is no exception. 
The neo-liberal developmental state emerging in India since economic reforms (Mahadevia 
2008a), has infact, pushed the poor out to the cities and squeezed lands available for their living 
and working. Nonetheless, the poor have survived and continue to live in Indian cities through 
subversions and informalities. Urbanization in India is through these processes. As this paper 
illustrates, taking examples from Ahmedabad and Surat, the poor squat and then inhabit lands 
with informal or uncertain tenure. They continue to improve their lives through their own efforts 
and the process gets a boost if an external agency such as an NGO intervenes or the local 
government extends de facto tenure security through extending basic services or partnering with 
an NGO for programmes such as SNP. 
 
This paper also illustrates that the efforts for social protection by the state are limited due to 
institutional limitations. The local state in Gujarat is engaged in provided only physical 
infrastructure whereas the state government has a mandate to ensure employment guarantee and 
                                                
1  She did not say how much. 
2   Data from the SMC. 
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provide primary education, primary health care and social security. But, the state government has 
restricted these functions to only rural areas and the poor households in urban areas are left to 
fend for themselves. Philanthropy and development NGOs have come to assist the urban poor, 
albeit their best efforts are fragmented and limited. There is a big institutional vacuum as far as 
extension of social protection efforts is concerned. The ULB in Ahmedabad, the AMC has begun 
with creating institutions of primary health care, but, these are recent and we do not have any 
evaluation of their utilization and impact. Thus, the first recommendation of this article will be 
that the state government assists the ULBs in extending social protection measures in the cities 
through the structure of decentralized governance mandated under the Indian Constitution1. 
 
In absence of institutions and policies of social protection, tenure security, even if it is de facto 
tenure security has assisted in the slum households in reducing their deprivations. However, if an 
external intervention through a slum development programme such as SNP or even extension of 
basic services by the ULB, alleviates the slum to de facto tenure security. In fact, the SNP 
ensures occupancy rights to the slum dwellers for 10 year period. This has led to transformation 
in the lives of the slum dwellers. When an NGO intervenes and mobilizes a community, even if 
the SNP is not implemented, the slum moves up the level in tenure security to high de facto 
tenure security. If the ULB has extended basic services then the slum attains a weak de facto 
tenure security. This study indicates that there are many levels of tenure security, attained 
through inaction of the local state (through not displacing informal settlement if not warranted), 
through pro-active action by the local state in extending services or implementing programme 
such as SNP, through an NGO’s intervention and community mobilization. 
 
This study also shows that eventually, the slum dwellers want a legal title to the property. But, 
that aspiration comes after they have gone through a process of upgrading their tenure security 
from informal to high de facto/ occupancy rights category. But, before legal property rights are 
extended, it is necessary that the right to live in the city is extended through atleast guaranteeing 
a weak de facto tenure security. This study also shows that tenure is more important for 
transformational social protection than access to micro finance. Hence, among all the efforts 
made for promotional as well as transformational social protection, tenure security extension is 
the most important in case of the urban areas. 
 
Ahmedabad has made transition from a Fordist regime to a neo-liberal regime, creating massive 
informalization. Surat is a Dickensian city, steeped in vast slum landscapes and migrant housing. 
Ahmedabad City, being the largest metropolis of the state, represents the aspirations of the 
state’s ruling class – the political and business class – to become a global city in her own right, 
promoting post-modernist buildings, economic growth centres through enclave development, 
city beautification projects and low income housing to rehabilitate displaced slum dwellers. The 
indigenous and bottom-up solution to urban poverty and vulnerability, represented through a 
programme like the SNP and also MFIs, have been relegated to a backstop, with the state moving 
in with the grand scheme of projects designed and implemented top-down. The idea of gradual 
integration of the migrants into city’s economy through negotiating local political processes has 
been replaced by a state-determined citizenship rights granted through schemes such as the 
BSUP, ID Cards, etc. At the same time, the local state is expanding its welfare role, say through 
                                                
1  Indian Constitution was amended in 1992 through 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, to create ward 
committees as local governance institution. 
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setting up of Urban Health Centres. The local state is also attempting to ‘include’ the slum 
dwellers for the purpose of increasing ‘efficiency’ – generating revenue from them as well as 
sanitizing the city from slums. 
 
Surat, a Dickensian city is sought to change through expansion of the welfare role of the local 
state. The local state has covered nearly all the informal settlements through basic services 
network, irrespective of the legal status, the threat of eviction looms even on the serviced slums.  
 
Two cities so selected where there have been innovations. Also cities selected where the local 
governments are pro-active and also civil society is active. Thus, we find progress with regards 
to increasing level of tenure security. Thus, a comparative understanding of the levels of tenure 
security could be developed along with observing differences in levels of living across different 
levels of tenure security could be observed. With the improvement in tenure security, the 
aspiration levels of the households change.  
 
Study finds that community mobilization has played a primary role in enhancing tenure security. 
But, results have been achieved in partnership and without confrontation with the local state. 
However, the process is slow. The state of Gujarat might as well move towards a tenure 
regularization policy and then a law. Detailed tenure status analysis will then be required to 
implement the policy. It is envisaged that the tenure complexity arises from town planning 
legislation and land legislation. It will be necessary to amend the land legislation, amend the 
town planning paradigm and legislation, and create participatory mechanisms for implementing 
these at the local level. To solve the complicated puzzle of tenure, number of policy and 
institutional changes need to be carried out in the cities. This will only happen when urban 
planning profession itself becomes inclusive and sensitive to the informal processes of city 
development observed all throughout urban India and as a matter of fact all throughout 
urbanizing Asia. 
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The rights of urban informal workers and access to social protection:  The 
Philippine experience 
 
Resurreccion Lao 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-Asia, 
 
 
I.Introduction 
 
1. A brief historical overview  of the development of the Philippine urban poor and the  
informal  sector 
 
While figures vary on how many they really are in the Philippines, undoubtedly, informality has 
been a “stubborn” feature of the country’s economy the last forty years.  The 1950s and 1960s 
saw the adoption of the Philippine government of import substitution model as a policy to 
achieve economic growth.  The almost twenty-year rule (1970-1986) of the late Marcos 
administration initiated to implement policies for export orientation.  Some Filipino analysts and 
sociologists opined that repercussions of this policy created  the environment in pushing a 
segment of the Philippine population to take on livelihood activities and to “survive” outside the 
mainstream economy. The informal sector was estimated to be around ten (10) million then 
(Apolonio, 2002).   Until the middle 1980s and the 1990s, the environment of fierce competition 
as a consequence of the government-supported economic liberation policy saw the scarcity and 
deterioration of jobs, thus leaving the unskilled Filipino worker behind. 
The own-account workers increased by almost 12 million from 10 million in 1996.  Thirty five 
(35%) of the own-account are women. In this five-year period, the number of female-led 
informal business increased by 22 % while the male-led informal businesses grew by only 4 
percent.   Thus, more women are finding themselves into the informal economy for survival 
(Apolonio, 2002).    Hence, from the more than 10 million in the 1990s, the 2002 Labor Force 
Survey estimated the number to be 22 million or 75% of the almost 40 million labor force  and 
that (Homenet-Philippines, 2006).  
Based from 2003 figures of the National Statistical Office (NSO) and the National Statistical 
Coordination Board (NSCB), at least three out of every ten Filipinos are still locked in poverty. 
More than half of the almost 78 million Filipinos view themselves as kabus, pobre,  or mahirap 
(the Visayan and Tagalog word for poor). The official unemployment rate is almost 10% but 
underemployment could be higher than 22% (Gonzales, 2007).  According to the National 
Statisticial Coordination Board (NSCB), forty three (43%) of the country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in 2006 came from the informal sector (Cilindro 2008). Of the estimated 14.6 
million in 2007 by the Bureau of Labor Emloyment and Statistics (BLES), 40.6% are women. 
 
2. The 2008 Informal Sector Survey 
Supported by the UNESCAP, a first-ever nationwide  data collection operation of the informal 
sector was conducted by the Philippine National Statistics Office (NSO).  Based from the 2008 
Informal Sector Survey (2008 ISS), there were about 10.5 million informal operators identified.  
These informal sector operators are either self-employed without any paid employee or employee 
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in  own-family operated business or farm.  .  The self-employed are about 9.1 million while the 
employer numbered 1.3 million.  Other survey results include that four out of ten operators are 
mostly attain only elementary level education while those who reached secondary education 
comprised 35.2 percent and only 17.7 percent reached college level.  Two-thirds of the IS 
operators are not only house holdheads but males. Seventy-five percent or three fourths of these 
IS operators  were in the age bracket 35 years old and above. 
 
The UNESCAP supported 2008 IS survey also revealed that ten per cent (11.1%) of IS operators 
were in CALABARZON, followed by IS operators in Central L uzon and Western Visayas 
with 8.3 percent and 8.1 percent respectively.  The smallest proportion of IS operators were in 
CAR region.  The 2008 Survey release only covers the results in Phase 1 for IS operators based 
on their primary job (Ericta,2009).  Phase 1 was conducted from April 8 to 20, 2008 as a rider to 
the April 2008 Labor Force Survey (LFS).  As a technical note, Administrator Ericta of NSO 
expressed that the second phase was to obtain data in estimating the contribution of informal 
sector enterprises to total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) conducted from May 1 to 15, 2008 
(NSO, 2009). 
3. Social security contribution, benefit structure and the poor including urban informal 
workers 
In the Philippines, around 28.2 million workers or 84.5 % of the employed population are 
covered by the country’s social insurance programme.   Compared to the better-off, the poor 
have less access to and benefit  from social security services. The better-off have more 
accessibility as they reside in urban areas and are knowledgeable about the system (Gonzales, 
2007).  The security package offered by the social insurance system does not include 
unemployment insurance.  Compared to its Asian counterparts, the Philippines  has less than 
20% allocation of its annual budget for social insurance.  An important safety net to cushion 
against temporary joblessness is often neglected due to the huge funding entailed; however the 
Philippine economy has not been generating jobs for the increasing workforce, thus aggravating 
the problem. 
 
PhilHealth is the national health insurance program which provides Filipinos access to inpatient 
and outpatient services in accredited medical facilities nationwide.  It covers a wide range of 
membership:  indigents, employed, individual paying entrepreneurs, paying elderly members, 
self-earning and overseas workers.  Including indigents, the estimated membership of PhilHealth 
is 16.26 million or 68.4 million beneficiaries ( Social Watch, 2007).    While  enrolment has been 
a success, it lags in other areas like delivery of quality care due to its low cost.  Efficient 
management of PhilHealth also faces questions from the public as regards fraudulent claims, a 
recorded loss of Php 4 billion (USD 87.4 million) due to unnecessary operations, ghost patients 
and  overpriced medicines.  Some critics observe politicians using free insurance cards in 
exchange for  votes during election (Gonzales, 2007). 
 
Only 14% of the estimated 15.5 million informal sector members – vendors, self-employed and 
other informal workers are voluntarily enrolled in PhilHealth (Geduspan, 2008).  Due to their 
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low income and exclusion from Labor or statutory provisions, health and social protection 
schemes remain inaccessible  to them. 
 
II.  Rights and access to social protection of the urban informal workers in the Philippine 
legal system 
1. Social Justice and human rights under the 1987 Philippine  Constitution  
 
Compared to the previous 1935 and 1973 constitutions, and as the highest law of the land, the 
1987 Philippine Constitution has laid down the fundamental tenets of social justice:   
“ Art.II,Sec.9.  The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure 
the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through 
policies that provide adequate social services, promote full ]employment, a rising 
standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. 
 
“ Art.II,Sec.10.  The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national  
development. 
 
“ Art.XIII,Sec.1.  The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures 
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, 
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequitites by equitably 
diffusing the wealth and political power for the common good. 
 
“ Art.XIII,Sec.2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create 
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.” 
 
 In specific reference to labor, the 1987 Constitution further provides that: 
“ Art.II,Sec.18.  The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force.  It shall 
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. 
 
“ Art.XIII,Sec.3.  The State shall afford full protection of labor, local and overseas, 
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment 
opportunities for all. 
 
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective 
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to 
strike in accordance with the law.  They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane 
conditions of work and a living wage.  They shall also participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. 
 
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers 
and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including 
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial 
peace. 
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The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing 
the right to labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to 
reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth. 
 
“ Art.XV,Sec.3(3).  The State shall defend: 
(3) The right of the family to a living wage and income; 
From the mentioned provisions, the 1987 Constitution as the fundamental law of the land, 
clearly guarantees social justice and protection of labor.  It has not only devoted an entire 
article but has given primacy on human rights and the interests of the common good than 
that of the few.  
 
2. The Philippine Labor Code 
Promulgated in May 1, 1974, the Labor Code of the Philippines ( P.D.No.442) is the main 
piece of labor legislation intended to implement the provisions enshrined in the 1987 
Constitution.  The provisions are divided into seven (7) areas or Books, namely (Inocian, 
2007) 
 
BOOK TITLE SUBJECT 
Book I Pre Employment Training of Workers and their recruitment for 
overseas employment 
Book II Human Resource Development Training of Workers (apprentices, learners and 
handicapped workers) 
Book III Conditions of Employment Minimum standards of employment 
Book IV Health, Safety and Social 
Welfare Benefits 
Health and Safety laws and social welfare benefits, 
particularly SSS and Employees Compensation 
Commission and State Insurance Fund 
Book V Labor Relations Rights to union, collective bargaining and 
negotiations, unfair labor practices and to 
strike/lock-out 
Book VI Post-Employment Security of tenure of workers and retirement 
Book VII Prescription, Transitory and 
Final Provisions 
Periods to complain/take action and penalties 
 
Article 3 in the Code reiterates the State’s declaration of basic policy (Feliciano,2002): 
“ The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work 
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relations between workers and 
employers.  The Sate shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective 
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.” 
 
On one hand, Article 4 also provides: 
“ Construction in favor of labor.- All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the 
provisions of the Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in 
favor of labor.” 
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Labor laws are divided into two categories of rights (Inocian, Lao, 2007):  labor rights and 
Labor Standards and Social Protection Rights 
 
 2.1 Labor Relations 
The following are the rights to capacitate and or empower the workers to deal with their 
employers in relation to negotiations and  bargaining and also particularly with reference 
to the conditions of their work including appropriate mechanisms to address conflicts: 
 *  right to unionism and association 
 *  right to peaceful assembly 
 *  right to policymaking processes involving labor rights 
 *  right to security of tenure 
  
2.2  Labor standards 
As minimum standards of the terms and conditions for employers to subscribe, the 
following are the labor standards: 
 wages 
 health and safety 
 working conditions and rest periods (8 hours work, breaks, meal periods,rest 
day;holiday, service incentive leave, night differential) 
 working conditions for special groups (women, minors, domestic helpers, 
homeworkers) 
 
2.3 Social Protection 
Now recognized as a fundamental human right and an intrinsic component of labor 
standards, social protection is defined as the “development, delivery and promotion of 
work-related standards and projects that would cushion the impact of unemployment, 
lack of access to basic social services, including the occurrence of calamities and force 
majeure” (Inocian,2007).    There are four (4) modes of social protection as provided by 
law in the Philippines, namely :  (1)  social security, (2)workmen’s compensation, (3) 
health insurance, and (4) housing. 
 
Mode of Social 
Protection 
Laws 
Social Security RA 8282 or Social Security Act which provides 
protection to the employee and his family “ against 
hazardous of disability, sickness, old age and death…”  
This has been extended to self-employed individuals, 
particularly targeting the informal sector 
Workmen’s 
Compensation 
Governed by Title II Book IV of the Labor Code which 
provides protection to workers in the event of disability 
or death 
Health Insurance RA 7875 or the National Health Insurance Act of 1995. 
This includes the self-employed and the poor who 
cannot avail of health insurance 
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Housing P.D. 1752 or the amended Home Development Mutual 
Fund or PAG-IBIG which encourages the employed  
and other income-earning groups to provide for their 
housing needs by membership in an integrated, 
nationwide savings system.  Coverage of PAG-IBIG is 
“mandatory upon all SSS ad GSIS member-employees 
and their employers, although coverage of employees 
whose monthly compensation is less than Php 4,000 (a 
month) is merely voluntary. 
 
Application to the informal Sector 
The Philippine Labor Code has been viewed to be largely inapplicable and do not equally 
cover the informal sector due to its emphasis on the employer-employee  of relationship as  a 
prerequisite to the implementation of many of its provisions.  The applicability varies from 
“ full application, limited to none at all (Inocian,2007).”  Since In 2002, it has been proposed 
to formulate a separate law suiting the needs of the informal sector groups.  Table 4 (Inocian, 
2007) further illustrates the limited or non-applicability of such labor-related provisions:   
 
Table 4 
BOOK TITLE SUBJECT Subtopic Applicability 
Book I Pre 
Employment 
Training of 
Workers and 
their recruitment 
for overseas 
employment 
  
Limited application 
Book 
II 
Human 
Resource 
Development
Training of 
Workers 
(apprentices, 
learners and 
handicapped 
workers) 
 Not applicable 
Book 
III 
Conditions 
of 
Employment 
Minimum 
standards of 
employment 
Hours of work 
Weekly rest periods 
Holidays 
Service Incentive 
Leaves 
Service Charges 
Wages 
On Women 
On Minors 
On House helpers 
On homeworkers 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not 
applicable(hotel/restaurants)
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable  
Book 
IV 
Health, 
Safety and 
Social 
Welfare 
Health and 
Safety laws and 
social welfare 
benefits, 
Medical services 
Dental services 
Occupational health 
and safety 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Applicable 
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Benefits particularly SSS 
and Employees 
Compensation 
Commission and 
State Insurance 
Fund 
Employees 
Compensation 
Adult Education 
Not applicable 
Book 
V 
Labor 
Relations 
Rights to union, 
collective 
bargaining and 
negotiations, 
unfair labor 
practices and to 
strike/lock-out 
Right to form unions 
and associations 
Right to collective 
bargaining/mutual 
aid and protection 
Unfair labor 
practices 
Strikes and lock-outs 
Limited application (only 
associations/cooperatives) 
Limited application (only 
for mutual aid and 
cooperation) 
 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Book 
VI 
Post-
Employment 
Security of 
tenure of 
workers and 
retirement 
Termination 
Retirement 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Book 
VII 
Prescription, 
Transitory 
and Final 
Provisions 
Periods to 
complain/take 
action and 
penalties 
  
 
 
In summary, the applicability of the provisions of the Labor Code is shown in the Table 5 
(Inocian, 2007) 
Table 5 
BOOK TITLE SUBJECT                                 WORKERS 
COVERED 
   Formal Informal 
Book I Pre 
Employment 
Training of Workers and 
their recruitment for 
overseas employment 
Applicable Subsistence 
employees 
Own 
account/self-
employed 
Book 
II 
Human 
Resource 
Development
Training of Workers 
(apprentices, learners and 
handicapped workers) 
Applicable Limited 
application 
 Limited 
application 
Book 
III 
Conditions 
of 
Employment 
Minimum standards of 
employment 
Applicable Limited 
application 
Not 
applicable 
Book 
IV 
Health, 
Safety and 
Social 
Welfare 
Benefits 
Health and Safety laws and 
social welfare benefits, 
particularly SSS and 
Employees Compensation 
Commission and State 
Insurance Fund 
Applicable Limited 
application 
Not 
applicable 
Book Labor Rights to union, collective Applicable Limited Limited 
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V Relations bargaining and negotiations, 
unfair labor practices and to 
strike/lock-out 
application application 
Book 
VI 
Post-
Employment 
Security of tenure of workers 
and retirement 
Applicable Limited 
application 
Not 
applicable 
Book 
VII 
Prescription, 
Transitory 
and Final 
Provisions 
Periods to complain/take 
action and penalties 
Applicable Limited 
application 
Not 
applicable 
 
 
2.4 Other Statutes 
Below are some of the Philippines social legislations enacted aimed to reduce urban poverty 
and providing for social protection also affecting members of the urban informal sector 
members 
Table 6 
Administration Law/Administrative 
Program 
Description and Relevance to the Poor 
and the informal 
Aquino  (1986-
1992) 
Republic Act 6846 (RA) or 
Social Housing Support 
Fund Law (Abot Kaya 
Pabahay Fund Law) 
Provides a means for indigent members of 
the community to acquire low-cost housing 
Ramos (1993-
1998) 
RA 8282 or Social Security 
Law 
 
 
RA 8425 
Provides social security benefit protection 
to the employee and coverage extended to 
self-employed particularly the informal 
sector 
 
The creation of the National Anti-Poverty 
Commission (NAPC) in charge of 
incorporating the social reform agenda into 
the development plans of government 
including anti-poverty programs 
Estrada (1998-
2001) 
Executive Order 138 or 
Welfare Assistance 
Directed government agencies  involved in 
the credite programs to adopt the credit 
policy guidelines formulated by the 
National Credit Council 
Macapagal-Arroyo 
(2001 to present) 
RA 9178 or Barangay 
MicroBusiness Enterprises 
Law of 2002 
 
Manila Metropolitan 
Development Authority 
(MMDA)A Resolution 02-
28-2002 
 
“One Town, One Product, 
This law provides incentives to spur 
growth of micro-enterprises in local 
communities and identified the informal 
sector as the target sector. 
In this resolution, the MMDA has the 
authority to remove any obstruction on the 
streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, 
parks and other public places in Metro 
Manila so that roads and highways can be 
utilized 
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One Million Pesos” 
 
 
 
“Business One Stop Shop” 
 
The program targets to boost domestic 
market by developing small-medium 
enterprises, It works by distribution of one 
million pesos to towns nationwide.  Money 
comes from the President’s Social Fund 
 
Designed to eliminate red tape in 
government, this program  makes possible 
the processing of a business permit in just a 
day and in one office  
 
 
2.5 Local ordinance 
As an active intervention at the local policy level, the City of Naga under the leadership of 
Mayor Jess M. Robredo passed the Ordinance No.2004-003 entitled “  An Ordinance 
Implementing Republic At 9178, Otherwise Known as the ‘Barangay Micro Business 
Enterprises (BMBE’s) Act of 2002’ In the City of Naga and Formuating Safety Net for Labor 
Sector”.  In this said progressive ordinance, a One-Stop Business Registration Center was 
established to handle efficiently the registration and processing of permits thus rationalizing  
bureaucratic restrictions and encouraging small entrepreneurs including informal sector 
workers  to avail of (naga.gov.ph/metropeso/ordinances).  
 
“Growth with equity” is the City’s development framework.  In sharing the lessons learned in 
governance, one of the principles in fighting poverty is by forging tie-ups with civil society 
(Robredo, 2009).  People’s participation in Naga was made feasible through the following:  (1)  
Women Empowerment through Enterprise Development (WEED), a strengthening of the 
capability of women with entrepreneurial skills through appropriate interventions, (2) 
Community-based Training for Enterprise Development (CBTED),  enhancing the 
productivity of micro-entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs; ( 3) Micro-enterprise 
Development Program (MDP), or assistance to micro-enterprises through technical assistance 
to eligible projects, and (4) Cooperative Development Program (CDP),or promoting 
cooperatives through financial  assistance.   
 
These programs laid down various channels through which the Naga informal business sector 
can participate in identifying development priorities.  The channels included neighborhood 
level consultations, sectoral level dialogues to identify issues specific to a particular sector, 
city-wide referenda to listen to the sentiments of the populace on major city policies and 
including field surveys to generate an objective assessment in relation to the performance of 
the City government. 
 
3. International treaties and obligations the Philippine government has ratified 
The Philippine government is a signatory, if not, one of the leading signatories to host of  
international treaties and instruments. It did not only signed the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which provided for provisions on the following:  right to 
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life, right to equality before the law, right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.  
 One of the more equally important international obligations the ratified in 1976 by the late 
President Ferdinand Marcos was  the  International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  In August 2008, the Philippine government, member of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council, along with more than fifty (50) member States, 
unanimously passed the Optioanl Protocol to the ICESCR. Almost 10 years in the making, 
the Optional Protocol, as a petition and communications procedure could give voice to the 
poor in the redress of the derogation and violation of their rights such as right to work and 
livelihood, social insurance and social security, right to proper working conditions, right to 
adequate standards of living, right to form and join trade unions and the right to physical and 
mental health, and among other ESC rights.   
  The Philippines has also acceded to 33 international labour instruments which bind it to 
respect, protect and fulfill its obligations.  A menu of civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights greatly affects the poor, including the urban poor.  
 
III. Toward Realizing the Constitutional Rights Particularly Access to Social Protection 
and Safety Nets of Urban Informal Workers in the Philippines 
  
1. A government initiative: The conditional cash transfer (CCT) program 
Known as the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino na Programa (4Ps), the conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) program is the poverty reduction strategy of the Arroyo Administration under the 
flagship of the  Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).  This strategy 
provides money to extremely poor households to allow the members of the families to meet 
human development by improving health, nutrition and education.  It aims to benefit 321,000 
households with half of DSWD’s total budget of P 10.5 billion in 2009.   For a health 
package, a household is entitled to P 6,000 a year or P 500 a month.  The education package 
grants P 3,000 for ten months or P 300 monthly per child (Fonbuena, 2008).   
This strategy was met with mixed reactions not only from civil society but also from local 
policymakers in terms of the sustainability and appropriateness of the strategy to address 
poverty.  Some House of Representatives members believe that it has benefited  the poor as it 
has clear set of beneficiaries. On the one hand, former Senate President Franklin Drilon 
warned that DSWD’s P 5 billion conditional cash transfer program was one of the lump sum 
appropriations of 2009 National Expenditure that might have been President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo’s pork barrel as its release depends on “absolute discretion” of the 
President or department heads (Fonbuena,2008). 
Critics like the Manila  church-run Caritas slammed the P 5billion program as “ anti-poor” 
because it allegedly “ gives the poor no dignity and only breeds dependency.”(Hermosura, 
2008).  In response, Secretary Esperanza Cabral assured including some questioning 
policymakers that the “bulk of the beneficiaries” will come from the top 10 poorest provinces 
of the Philippines.  Using the latest Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES),the 
poorest municipalities of the poorest provinces will be identified.  Pushing for transparency, 
DSWD published online the list of cash transfer recipients and has so far listed  337,416 
beneficiares as of end 2008.  The program was tested in Agusan del Sur, Misamis Occidental, 
Pasay City and Caloocan City from June to December 2007.  Full implementation began in  
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January 2008 and will run till December 2012 (Hermosura, 2008).  DSWD has also allotted P 
1 billion for the National Targetting System for Poverty Reduction which aims to generate a 
database  of poor household that can be used for social protection programs at the national 
and local level.   
 
 “ Is conditional  cash transfer a magic bullet?”, a question asked of the controversial 
AHON-Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino  Program.  “No, but it is a powerful means of reducing 
poverty and increasing human capital formation”, a rejoinder from Secretary Cabral of 
DSWD (Hermosura, 2008). 
 
2. Some Urban Poor Social Protection Initiatives  
While civil society and the urban poor welcomes the many laws, programs and interventions 
addressed to reduce urban poverty the past twenty five (25) years, yet, much is still to be 
desired in terms of full social protection, regulation and empowerment of the poor.  While 
not large-scale but though community-based, these localized social protection schemes have 
spelled a difference in the ordinary lives of the urban poor. To mention a few, are the 
following: 
a. The Association of Construction and Informal Workers (ACIW)  
A national formation of non-corporate construction workers with a membership of 
15,000 in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, ACIW, not relying on government 
programs,  endeavored self-help social protection schemes in the following:  Piso 
Program and DAMAYAN. Through the annual dues from its diligent five thousand 
(5,000) paying members, it is not only able to provide health, burial and death 
benefits to its members but also including sustained capacity-building skills 
upgrading and livelihood schemes.  Its creative organizing has established centers in 
Davao, Romblon, Capiz and Metro Metro Manila.  Community-based, ACIW’s goal 
is to form a national guild of  non-corporate constructions workers. Exercising the 
right to association and relying on its own self-help funds, ACIW provides every 
annual due paying member a monthly hospitalization of P 1,500, P3,500 for partial 
disability, P 7,000 for disability and  
P 12,000 as death benefit.  At least almost five thousand members (5,000) have 
availed of any of the benefits.  
In  partnership with the government’s Technical Education and Skills Assistance 
Authority (TESDA), ACIW’s DAMAYAN and skills training program has no let-up 
since January 2009 (Pelayo, 2009).  Trainings in carpentry, masonry, tile-setting, 
plumbing, welding and  Basic safety in building construction were conducted in 
Romblon, Capiz, Davao.  More than two thousand members have been trained in 
quality construction work the last three years.   
b. Katipunan Samahang De Padyak Para sa Adhika ng Kaunlaran 
KASAMPADYAK), Navotas,Metro Manila 
For three years now, members of the association of 2,000 “padyak” (Filipino word for 
pedal) or small transport drivers in Navotas,  have enjoyed accessing modest c social 
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protection schemes both from their respective local government but also from self-
sustaining organizational efforts.  Passed in July 2007, Resolution 185 was approved 
by the Navotas local government under the leadership of Mayor Tobby Robles thus 
granting every KASAMPADYAK member free PhilHealth  and burial benefits.  
Mutual aid is also annually to every member in the amount of  P 700 as financial 
support for various needs (Lopez,2009). 
c. Cebu City  Union Vendors Association (CECUVA) 
With 8,000 sidewalk  vendor members, the Cebu City  Union Vendors Association 
(CECUVA) has  fortified its in-house social security including health benefits of its 
members.  To date, its build up funds coming from monthly contribution of its 
members is already  7 million pesos.  With this funds, they are able to generate not 
only modest capital loans to its members but also social security benefits like sickness 
and hospital benefits.  
3. “Bottom-up” and bases of crafting of a rights-inspired legislative framework or a Magna 
Carta of Members of the informal sector groups 
There are a number of proposed legislative measures related  to protecting the rights of 
members of the informal sector filed at the House of  Representatives and at the Senate the 
the 14th Congress.  Introduced by Hon. Danilo Ramon Fernandez, the 21-paged House Bill 
No.1955 “An Act Providing for  Magna Carta for Workers in the Informal Economy, 
Institutionalizing Mechanisms for Implementation Thereof And for Other Purposes” was 
filed at the Committee on Labor.   House Bill No. 1955 is bannered by MAGCAISA, an 
aggrupation of some NGOs and informal sector groups. 
 
Introduced  by Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri, Senate S.O. 1585 entitled “An Act Providing 
For A Magna Carta for the Workers in the Informal Sector, Institutionalizing Mechanims for 
Implementation Thereof and For Other Purposes” was filed last Sept.7,2007.   
 
While supporting the above mentioned measures, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-Asia 
(ESCR-Asia), in partnership with SALIGAN, an alternative legal group, together with other 
urban poor and informal sectoral groups reviewed the earlier submitted measures.  Some 
grassroots representatives expressed reservations to some provisions and disagreement to 
mechanisms proposed, and also of the missing provision which should stipulate recourse 
mechanisms if violations occur.  The proposal to formulate a national law  where the 
concerned urban poor and informal sector groups are themselves involved in the bill drafting 
was also bolstered by the insight that local government officials have “mixed” and also 
“confusing” treatment of the urban poor and informal sector groups in terms of recognition of 
the contribution to the local economy and rights of the sector.   
 
For the last 15 years, these urban and informal groups have been a source not only of local 
revenues from market taxes and or “kotong” (Filipino term for “protection money”, form of  
undertable payment or bribery)  collected by local authorities but also a source of political 
votes during elections.  Officer of the Quezon City Informal Sector Council (WISC), Beltran 
Abellera (2009) reports to ESCR-Asia that the local government earns at least P 2,100,000.00 
from six thousand (6,000) small transport drivers for every three-year renewal aside from the 
estimated annual P 1.2 million  “kotong” ( P200/weekly  per tricycle driver x 6,000) 
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collected by barangay officials.  The University of the Philippines-Cebu made a study of the 
arcabala (Filipino term for market  fees) that the local government earns from the street 
vendors.  With the daily arcabala of P 35.00 for 5 days for every sidewalk vendor, the local 
government collects  at least P 140,000.00 from half of the eight thousand throng Cebu City 
Union Vendor’s Association (CECUVA), P 700,000.00 a week or P 8,4000,000 a year.   
Figures vary in every municipality, but indeed, local government units do not remit a single 
cent to the National coffers, as affirmed  by the National Economic Development Authority 
(Lotilla, 2006). 
 
The  “ A Proposed Magna Carta of Workers  in the Informal Sector, Institutionalizing 
Mechanisms for Implementation Thereof and Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions 
of Republic Act 7160 and Republic Act 8282” , which underwent rigorous consultations with 
informal sector groups and leaders from the five informal subsectors  in Luzon, Visayas and 
Mindanao in 2008 hopes to provide a one-stop business registration, transparent and 
systematic collection of dues or minimum tax, thus minimizing or preventing “extortions” 
from the urban poor.  
 
 This 34-paged proposed legislative framework proposes pertinent Sections and provisions.  
Example, Title II Chapter I on Rights and Benefits of Workers in the informal sector, 
Chapter II on Empowerment of Informal Sector Workers, Chapter III Social Protection, 
Chapter V is Security in the Workplace of Vendors, Chaper VI is Security in the Workplace 
of Small Transport, Chapter VII is Security in the Workplace of Home-based workers,  
Chapter VIII Rights and Benefits of own Account or Self-employed Informal Workers, 
Chapter IX is Security in the Workplace of Small Farmers, Chapter X is Security in the 
Workplace of  Marginalized Fisherfolks, Title III Chapter 1 is Special Allocations for 
Development Initiatives, Chapter II is the formation of the Informal Sector Development 
Council with due representation from informal sector groups and attached to the National 
Economic Development Authority (NEDA), Chapter III on the Informal Sector Local 
Development Office, Chapter IV on the Informal Sector Comprehensive and Integrated Plan 
and Inter-agency Networking.   
 
Organizing champions not only from both the House of Representatives and Senate but also 
from select key national government and regional agencies, this grassroots-crafted and rights-
inspired Magna Carta hopes not only to provide access to social protection benefits to almost 
15 million members of the informal sector but also to provide appropriate regulation, due 
representation in local government agencies and meaningful planning will harness their full 
potentials and be effective economic actors. 
 
4. Other Legal Empowerment of the Poor Initiatives in the Philippines 
 
Civil society groups in collaboration with select national and local agencies also upscaled the 
Legal Empowerment of the Poor endeavors since 2007 through the following:  a policy 
conference on legal empowerment of the poor in July 2007 attended by at least 100 
participants from both government and civil society groups, a  LEP Caravan, in Cebu, 
Cagayan de Oro and Zamboanga City where continuing social dialogues and in exchanging 
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good practices in effective localization of social protection, not mentioning the capacity-
building or training activities accorded to informal sector leaders.   
 
To this date, other ongoing initiatives by ESCR-Asia include pursuing curriculum reforms in 
integrating human rights and the informal economy concerns to public governance and law 
schools, filing pilot or test cases in courts defending the rights of the informals in relation to 
humane treatment, work, equal protection before the law, health, adequate food and shelter.    
ESCR-Asia, is also cooperating with the Office of the Legal Aid of the University of the 
Philippines and the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)-Visayas in handling test cases for 
the informals. 
 
IV.   Analysis,  Observations and Recommendations 
 
Undoubtedly, the Philippines is one of the most socially progressive nation in Asia.  Its 
1987 Constitution sets forth guarantees for social justice and  full respect not only of civil 
and political rights, but also economic, social and cultural rights as well.    These last thirty 
years encompassing five (5) administrations from the late Marcos to the Macapagal-Arroyo, 
at least there have been 55 laws and Executive Orders and a minimum of 25 administrative 
programs and policies that affect the poor in one way or the other.  The country has a menu 
of existing social security programs, services and packages the last twenty years but coverage 
is inadequate, quality delivery needs to be improved and financing needs to be scaled up 
though it also falls prey  to corruption. 
 
On the access to safety nets and social protection, of the urban poor and the informals, at 
the onset, let it be stressed that there exists only one economy.  The perceived dichotomy 
between formal and informal economy, in reality is, artificial in nature (Indon, 2007).  
Formal economies are capital-intensive and growth-based while those that are seen as 
informal economies are labor-oriented and people-centered.  The reality is that they basically 
interact with one under a single economy (Indon, 2007). The entitlements and or rights that 
are accessed by the formals are and should be the same rights accessed by the poor 
particularly with reference to right to social insurance, social security.   
 
There exists a rights deficit for the urban poor or the informals in relation to access to 
social security.  Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights states that “ The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize of everyone to social 
security, including social insurance”.  Given the nature of their work and excluded from 
regulation and social protection, they do not enjoy the privilege of being covered by Social 
Security  and PhilHealth. Not only from inhumane treatment in the workplace, the urban poor 
and informal operators  needed to be protected from abuse or be taken advantaged to be 
asked of protection money (kotong).    The full protection and general welfare clause of the 
Constitution and the  Labor Code are inadequate in defining and protecting the informal 
sector. There is lack of consistency in implementation of the labor standards on social 
protection laws for the dependent workers (Lao, 2008). 
 
The local civil society and grassroots indigenous social insurance have complemented the 
inadequacies of government.  Based on the few cases cited above,  social assistance and 
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grant-giving to constituencies of sidewalk vendors, “padyak” drivers, non-corporate 
construction workers and other urban poor have been welcomed.  It has even developed 
micro-finance packages with accompanying capacity or skills-enhancing activities.  
Community-based life and health insurances are thriving  and has in fact helped mitigated the 
risks for the poor. 
On the onehand, despite the mixed efforts and performance of both government and local 
civil society for the urban poor in providing for social protection including access,  the  
principal responsibility still rests with the Philippine government as the dutybearer.  Private 
entities and civil society can pitch in their share of assistance but the  greater task of ensuring 
and scaling equal access for all services rests with the government. 
The country has adequate resources; budget allocation and the technical know-how are 
not the culprits in the unequal access to safety nets.  While reforms are needed in the social 
security arena to make it more relevant to the situation  of the poor, political will is much 
needed (Gonzales, 2007). 
 
V. Way forward for the social protection and empowerment of the poor. 
 
A wholistic approach is imperative in reducing urban poverty and  empowering the poor to 
be better acters-partners-beneficiaries in Philippine economic development.  Eliminating  the 
rights deficit of the urban poor and informals may mean addressing the problem from a 
governance perspective ( ILO, 2002).   There is a need to review macroecomic and social 
policies that affects the poor.  A revisit and or a serious review of all existing programs on 
social protection taking into account the actual situation of the urban poor is needed.   At 
primordial importance is even accounting who and where the poor are (Litong, 2008).  The 
NSO-led 2008 Informal Sector Survey is a laudable effort in making the urban informals 
more visible, thus scientific data yields to better policymaking and programming.  
 
On the one hand, identifying where and who the poor are not enough.  While some Philippine 
laws are good, some laws conflict.  While the adoption of the official definition on the 
informal sector, which the urban poor comprise,  through NSCB Resolution 15, the passage 
of the proposed Magna Carta of Members of the Informal Sector will be one great step 
towards ensuring universal access to social protection by all Filipinos. 
 
A two-tiered approach to social protection with emphasis on bottom-up. 
Successful national programs to access to safety nets and social security must have 
corresponding effective localization and clear budget allocations.  The best entity to design 
culturally sensitive and appropriate social protection and delivery mechanisms are the local 
government units (LGUs) and their constituencies (Indon, 2008).  Ensuring wider and 
deepened grassroots participation  in improving access to social protection  will indirectly 
reduce urban poverty in the Philippines. 
 
Indeed the solution and process toward fulfilling the Constitutional mandate of social justice 
and human rights for the urban poor-informal is longterm.  Both civil society and 
government are inching their efforts to make life a little better for the poor.  It may not be 
totally failing but there is expediency for the  latter to rev up not only its priorities, political 
will but more fundamentally, its genuine care for the poor. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In response to the 1997/98 economic crisis, after the fall of the Soeharto regime, the Indonesian 
new government developed a number of poverty mitigation schemes under the umbrella of the 
social safety net (SSN) programs, or known in Indonesia as Jaringan Pengaman Sosial (JPS). 
JPS included (a) a food aid program, or known later as the Raskin (Beras untuk Orang Miskin) 
program, i.e. targeted sales of subsidized rice; (b) work/employment creation programs; (c) 
scholarships to students and block grants to schools, (d) targeted health care subsidies; and (e) 
community block grants. These programs were accompanied by many other programs from both 
local NGOs and international funding agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). Several of these programs are still operational, although they have 
undergone changes in their names and the orientation of their activities. In the last quarter of 
2005, the Indonesian government launched another JPS program, called Bantuan Likuiditas 
Tunia (BLT), which is an un conditional direct cash transfer to the poor.  
The Raskin program is a national program aimed at helping poor households to fulfill their 
food needs and reducing their financial burden by providing subsidized rice. The program is a 
continuation of the Special Market Operation (OPK) program launched in July 1998. Each 
targeted households received initially 10 kg of rice each month with the price of Rp1,000 per kg. 
at the distribution point. The National Logistics Agency (BULOG) is responsible for the 
distribution of the subsidized rice to the distribution points, while the local government is 
responsible for distributing the rice to targeted poor households from the distribution points.    
The BLT program is a program for poor households, which was launched in 2005 to 
compensate for the fuel price increase. Through the office branches of PT Pos Indonesia (the 
national postal service), every poor households received an amount of Rp100,000 per month 
which was transferred quarterly. The program ended in the third quarter of 2006 and was 
replaced by a conditional cash transfer program under the coordination of the Ministry of Social 
Affais (Rahayu and Fillaili, 2007). 
The main aim of this paper is to assess the impacts of those two JPS programs on the urban 
poor. More precisely, the study deals with the following two major questions: (1) how is the 
selection of beneficiaries, or have the programs reached the poorest members of the community? 
(2) What is the impact of the programs on the targeted beneficiaries, or have the implementations 
of those two programs achieved their main objective?  
Methodologically, this paper tries to answer these two questions by analyzing existing 
secondary data and studying existing key literature on this issue in Indonesia, including several 
studies and monitoring reports from the SMERU Research Institute, which is the only research 
institute specializing on poverty issues in the country. 
 
2. Urban Poverty in Indonesia: A Brief Discussion 
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National data on poverty issued by the National Statistics Agency (BPS) show that in the 
aftermath of the 1997/98 economic crisis in Indonesia, poverty increased dramatically from 
around 17.47 per cent in 1996 to about 24.23 in 1998, when the crisis reached its climax. 
However, in 1999 the poverty started decline gradually, though first very slightly, up to 2005. In 
2006, due to the high increase of world fuel prices, and as Indonesia has become increasingly 
dependent on imports of oil, the poverty rate increased again, on average between 1.8 percentage 
point per year or about 4.2 million people fell into poverty between the period 2005-2006. Only 
after some policy adjustments and macroeconomic stabilization, the poverty rate started to 
decline again in 2007. In relative terms, the poverty rate in 2007 was the same as that before the 
1997/98 economic crisis. However, in absolute terms, the number of those who live under the 
current poverty line was still higher than that in the pre-1997/98 crisis period. Although the 
difference varies by year, the poverty rate in urban areas is always lower than that in rural areas 
(Table 1). 
Table 1: Poverty by Region in Indonesia, 1976-2008 
Number of poverty (million) Percentage of poverty (%) Year 
 Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
1976 
1980 
1984 
1987 
1990 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
10.00 
9.50 
9.30 
9.70 
9.40 
9.42 
17.60 
15.64 
12.30 
8.60 
13.30 
12.20 
11.40 
12.40 
14.49 
13.56 
12.77 
44.20 
32.80 
25.70 
20.30 
17.80 
24.59 
31.90 
32.33 
26.40 
29.30 
25.10 
25.10 
24.80 
22.70 
24.81 
23.61 
22.19 
54.20 
42.30 
35.00 
30.00 
27.20 
34.01 
49.50 
47.97 
38.70 
37.90 
38.40 
37.30 
36.10 
35.10 
39.30 
37.17 
34.96 
38.79 
29.04 
23.14 
20.14 
16.75 
13.39 
21.92 
19.41 
14.60 
9.76 
14.46 
13.57 
12.13 
11.68 
13.47 
12.52 
11.65 
40.37 
28.42 
21.18 
16.14 
14.33 
19.78 
25.72 
26.03 
22.38 
24.84 
21.10 
20.23 
20.11 
19.98 
21.81 
20.37 
18.93 
40.08 
28.56 
21.64 
17.42 
15.08 
17.47 
24.23 
23.43 
19.14 
18.41 
18.20 
17.42 
16.66 
15.97 
17.75 
16.58 
15.42 
        Source: BPS (2008). 
 
Two among other indicators often used for measuring the seriousness of poverty or the 
economic condition of the poor are the deepness index or known as Poverty Gap Index (PGI) and 
severity index or Distributionally Sensitive Index (DSI). PGI is a measure of the average gap or 
‘distance’ between expenditure of the poor and poverty line. The highest the gap, the worst is the 
economic condition of the poor. It reveals the size of the lump-sum subsidy that would be 
required for those living below the poverty line to escape from poverty. Meanwhile, DSI is to 
some extent shows the distribution of expenditure among the poor. Table 2 and Table 3 show 
calculations of PGI and DSI, respectively, in Indonesia by region. As can be seen, although both 
indicators shown a decline in urban as well as rural areas during the reviewed period, urban areas 
appeared to be better off than rural areas in terms of their PGI, and were more or less of a similar 
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condition with the rural areas in terms of their DSI.  This suggests that the economic growth after 
the 1997/98 crisis up to 2008 tended to favor urban households more than those in rural areas.   
Table 2: Poverty Gap Index in Indonesia by Region, 1999-2008 
Year Urban Rural Total 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
3.52 
1.89 
1.74 
2.59 
2.55 
2.18 
2.05 
2.61 
2.15 
2.07 
4.84 
4.68 
4.68 
3.34 
3.53 
3.43 
3.34 
4.22 
3.78 
3.42 
4.33 
3.51 
3.42 
3.01 
3.13 
2.89 
2.78 
3.43 
2.99 
2.77 
                                                Source: BPS (2008). 
 
Table 3: Distributionally Sensitive Index in Indonesia by Region, 1999-2008 
Year Urban Rural Total 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
0.98 
0.51 
0.45 
0.71 
0.74 
0.58 
0.60 
0.77 
0.57 
0.56 
1.39 
1.39 
1.36 
0.85 
0.93 
0.90 
0.89 
1.22 
1.09 
0.95 
1.23 
1.02 
0.97 
0.79 
0.85 
0.78 
0.76 
1.00 
0.84 
0.76 
                                                Source: BPS (2008). 
 
The characteristics of poverty in Indonesia are: (1) most of them are living in rural areas; (2) 
their family size are bigger than the average (also bigger than the poor families in urban areas; (3) 
the main source of income of the poor living in rural areas is agricultural sector, and that of the 
urban poor is mainly in the informal non-agricultural sector, and in the formal sector their 
incomes are mainly from working in public transportation and construction; (40) lack of 
resources; (5) lack of education (most of them who have primary education, never finished it); (6) 
most of their income is used for basic needs; and (7) tend to have food insecurity (Sudaryanto 
and Rusastra, 2006).  
As in other developing countries, the urban poor in Indonesia include a diverse range of 
people whose vulnerability and poverty vary widely. These include for instance slum-dwellers, 
street traders, street children, informal laborers and sex workers, which can be seen obviously in 
big cities like Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung and Medan. Perhaps the most visible of the urban poor 
work in the informal sector as street traders (known as pedagang kaki lima). In Jakarta and 
Bandung, for instance, these traders can be seen in abundance working in crowded streets, in 
public markets and near commercial centers and transportation terminals, typically clustered in 
groups. Key to establishing a street-trader business is modest start-up working capital, normally 
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around Rp 200,000. Although street-traders are generally assumed to be poor, they can still 
succeed in creating opportunities for their households to better survive and, in some cases, even 
prosper above the poverty line (World Bank 2006). 
The second most viable of the urban poor in Indonesia are sex workers: The sex industry 
flourishes in most urban areas and women generally enter the industry because they are bonded 
by relatives or guardians, are deceived or abducted, or choose to enter voluntarily. Of those who 
enter voluntarily, many explain their reason as the need to look after poor or sick parents, to 
support children or younger siblings, or to meet important social obligations. In cities like Jakarta, 
Bandung and Surabaya, sex work occurs in: official brothel complexes where sex workers both 
work and live; unofficial brothels and entertainment venues, where women are managed, and 
often abused, by pimps; and on the street and in open public locations. These traditional forms of 
sex work and the vulnerabilities that they bring are increasingly being added to by new forms of 
sex work in the urban environment. These now include young women who are often educated 
(and generally not poor) but who choose to accept sex work to pay for schooling or clothes 
(World Bank 2006).   
Street children are another most viable of the urban poor in Indonesia: Street children are 
often (but not always) live outside their homes and undertake economic activities, such as 
begging, rubbish-picking, shoe-shining, newspaper-selling, or work as sweatshop workers or 
petty criminals. Many are later forced into sex work. An ADB survey of 12 cities conducted in 
1999, as cited in the World Bank’s study (2006), estimated that there were some 170,000 street 
children in Indonesia. Typically, domestic violence or sexual abuse, household poverty and 
seeking economic opportunities were given as reasons that children become street children. 
However, some poor households sell or abandon their children to reduce family size.  The lives 
of street children are characterized by vulnerability and risk. They may work alone, with older 
street children, or under the control of adults or gangs. In many cases they are forced to raise a 
certain sum of money each day for ‘invisible adults’ who control traffic intersections, footbridges 
or markets. The consequences include: detention and beatings by the authorities; prostitution; 
exclusion; and a loss of self-esteem. Most have no ID cards or any form of identification, 
denying them access to formal health services or education.   
 
 
3. Social Safety Net Programs 
 
SSN programs like Raskin and BLT are very important in Indonesia, if not to reduce, to mitigate 
the financial burden of the poor. Especially the fact that although the poverty rate in Indonesia 
had been decreasing since the end of the 1997/98 crisis, except in 2006 caused by the price 
increased of fuel discussed earlier, most of those escaping poverty are just above poverty line, 
meaning that they are still vulnerable. When there is just a small shock, e.g. an increase in fuel 
price or prices of food, can send them quickly below the poverty line. Raskin which is an indirect 
income transfer and BLT which is a direct income transfer may help them to stay above the 
poverty line when a crisis occurs. 
The main objective of Raskin or BLT is to at least prevent the level of real incomes and 
hence the level of consumption expenditures of the poor from declining when prices of basic 
needs (e.g. food) increase. Given this objective, the effectiveness of such SSN programs will thus 
depend on three very important factors: the accuracy of targeting, the level of coverage, and the 
amount of transferred cash. With respect to the first factor, the targeting is accurate only when 
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the targeted households are indeed, financially, very poor households. With respect to the second 
factor, the level of coverage is 100 per cent only when all eligible households defined correctly 
in Indonesia are indeed covered by the programs. With respect to the second factor, the benefits 
obtained from the programs must be sufficient to lift their real income levels to meet the poverty 
line. In the BLT program, for example, it means that the amount of the transferred income per 
unit of consumption at least must not be less than the difference between previous price and new 
(increased) price.1   
Thus in assessing the effectiveness of a SSN program, targeting, coverage and amount of 
the program are the most important aspects that should be taken into consideration. 
 
3.1 The Raskin Program 
 
A) Design, Scope and Targeting 
 
In order partly to lessen the economic pressure on poor families affected by the economic crisis 
in 1997-98 and partly to alleviate their food vulnerability affected by the drought in many parts 
of the country during the same period, the Indonesian government has implemented a subsidized 
rice program since July 1998, the year when the economic crisis reached its climax. The program 
was initially referred to as Operasi Pasar Khusus (OPK) or Special Market Operation. It is the 
largest and arguably the most critical component of the SSN programs in the country aimed 
initially at assisting around 8.8 million of the poorest and most food vulnerable households (or 
roughly 15 per cent of all households in Indonesia) in rural as well as urban areas to obtain cheap 
rice.  
 This program is considered as very crucial because rice is not only the most important 
staple in Indonesia, but by far it is the most important commodity for poor households. Rice 
comprises nearly a quarter of average monthly expenditures in poor households, contributing 
around 34 per cent and 26 per cent to the official rural and urban poverty lines, respectively 
(Sumarto and Widyanti, 2008). Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) data derived from annual 
household surveys covering over 200,000 households in 341 districts throughout the country 
show that four out of five households are net consumers (i.e. they consume more rice than they 
produce). Although most of the poor in Indonesia live in rural areas and work in agriculture, 
more than three-quarters of the poor (76 percent) are net rice consumers. In urban areas, 85.6 per 
cent of the poor are net rice consumers and 72.1 per cent in rural areas. Consequently, the poor 
are very sensitive to increases in the price of rice. Any increase in the price of rice 
disproportionally hurt the poor, especially in urban areas as they are not farmers. 
 Although expenditure poverty levels have now returned to pre-1997/98 crisis levels, the 
program has been continued because Indonesia’s nutrition situation has not improved, real wages 
remain below pre-1997/98 crisis levels, and nearly half the population subsists on incomes less 
than international poverty norms of $2 per day. What was once an emergence response operation 
has evolved to become a key component of the government’s overall social protection program.  
                                                
1 If the amount of the transferred income per unit of consumption is larger than the price changes, the real income of 
the poor increases and this will generate income multiplier effects through two main channels. First, consumption 
channel: total consumption of the poor increases leading to the growth of (local) economic activities and hence 
employment creation. Second, investment channel: given constant total consumption expenditures, the poor have 
left money in investment in small/informal economic activities. Of course, this hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that other determinant factors are constant. 
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 For the implementation process, two agencies are responsible for the distribution of Raskin 
rice quotas: BULOG and local governments at the district, i.e. kabupaten/kota, level. BULOG is 
responsible for getting the rice to over 44,000 distribution points (in 2002), i.e its local branches 
(DOLOG), throughout the country. The local governments (district/city) are responsible for 
distributing the rice from the distribution points to the target households.   
 National decisions about the allocation of Raskin rice quotas are based on the availability of 
the budget for subsidies and on the number of target beneficiaries. At the national level, quotas 
are allocated to each province based on data on targeted beneficiaries after considering proposals 
submitted by provincial governments. After that,  provincial  governments  decide  on  the 
allocation  for  each  district and  city,  while the district and city governments subsequently 
determine the allocation for their respective subdistricts and villages (kelurahan). These shares 
are all set in proportion to the data for prospective recipients in each area. From the beginning of 
the OPK program until 2005, following the Raskin General Guidelines, target beneficiaries 
should be determined through village meetings and they should refer to data for ‘pre-prosperous 
families’ and ‘prosperous level 1 families’ obtained from the results of the National Family 
Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN) data collection. With the BKKPN data, local 
governments prepare a list of beneficiaries in their locations. The beneficiaries receive then an 
official Raskin card and coupons distributed by the village leader (lurah). To get the subsidized 
rice, the families should present the card and coupons to the local officials. This system of 
allocation is implemented in both rural and urban areas.   
 The reason to use initially the BKKPN data was simply because there was no other 
alternative comprehensive information. In other words, as far as information about poverty at the 
household level, the only available source of data that covers the entire country in a thoroughly 
comprehensive manner has been that produced by the BKKBN. The data were compiled from a 
national registration based on the work of an army of village-based, family planning cadre.1By 
contrast, the SUSENAS data on consumption/expenditure that has been used by BPS to calculate 
poverty rates and poverty lines is only available as part of a survey of a selected sample of the 
entire population.  The SUSENAS survey is carried out on an annual basis (usually in February 
every year), and consists of a core survey that is administered to over 200,000 households, and 
which is estimated to cover more than 800,000 individuals across the entire country. It collects 
data on a broad range of socio-economic indicators, including education, health, and 
employment as well as consumption and other expenditure items.  From this sample group, a 
subset of 65,000 households is surveyed on a certain topic or set of issues in much greater detail.  
This is referred to as the SUSENAS Module. Once every three years the SUSENAS Module 
collects detailed information about consumption and other expenditures. This is widely regarded 
as the best data source for calculating poverty incidence as measured by consumption, despite 
the fact that it is based on a sample as discussed earlier (Perdana and Maxwell, 2004).   
                                                
1 One of the major criticisms of the BKKBN registration is that, in marked contrast to the BPS SUSENAS surveys 
and census that employ paid and trained data collectors and enumerators, the village cadre who carry out the 
BKKBN registration are unskilled and do the work in an honorary capacity.  Although this is substantially true and 
must have some influence on the accuracy of the registration process, this must also be balanced against the 
advantages of local knowledge. In the process, BKKBN conduct regular workshops to inform their workers about 
the procedures to be followed during the registration process, and there is an evident sense of pride among those 
who hold these positions. Typically these village cadres are the wives of prominent local people, school teachers and 
village officials, have often been carrying out the task over a number of years, and have the advantage of a close and 
intimate knowledge of their local community.  The data is collected on a regular basis and the results are updated 
annually (Perdana and Maxwell, 2004).   
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.     According to the BKKBN criteria, which used to determine target households, a household 
is considered as the poorest household, sometimes translated as a ‘pre-prosperous’ family if it 
fails to meet the following conditions: (a) all household members are able to practice their 
religious practices; (b) all household members are able to eat at least twice a day; (c) all 
household members have different sets of clothing for home, for work, or for school and formal 
occasions; (d) the largest section of the floor of the family house is not made of earth; and (e) the 
household has access to modern medical assistance for sick children and to family planning 
services for women of fertile age (Sumarto, et al., 2001). These criteria were subsequently 
expanded to the so-called ‘prosperous families level 1’, so that the poorest households also 
included households that consumed protein only once a week, families with children who 
dropped out of school for economic reasons, and families headed by unemployed adults. 
Specifically, any family will be classified as ‘prosperous families level 1’ if it fails to meet any 
one criteria: (a) at least once a week the family is able to eat meat, fish or eggs as side dishes to 
their meals; (b) every family member has obtained at least one new set of clothes during the past 
year; (c) there is at least 8 m2of floor space in the family home for every member of  the 
household; and  (d) all children between 7 and 15 years of age are presently attending 
school.(Daily and Fane, 2002).1  
 In the implementation process, community groups in cooperation with village heads or 
lurah are allowed some scope in adjusting coverage, especially in situations where the data 
provided by the BKKBN were deficient. For example, the BKKBN data did not include 
households with a single or widowed head (Kusumastuti et al, 1998). Coverage of the BKKBN 
data was also considered seriously inadequate in many urban areas, especially in big cities like 
Jakarta and Surabaya because of high levels of annual migration and the inadequate system of 
registration in the cities of new moving in households or individuals (Daly and Fane, 2002).  
 During the course of its operation, the program underwent several changes in order to 
improve its efficiency as well as effectiveness. Until November 1998, OPK distributed 10 kg of 
medium quality rice per family per month at Rp1,000 per kg. In December 1998, the target 
allocation per household was doubled to 20 kg per month and the entitlement was extended to 
include the 9.4 million households in the second poorest group, as indicated by the BKKBN data. 
However, due to funding limitations in 2000 and 2001, OPK rice allocations were reduced to 
between 10 and 20 kg per family per month (Daly and Fane, 2002). The name was also changed 
from OPK to Raskin, or rice for the poor in January 2002 in order to prevent non-poor families 
from getting the subsidized rice, and rice allocations were increased again to 20 kg/family 
(Hastuti and Maxwell, 2003). 
 Another important change was about the data and classification used to target households. 
As explained before, initially, the Raskin program targeted households falling into the pre-
prosperous and prosperous family level 1, based on data from the BKKBN. But since 2006, the 
program has targeted households categorized as poor households according to the results of PSE-
05 data (Enumeration of Household’s Socioeconomic Data 2005) that was collected by 
                                                
1 There have been a number of criticisms of the use of the BKKBN lists for targeting purposes. The list does not 
capture transitory shocks to income as they are based on relatively fixed assets (such as the type of floor in the house, 
possession of changes of clothing). The lists also draws on non-economic criteria (the capacity of families members 
to meet religious obligations).  In addition, the lists are compiled by relatively poorly trained workers at the village 
level, so consistency across regions is not assured, and the composition of the list is susceptible to changes by local 
government officials (Sumarto et al., 2000; Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2001) 
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BPS.1Poor households in these PSE05 data are classified according to the following 14 variables: 
size and type of house floor, type of house wall, WC facility, source of drinking water, used 
lightening, used fuel, frequency of eat within a day, capability of buying meat, chicken, milk and 
cloth and to go to health care services, main occupation and level of education of the head of the 
family, and asset ownership. 
 According to the 2006-2007 Raskin General Guidelines, the BPS list of poor households to 
receive the Raskin rice is to be used as the basis for setting allocations down to village/kelurahan 
level. At this level, a village consultative meeting is used to determine beneficiaries. According 
to the guidelines, the meeting should be conducted in a transparent and participatory manner by 
involving the various components of the community, including representatives of poor 
households (Weatherley, 2008). 
 
B) Impact 
 
According to the Raskin General Guidelines, Raskin’s success can be measured based on the 
level of achieving the “6T” (six correct) indicators: correct target, correct amount, correct price, 
correct time, correct quality, and correct administration. Unfortunately, despite the intentions of 
central government planners dealing with the Raskin program, accurate public information about 
the actual implementation of the program, especially with respect to its effectiveness in helping 
the poorest and most food vulnerable households in rural as well as urban areas to obtain their 
basic food, rice, has not been readily or widely available.  
 Based on information from BULOG for the period 2000-2009, Table 1 shows that the total 
national Raskin rice quota increased each year until 2002, after which it decreased, but since 
2007 it rose again. Meanwhile, the number of targeted poor households has tended to increase 
from year to year. Up to 2007, the total number of target households was lower than the total 
number of poor households. But since 2008 the targeted poor households has reached 100 per 
cent of the total poor household in Indonesia. However, the increase of the number of targeted 
poor households does not happen in all provinces. In Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, the 
number of targeted poor households increased from 160,472 in 2008 to 180,660 in 2009 (Table 
2). 
Table 1: Number of Poor Households and National Raskin Allocations 
Year 
 
Total poor 
households (A) 
Targeted 
Poor 
households 
(B) 
B/A (%)  Allocations 
 (tons)  
2000  
2001  
2002  
2003  
2004  
2005  
2006  
2007 
16,000,000  
15,000,000  
15,135,561  
15,746,843  
15,746,843  
15,791,884  
15,503,295  
19,100,905 
7,500,000  
8,700,000  
9,790,000  
8,580,313  
8,590,804  
8,300,000  
10,830,000  
15,800,000 
46.88  
58.00  
64.68  
54.49  
54.56  
52.56  
69.86  
82.72 
1,350,000  
1,501,274  
2,349,600  
2,059,276  
2,061,793  
1,991,897  
1,624,500  
1,896,000 
                                                
1 Data on poverty in Indonesia used to be calculated from SUSENAS data which are macro data on poverty 
estimation at province/district level. Whereas, PSE05 covers data at micro level which is a directory of households 
as the recipients of the Raskin rice.  
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2008 
2009 June 
19,100,905 
18,497,302 
19,100,000 
18,497,302 
100.00 
100.00 
3,342,500 
3,329,514 
                  Source: BULOG. 
 
Table 2: Number of Targeted Poor Households by Province, 2008 and 2009 
 Province 2008 2009 
1 NAD 497,014 529,481
2 North Sumatra 944,927 937,722
3 Riau 293,693 270,088
4 Kepulauan Riau 73,676 74,601
5 West Sumatra 312,625 297,718
6 Jambi 199,729 157,362
7 South Sumatra 683,149 652,533
8 Bangka-Belitung 33,650 31,528
9 Bengkulu 163,928 140,626
10 Lampung 785,004 757,741
11 DKI Jakarta 160,472 180,660
12 Banten 702,016 637,743
13 West Java 2,905,079 2,931,396
14 Central Java  3,171,051 3,004,068
15 DI Yogyakarta 275,097 215,032
16 East Java 3,236,727 3,336,173
17 West Kalimantan 360,888 346,675
18 East Kalimantan 228,084 193,513
19 South Kalimantan 245,936 204,965
20 Southeast Kalimantan 197,464 147,593
21 North Sulawesi 127,289 132,945
22 Gorontalo 102,726 81,344
23 Central Sulawesi 211,363 159,126
24 Southeast Sulawesi 281,327 263,076
25 South Sulawesi 594,938 575,272
26 West Sulawesi 111,897 106,749
27 Bali 147,037 134,804
28 West Nusa Tenggara 567,578 586,571
29 East Nusa Tenggara 623,107 577,640
30 Maluku 182,832 166,599
31 North Maluku  65,351 65,484
32 Papua 486,834 487,268
33 West Irja  127,512 113,206
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Total 19,100,000 18,497,302
                      Source: BULOG. 
 
 However, the realization of the Raskin is always lower than 100 percent of the 
predetermined volume of the subsidized rice for a number of reasons, which will be discussed in 
next sections. In 2005, the realization percentage was 99.96 and by June 2009 it was 37.44 per 
cent of total allocations (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Realization of the Raskin Program, 2002-2009 June (% of Total Allocations)  
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                          Source: BULOG. 
Until today many studies have been made to evaluate the program, and among them the 
SMERU Research Institute (SRI) is the leading institute which has continually monitored and 
evaluated the implementation of the program since 1998, through its Social Monitoring and 
Qualitative Analysis Team. In doing so, the SRI has analysed secondary data and conducted 
surveys, in-dept interviews and focus group discussions (FGD) in a large number of districts 
Two key issues considered in its evaluation of the program are how have been the beneficiaries 
targeted and to what extent has the subsidized rice been fairly distributed to the targeted 
beneficiaries according to the principles set out in the program guidelines.  
Table 3 summarizes some of the SRI’s principle findings of its evaluation of the Raskin 
program in certain locations during the period August 1998-February 1999 (when the 
beneficiaries were determined by the BKPPBN data) by using expenditure data from SUSENAS 
and a panel survey carried out by BPS and UNICEF called the “100 Villages Survey”.1The 
estimated figures in the table are derived from special module of the Raskin program that was 
included in the SUSENAS.2Two measures of ‘targeting’ are presented: the ratio of the program’s 
coverage of the poorest 20 per cent of the population to its coverage of the remaining 80 per cent 
of the population, and the ratio of its coverage of the poorest 20 per cent of the population to its 
coverage of the richest 20 per cent. The table indicates that only around 53 percent of the 
households in the bottom 20 percent of the expenditure distribution received Raskin, and those in 
this poorest 20 percent were only 40 percent more likely to benefit from the program than the 
rest of the population. Nevertheless, the ratio of coverage of the poorest 20 percent- coverage of 
the richest 20 per cent may suggest that the program was relatively accurately targeted away 
from non-poor households.  
Table 3: Coverage and Targeting of the Raskin Program, August 1998-February 1999 
                                                
1 The 100 Villages Survey is a panel with five rounds:  May 1997 (pre-crisis), August 1998, December 1998, May 
1999 and October 1999.  The May 1997 round of the 100 Village Survey interviewed 120 households in each of ten 
villages in ten districts purposively chosen to represent various disadvantaged economic types (e.g. fishing villages, 
remote).  In subsequent rounds 80 of the original 120 households in each village were re-interviewed to create a 
panel of around 8,000 households (Pritchett, et al. 2002).. 
2. It is a module which asked households about their awareness of, participation in, and benefits from the program 
was fielded in December 1998 round of the 100 Villages Survey, and then a substantially expanded version was 
included in the February 1999 SUSENAS.  The module, particularly in the 100 Villages Survey, asked whether 
households reported “participating” or “receiving benefits” from the program in the last three months  (Pritchett, et 
al. 2002). 
   141
Program Coverage (%) 
- Poorest 20%1) 
-Poorest 40%  
-All potentially eligible group 
-Non-poor (upper 80%) 
- Richest 20%  
 
52.64 
49.41 
40.09 
36.90 
24.33 
Program Targeting ratio 
-Coverage2)of poorest 20%/coverage of remaining 80% 
- Coverage of poorest 20%/coverage of richest 20%4) 
- Proportion of total recipients from non-poor 
 
1.43) 
2.2 
0.74 
Notes: 1) of the total potential eligible group for the program, i.e. 50,385,444 households; 2) 
coverage= number covered (i.e. the number of households in which any member had 
received benefits from the program in the six months prior to the survey)/size of 
potentially eligible group;  3) 1.4 = (4x52.6)/(5x40.1-52.6); 4) coverage of the 
richest 20% = 52.6/2.2         
Source: Sumarto, et al. 2001). 
 
With respect to Table 3, Daly and Fane (2002) argue that since BKKPN poverty criteria are 
only fairly weakly correlated with low expenditure and coverage problems of the BKKPN data 
as discussed earlier, it is not surprising that the Raskin program turned out not to have been 
targeted very accurately to those in the bottom 20 percent of the distribution of expenditure. And 
since random errors in the survey data on expenditure would make even a perfectly targeted 
scheme appear to contain a random element, the estimated targeting performance of the program 
shown in the table probably understates their true performance.1 
Reviewing several field studies conducted by the SRI (e.g. Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2001; 
Sumarto, et al. 2001; Hastuti and Maxwell, 2003; Weatherley, 2008) provides the following most 
important facts  
1) In many locations, the beneficiaries, though they have presented the card and coupons did not 
receive precisely 20 kg.  While, many families identified as deserving cases and therefore 
included on the list of beneficiaries have been receiving about 10 kg subsidized rice though 
they do not have a Raskin card or coupons.  
2) In other many monitored areas, the subsidized rice was distributed to a far larger number of 
families than those identified by the BKKBN data, thus including also non-poor families. 
According to Sumarto and Suryahadi, Raskin reached 52.6 per cent of poor households but 
the number of non-poor households that benefited was also relatively high at 36.9 per cent. 
As a result, in those areas, the beneficiaries received Raskin rice per distribution less than the 
stipulated level. 
3) In many places the actual price for Raskin rice paid by the beneficiaries was actually higher 
than the determined one, i.e. Rp 1,000/kg; although the positive net between the official and 
the actual paid price varies by location. In 2000, for instance, the current market price was 
                                                
1 The SRI conducted a survey of many villages in December 1998. Based on the survey’s findings, Suryahadi et al. 
(1999) find a fairly weak correlation between the expenditure-based measure of poverty and the criteria used by the 
BKKBN to define poor families. They estimate that only about 25 percent of the families that are considered poor 
by the BKKBN criteria were in the poorest 20 percent of families according to the expenditure criteria, and that 
around 38 percent of families in the poorest 20 percent according to the expenditure criterion were not classified as 
poor based on the BKKBN criteria.   
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Rp2,500-3,000/kg. With the Rp1,000/kg for the Raskin rice, the benefit per household was 
therefore about Rp 15,000-20,000 per month. This is about 5 percent of the total expenditure 
of a household of four people at the official poverty line1(Daly and Fane, 2002). With the 
higher actual price paid than the determined one, the benefit (the indirect income transfer) is 
then smaller The higher actual price paid was caused by many factors, including operational 
and transportation costs, which also vary, sometimes, significantly between locations. 
Especially in rather isolated regions in outside Java, the transportation costs from the 
distribution points to collection points, where beneficiaries obtain their allocations, are 
significantly higher than in Java. In some locations, the SRI interviewed local officials and 
according to them the actual price of the Raskin rice was set through meetings. However, the 
SRI observed that there were more places where such meetings only consisted of the local 
officials themselves than places where the meetings also attended by community 
representatives. But, in both cases, there is a tendency for the lurah to have the largest role in 
determining prices; while the community representatives played a minor role in influencing 
the price decision. Furthermore, such meetings are often held not mainly to produce a 
common decision between local officials and local communities about what should be the 
actual price, but mainly in order to comply with the rules and regulations related to the 
implementation of the program. That is why the SRI has found that communities or the listed 
families in particular in the majority of its sampled locations were unaware of details of price 
rises.    
4) Although the subsidized rice allocation is officially based on a list provided by district/city 
governments based on the BKKPN data and later on the BPS data, in reality, responsibility 
for the final decision about who will be eligible to purchase the rice has been pushed back 
onto local community. In many areas any attempt to determine a list of eligible beneficiaries 
has been simply abandoned and the Raskin rice is being offered to all families more or less 
equally on a ‘first come, first served’ basis. Thus, any family who whishes to do so can 
purchase Raskin rice irrespective of any assessment of their real need.2In many other areas, 
an attempt has been made to identify all families considered to be the most deserving cases. 
Once this list of beneficiaries has been compiled, local officials will limit distribution to the 
listed families. Consequently, beneficiaries usually receive considerably less than they were 
supposed to get. 
5) The fact that the 2006–2007 Raskin General Guidelines do not stipulate that the village 
meeting must refer to the BPS data on poor families may also one of the causes of low 
effectiveness of the program. In fact, in the section entitled ‘Determination of Beneficiaries’, 
it is not stated that beneficiaries must be poor households. The absence of such a requirement 
can be used by local program administrators as justification for distributing Raskin not only 
to poor households or for sharing it out equally, provided that the decision to do so is made 
during a village meeting. Although in the introduction to the guidelines it is stated that the 
                                                
1 Separate official poverty lines are used for urban and rural areas in each province. In 2000, the average for urban 
areas was Rp 92,000 per person per month. In rural areas, the average was Rp 74,000 per person and per month. The 
average size of all Indonesian households in that year was 4 persons (Daly and Fane, 2002). In 2008, in cities, the 
average size of poor and non-poor households is 4.70 and 3.86, respectively, and in rural areas, 4.61 and 3.74, 
respectively (BPS, 2008). 
2  Daly and Fane (2002) argue, however, that where the differences in income among households within the 
particular locations are small, or where the official criteria are poor measures of poverty, this is an appropriate 
strategy.  
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Raskin program targets poor households, in many locations, program administrators do not 
use the guidelines in full.1 
6) Although in the Raskin General Guidelines, it is stated that at the village/kelurahan level, a 
village consultative meeting should be conducted to determine beneficiaries, in reality such 
meetings are not conducted in all areas and implementation of such meetings is often far 
from optimal. Consequently, the method by which beneficiaries are determined varies from 
place to place. Some villages set targets through a village meeting, some use national 
reference data as the basis (BKKBN data or BPS data for poor households), and in some 
cases decisions are made by RT and RW heads or by village/kelurahan heads. In many cases 
these various methods ultimately result in a decision that the rice should be shared out 
equally  among  a  greater  number  of  households  or  among  all  households.   The  
different reasons behind these decisions include prevention of conflict, insufficient supply of 
rice than is needed for the number of poor households, avoidance of social jealousy, the 
existence of demands from persons who were not entitled to receive the rice, and the need to 
reach deadlines for the sale and payment of the rice. 
7) One of the program’s weak points is the informal method of socializing the Raskin program to 
the community via village/kelurahan officials/heads and local people distributing the rice to 
the beneficiaries. Generally, the community and Raskin beneficiaries have not received 
comprehensive program information; in fact, many were not aware of general information 
about the program,  such  as  what  the  program  name  means,  how  much  rice  beneficiaries  
are entitled to receive, what the government-stipulated price of the rice is, and how often or 
how many times a year they should receive the rice. Nevertheless, the community was widely 
aware of the essence of the program that Raskin is rice assistance from the government for 
poor communities.  
8) As poor households are spread across all administrative levels of all regions, the Raskin 
program operates in all regions, without differentiating between regional poverty conditions. 
All regions, down to village/kelurahan level, receive a Raskin allocation. In actual 
implementation, however, some areas have not received Raskin for several months at a time 
due to outstanding payments, implementational deviation, transport problems, or a request 
from the subdistricts. The subdistricts concerned regarded Raskin as a nuisance and felt that 
the rice that they received was not in proportion to the labor required and the risk that had to 
be borne. 
9) The Raskin program’s targeted number of poor households is increasing by year (as also 
shown earlier), but is still lower than the total number of poor households. For instance, the 
program targeted 19.1 million poor households in 2007, but the central government only 
agreed to 15.8 million households. Consequently, 3.3 million poor households did not receive 
a Raskin rice quota. The allocation shortfall led to the emergence of various implementational 
problems, such as targeting issues, inaccurate amounts, and inconsistent distribution frequency.  
 
In overall, the field findings discussed above show that the program’s effectiveness is still 
relatively low. This  is  shown  in  the  program’s  lack  of  socialization  and  transparency; 
inaccurate targeting, prices, amounts, and distribution frequencies; high management cost; below 
optimal monitoring; and poorly functioning complaints system. Because of these problems, on 
                                                
1 According to Kusumastuti et al. (1998), one reason for not selling all the subsidized rice under the Raskin program 
just to the targeted poor households that met the official criteria is that it was often difficult for many of them to 
have money on time to purchase the subsidized rice. 
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one hand, many poor families who were supposed to get the Raskin never received it, and, on the 
other hand, many non-poor families have managed to obtain some of the subsidized rice on offer. 
Also, the official Raskin Card and Coupon system has been a complete failure, since the actual 
amount of rice received and the actual price paid by beneficiaries do not conform what is printed 
on the card. Thus, not only that the program has coverage and allocation problems, it has also a 
serious ‘leakage’ problem.  
According to Tabor and Sawit’s report (2005), Raskin rice is received by eligible 
beneficiaries in 84 per cent of all cases.  This implies that an annual average of Rp.2.73 trillion 
of direct program benefits accrued to households deemed “needy” by village leaders, while some 
Rp.520 billion of total program benefits “leaked” to “non-needy” households..   
By analyzing SUSENAS, Weatherley and his team (2008) also find a significant leakage in 
the implementation of the program.  According to the data, subsidized rice under the program 
was received by all household groups where grouping is based on quintiles of per capita 
expenditure. As can be seen in Table 4, households in quintiles 1 and 2, which are the poorest 
groups, constituted only around 53 per cent of total recipients. The other recipients were from 
households classified as non0poor in quintiles 3 to 5, despite the fact that these households 
should not have obtained Raskin rice at all. This means that leakage of 47 per cent occurred at 
the national level. 
Table 4: Distribution of Raskin Recipients by Quintile of per Capita  
Household Expenditure (%) at the National Level 
Quintile 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Total 
29.11  
23.66  
19.63  
16.37  
11.22  
100.00 
28.19  
23.38  
19.88  
16.74  
11.81  
100.00 
28.47  
23.37  
20.03  
16.60  
11.53  
100.00 
29.19  
24.01  
19.84  
16.06  
10.90  
100.00 
29.04  
23.48  
19.83  
16.36  
11.29  
100.00 
                     Source: Weatherley (2008). 
 
Further, based on Consumption Module Panel SUSENAS 2008 (March), Table 5 shows 
percentage distribution of households who received subsidized rice by region and deciles of per 
capita household expenditure. As can be seen, in both rural and urban areas, the higher is the 
deciles the lower is the percentage share of households who received the Raskin rice. This means 
that the Raskin rice recipients are dominated by households in deciles 1 to 6 with the average 
percentage per deciles is more than 10 per cent in rural as well as urban areas. The table also 
indicates that the percentage distribution of households who received the Raskin rice in deciles 1 
to 4 in urban areas is higher than that in rural areas. Another important fact from this table, 
confirming the findings in Table 4, is that many households in deciles 7 to 10 in both rural and 
urban areas, who are certainly not poor, also received the Raskin rice, with the average 
percentage per deciles is less than 10 per cent.   
 
Table 5: Percentage Distribution of Households Who Received the Raskin Rice by 
Region and deciles, 2008 
Deciles Urban Rural Urban+Rural 
1 
2 
22.69 
18.85 
12.42 
12.47 
15.51 
15.11 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 
Total Households 
15.63 
13.42 
10.06 
7.75 
5.52 
3.57 
1.89 
0.63 
 
100.00 
12.06 
11.41 
11.26 
10.61 
9.35 
8.40 
7.36 
4.65 
 
100.0 
14.04 
13.16 
11.83 
10.19 
8.45 
6.35 
3.88 
1.48 
 
100.0 
             Source: BPS (2008). 
Total number of households who received and who not as a percentage of total households 
by deciles of per capita household expenditure and region is presented in Table 6. It shows that 
the number of households who received the Raskin rice in 2008 (March) is about 49.51 per cent 
of the total households. By region, the proportion in urban areas is 33.56 per cent and 61.18 per 
cent in rural areas. The table also shows that the percentage of the recipients in rural areas is 
higher than that in urban areas, and the same pattern also happens in almost all deciles, except in 
deciles 1. On important pattern of distribution emerged from this table is that the higher is the 
deciles of per capita household expenditure the smaller the percentage distribution of households 
who received the Raskin rice. This patter between deciles is valid for both rural and urban areas. 
This means that many poorest households (deciles 1 and 2) in rural as well as urban areas never 
received the Raskin rice. 
Table 6: Percentage Distribution of Households per Deciles by Region and Status  of 
Receiving Raskin Rice, 2008 
Urban Rural Urban+Rural Deciles 
Received Not 
received 
Received Not 
received 
Received Not 
received 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 
Total 
Households 
76.14 
63.27 
52.44 
45.02 
33.76 
26.03 
18.53 
11.97 
6.33 
2.11 
 
33.56 
23.86 
36.73 
47.56 
54.98 
66.24 
73.97 
81.47 
88.03 
93.67 
97.89 
 
66.44 
75.99 
76.31 
73.77 
69.80 
68.89 
64.89 
57.19 
51.42 
45.04 
28.48 
 
61.18 
24.01 
23.69 
26.23 
30.20 
31.11 
35.11 
42.81 
48.58 
54.96 
71.52 
 
38.82 
76.78 
74.82 
69.49 
65.17 
58.59 
50.47 
41.83 
31.45 
19.20 
7.32 
 
49.51 
23.22 
25.18 
30.51 
34.83 
41.41 
49.53 
58.17 
68.55 
80.80 
92.68 
 
50.49 
             Source: BPS (2008). 
Many universities in Indonesia have also conducted studies to assess the effectiveness of the 
Raskin program. They find that the determination of target beneficiaries is the main weakness of 
the Raskin program because not all poor households receive Raskin rice while many non-poor 
households do. The University of Indonesia came to the conclusion that in terms of effectiveness 
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in implementation, Raskin has many problems related to targeting accuracy (UI, 2004). 
Hasanuddin University stated that the problem with beneficiary targeting is still the main issue 
because there are poor households that do not receive Raskin rice and vice versa (UH, 2006). 
The same finding was expressed by Andalas University, which stated that one of the weaknesses 
of the Raskin program is the fact that there are non-poor recipient families that receive the rice 
(UA, 2005).   
The World Bank (2006) has even reported that more non-poor than poor households receive 
Raskin rice. Hastuti  and  Maxwell  (2003) showed  that  targeting  accuracy  is  influenced  by  
the determination and commitment of the village head to distribute Raskin rice only to poor 
households. The local community accepted this policy because the village head socialized  the  
fact  that  Raskin  rice  is  intended  only  for  poor  households  and  because transparency 
existed on the part of recipient households.  
From his analysis of Raskin targets and achievements using BPS and BULOG data for the 
period 2002-2006, Weatherley (2008) points to the same conclusion. As shown in Table 7, 
during that particular period Raskin rice was distributed to a greater number of recipients than 
the number of target households. According to Bulog data, the ratio of recipient households to 
target households ranged from 128 per cent to 147 per cent, while SUSENAS data indicate that 
the proportion was between 214 per cent and 284 per cent or approximately two to three times 
greater.   
Table 7. Raskin Beneficiaries: Targets and Achievements 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  
                                                        Target 
No. of poor households   
Target poor households 
15,135,561 
9,790,000
15,746,843 
8,580,313
15,746,843 
8,590,804
15,791,884  
8,300,000 
15,503,295 
10,830,000
                                               Achievements 
No. of recipients:    
-Bulog data  
-BPS data  
Ratio of BPS data to  
Bulog data 
14,355,227 
20,943,085 
1.46
11,832,87 
22,519,131 
1.90
11,664,050 
20,063,738 
1.72
 
11,109,274  
23,552,956  
2.12 
13,882,731 
25,147,329 
1.70
% recipients from poor 
households   
-Bulog data  
-BPS data 
94.84 
138.37
75.14 
143.00
74.07 
127.41
 
70.35  
149.15 
89.55 
162.21
% recipients from targets   
-Bulog data  
-BPS data 
146.63 
213.92
137.91 
262.45
135.77 
233.55
 
133.85  
283.77 
128.19 
232.20
  Source: Weatherley (2008). 
 
As Weatherley (2008) argues, if Raskin rice had only been distributed to the poorest 
households recorded in BULOG data, the program would have been able to reach between 70 to 
95 per cent of existing poor households, while based on BPS data, the distributed Raskin rice 
would have even exceeded the existing number of poor households, which is between 127 to 152 
per cent. Furthermore, with a total number of 50–59 million households during the period studied, 
the program should have been able to provide benefits for approximately 40 per cent of total 
   147
households in the country, and could have reached all poorest households, although the amount 
of rice would have been below the stipulated level.  
The SRI also tries to assess the extent of targeting accuracy of the Raskin program 
comparing the proportions of poor and non-poor households that the program does or does not 
reach. As can be seen in Table 8, the SRI’s SUSENAS data analysis shows that in the 2005–
2006 period, the proportion of poor households reached by the program rose by 19.8 percentage 
points from 62.9 per cent to 82.7 per cent. But, the non-poor households that benefited from the 
program also increased by 8 percentage points from 23.8 per cent to 31.8 per cent.  During the 
same period, the correlation between Raskin recipients and poor households in Indonesia 
increased from 0.3987 to 0.4836 but the value remained low, i.e. less than 50 per cent. 
Table 8. Percentage of Raskin Beneficiaries and Non-beneficiaries by Household Poverty 
Status (%) 
2005 2006  
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Recipients  
Non recipients  
Total 
62.88  
37.12  
100.00 
23.85  
76.15  
100.00 
82.69  
17.31  
100.00 
31.82  
68.18  
100.00 
Source: Weatherley (2008). 
 
From their own studies, Tabor and Sawit (2005) and Swastika and Supriyatna (2008) 
conclude that the limitations of the Raskin program were (i) households who were eligible to 
receive this subsidized rice did not able to participate because they did not have sufficient fund to 
purchase it or they were unaware that they are eligible to participate; (ii) households who were 
not eligible but wanted to get this cheap rice, so the Raskin rice was distributed to all households, 
regardless their economic status; (iii) lack of budget to distribute the rice up to the village level, 
so that the package was deducted by 1 or 2 kg per family. 
With all the limitations or problems faced by the program as discussed above, Hastuti and 
Maxwell (2003) conclude that the essential purpose of providing a measure of food security and 
a useful indirect income transfer through the Raskin program to the poorest sections of the 
community is clearly a lost cause.  
However, regardless its many limitations, the Raskin program by many, including the 
government, was and, as a matter of fact, is still considered to be very helpful to the poorest 
households. Based on a series of field studies conducted by the SRI, Sumarto and Widyanti 
(2008) estimated that households which participated in the Raskin program have 3 per cent lower 
probability to be poor. According to them, the indirect income transfer through the program 
constituted 9 per cent to 11 per cent of total pre-program monthly expenditure of the median 
participant households. An econometric result suggests that Raskin recipients experienced an 
increase in per capita household consumption that was in the order of 4 per cent higher than non-
recipients at similar welfare levels (Sumarto, et al. 2004). Whereas, based on their estimation of 
the impact of the program during the first few years of its implementation, Perdana and Maxwell 
(2004) argue that if the intended allocation had indeed been achieved, meaning that it has 
covered all the targeted eligible households, it would have constituted an indirect net monthly 
income transfer of approximately Rp20,000 to Rp30,000 per family.    
Therefore, the program was formally declared as one among other supporting systems to the 
rice economy in Indonesia by Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No.9, 2001. This instruction was 
added by another one, Inpres No.9 in 2002 to ensure rice stock and its distribution to the poor 
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and households with food insecurity (Pasaribu, 2006). Furthermore, in 2005 Inpres No. 2 was 
released to continue the implementation of the program which is still ongoing until now 
(Swastika and Supriyatna, 2008).     
In Tabor and Sawit’s (2005) report, it is stated that despite targeting deficiencies, RASKIN 
did contribute poverty reduction.  In 2003, RASKIN provided a transfer benefit equivalent to 4 
percent of the minimum income, and ten percent of rice expenditures of the average beneficiary 
household.   The poverty gap---i.e. the income required to boost the incomes of the poor to 
poverty line minimum levels--- would have been 20% higher in the absence of the program.   In 
addition, without RASKIN,  calorie intake would have been lower for the poor and vulnerable 
groups by between 17 and 50 calories per day, with the burden of the macro-nutrient shortfall 
falling disproportionately on vulnerable women and infants  (page v). 
 
3.2. The BLT Program 
 
A) Design, Scope, and Targeting 
 
In October 2005 the Indonesian government launched its most ambitious SSN program to date, 
which is an unconditional cash transfer (UCT), known as unconditional BLT (or UBLT) to the 
poor and near poor families,1to compensate the increase in fuel price occurred in that year.2This 
grant was distributed based on the Presidential Instruction or Inpres No.12, 2005. The grant was 
delivered every 3 months for one year: Rp 100,000/familiy/month, through local pos offices (PT 
Pos).  
A household’s eligibility was determined based on PSE-05 data by using a district-specific 
proxy means-testing method based on 24 indicators of poverty, including, among others, 
household size, assets, housing characteristics, level of education of household head, and 
household consumption pattern. An eligible household received a special card which they used to 
withdraw the payments from local post offices on a given date (Sumarto and Widyanti, 2008). 
Initially, the distribution of this grant faced the problem of determining the criteria of the 
poor families or targeting methodology (Pasaribu, 2006). Whereas, in the implementation 
process, according to Sumarto and Widyanti (2008), problems faced by the UBLT program 
include the followings. First, program socialization to the public was lacking or even absent in 
some places. Second, complaint resolutions were not sufficiently accommodated in the original 
program design, or the lack of any transparent complaints mechanism. Third, regional and local 
governments are generally unprepared to handle a program of this scale and in such a short 
implementation schedule, or the lack of clear role for local governments in the program. In the 
implementation process, they find that in many places the household census enumerators only 
visited households that had been identified as poor by local authorities. This has caused the 
program to suffer both leakage of about 5.83 per cent during the period 2005-2006 (Basuki, 2008) 
and under-coverage.  
                                                
1 Between February 2005 and March 2006, that was the period during which the oil subsidy was cut on 
two occasions, 56.5 per cent of initially poor households remained poor, 19.4 per cent moved to near-
poor; 17.7 per cent to near non-poor; and 6.5 per cent escaped poverty altogether, moving to non-poor. 
Meanwhile, only 6 per cent of non-poor households in February 2005 became poor or near-poor a year 
later (Sumarto and Widyanti, 2008). 
2 Following trends in other developing countries, the UBLT aimed to duplicate the success of an unconditional cash 
transfer program in Mexico, the Progresa/Oportunidades. See, for example, Gertler, et al. (2006) and IFPRI (2000) 
for evaluations of Progresa. 
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Hastuti, et al, (2006a,b) has conducted two evaluations on the impacts of the UBLT. The first 
one was a rapid appraisal undertaken in DKI Jakarta several days after the first payment period 
(2006a), and the second one was conducted in December 2005 in five districts in North Sumatra, 
West Java, Central Java, West Nusa Tenggara, and North Maluku (2006b). The evaluations were 
done by indept-interviews with program’s executors, recipient households as well as non-
recipient households and other key resource persons who know exactly what happened in the 
field and focus group discussions.. They find that targeting at the district or subdistrict level was 
quite accurate meaning that districts or cities that have more poor people received more the 
UBLT cards, while the most significant miss-targeting happened at the household level. The 
main causes of miss-targeting were local capture by relatively well-off households connected to 
local officials and weak proxy indicators in the household survey (PSE-05 data).1 
They also find a number of problems that emerged in the distribution of UBLT card, which 
include: (1) inconsistency between the identity of the recipient with the data included on the 
UBLT card; 2) cases of delays in the distribution of the UBLT card at the request of the 
community; 3) cases of levies for transport costs by officials distributing cards to recipients; 4) 
several cards that were cancelled/confiscated not yet delivered to BPS; and 5) information on 
cancelled cards not always being known by the post office.   
In 2007, the unconditional BLT has been replaced with a conditional BLT (or CBLT). In this 
new system, there are two types of the CBLT delivery mechanisms: one is distributed through 
the community and (2) directly transferred to beneficiary households through local post offices 
as in the case of UBLT. The first type is intended to improve the infrastructure, particularly for 
those which are needed to support the service delivery of health and education. The second type, 
which is better known as Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), on the other hand, is intended to 
ensure that beneficiary poor households have access to basic health and education services, 
particularly for mothers and children.  
In that year, the two types of CBLT programs were implemented in seven provinces in 
Indonesia, namely DKI Jakarta, West Java, East Java, West Sumatra, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, 
and East Nusa Tenggara. In these locations, the PKH covered around 500,000 chronically poor 
households. The PKH transfers cash to poor families when they meet certain conditions, e.g. 
children are enrolled in and attend school, infants are weighted and vaccinated, and expecting 
mothers get appropriate prenatal care (Sumarto and Widyanti, 2008). 
B) Impact 
 
The number of the poor and near poor families who received UBLT in the first phase, 2005-2006, 
was around 15.5 million households or approximately 62 million people. In that period the 
UBLT program could only be implemented in 10 cities, namely DKI Jakarta, Bandung, 
Semarang, DI Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Palembang, Banjarmasin, Makassar, and Kupang. 
The program continued in 2006. In this second phase more cities/locations were covered and the 
government expanded the number of eligible households to approximately 19.2 million 
households with average income Rp 175,000/month, partly in response to the overwhelming 
                                                
1 This was the first time that proxy means tests were used to target poor households in a national SSN program such 
as this BLT program. Although the 14-variable proxy used by official enumerators moved beyond the limitations of 
previous BKKBN targeting criteria discussed before, the official enumerators failed to capture sufficient variation 
between poor and nonpoor households, particularly in regions where there was a concentration of households around 
the poverty line (Sumarto and Widyanti, 2008). 
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number of supplementary eligibility requests. This enormous number of targeted households 
made the UBLT program the largest of its kind in the world. (Sumarto and Widyanti, 2008). 
Initial findings based on 2005 SUSENAS Panel Data (BPS), Figure 2 shows percentage 
benefits from the UBLT program by quintile of household expenditure. Whereas, based on 2006 
SUSENAS Core Data, nearly 27.5 per cent of Indonesian poor households received UBLT funds 
in late 2005 (Figure 3), and according to Sumarto and Widyanti’s (2008) evaluation report of the 
program, they conclude that the program was relatively well targeted to the poor. Targeting was 
more pro-poor, however, in urban areas where around 28.2 per cent of program benefits reached 
the poorest decile compared to only 17.5 per cent in rural areas. According to the evaluation 
report, this differential reflects the relative ease of targeting in urban areas where the distinction 
between poor and non-poor is more striking than in rural areas, where the majority of poor 
Indonesians reside. By decile of consumption expenditure, the UBLT program reached 55.6 per 
cent of households in the poorest decile and 39.4 per cent in the second poorest decile; or by 
quintile, the program reached 50.0 per cent of households in the poorest quintile and 36.4 per 
cent in the second poorest quintile (Figure 3). 
Figure 2: Percentage Benefits from the UBLT Program by Quintile of Expenditure, 
2005 
35.6 25.7 18.9 13.3
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Source: World Bank (2007) 
Due to its main objective, the likely impact of the UBLT program to the poor is that the 
targeted poor can able to cope with negative shocks due to reduction in the fuel subsidy took 
place in 2005 when the world price for fuel increased significantly. The beneficiary households 
can use the received fund either to buy food or other necessity household expenditures. 
Figure 3: UBLT Recipients by Region and Quintile of Expenditures, 2005 
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Source: BPS. 
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It was hope that this kind of direct income transfer program can prevent the poor from 
becoming poorer or help the near poor to be able to stay above the poverty line when the price of 
fuel increases. However, it seems that, despite the UBLT program has enormous number of 
targets, it failed to prevent the increase of poverty. As shown in Table 1, the national poverty rate 
increased from 15.7 per cent in 2005 (February) to 17.75 per cent in 2006 (March). There are 
some reasons why the UBLT program failed to reduce poverty. First, with Rp 
100,000/month/family and on average a family has 4 members, thus the UBLT can only help Rp 
25,000/month/person. Second, the poverty line in 2007 was Rp 166,697/month/person, and with 
the assumption that inflation in 2008 was at least 15 per cent, the poverty line in 2008 was 
expected to increase to Rp 191,702/month/person; thus the UBLT only covered 13 per cent of 
total consumption expenditure of the poor (Rustam, 2008).  
However, according to Sumarto and Widyanti (2008), the UBLT funds constituted a 
significant proportion of monthly expenditures for the poorest households covering around 24 
per cent of average monthly household expenditures in rural area and 17 per cent in urban areas 
among households in the poorest decile. They also find that for certain households, the BLT 
money were sufficient to cover not only consumption goods but also some health and education 
expenditures. Therefore, they argue that by most accounts, the UBLT program prevented the 
sudden increase in poverty that many had predicted the period leading up to October 2005, when 
the government reduced fuel subsidy.   
It is very likely that the failure or insignificant impacts of the program on poverty reduction 
was caused, among other factors, by the miss-targeting as found by Hastuti, et al, (2006a,b) from 
their evaluations of the program in many cities/districts, as discussed earlier.. By using 
SUSENAS data 2004 (Consumption Module Panel), Hastuti, et al. (2006a) made a simulation, 
and the result strongly suggests a negative correlation between the level of correctness in 
targeting and the level of poverty (Figure 4). It shows that the increase in fuel price in October 
2005 has increased poverty. But, if the targeting is 100 per cent correct, the program can reduce 
the increase in poverty rate from 5.49 per cent to 1.21 per cent.      
Figure 4: Correlation between The Correctness in Targeting of the UBLT Program and 
Poverty Rate 
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Source: Hastuti, et al. (2006a) 
 
Miss-targeting also relates to basic data used for targeting households. Two different data 
show two different pictures about poverty. As can be seen in Table 9, data from BKKBN and 
data from BPS show different total number of poor households in Jakarta. The difference is due 
to different variables used by BKKBN and BPS to define poor households, as discussed earlier.   
Table 9: Number of Poor Households in Jakarta by Subdistrict. 
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Subdistrict BKKBN (August 
2005) 
BPS (PSE-O5) 
Central Jakarta  
South Jakarta  
East Jakarta  
West Jakarta  
North Jakarta  
DKI Jakarta 
23,688 (13.96) *
4,644 (1.44) 
43,016 (9.94) 
24,030 (8.17) 
31,142 (12.17) 
127,254 (8.60)
18,397 (8.50) 
8,546 (1.89) 
26,618 (4.38) 
20,882 (4.10) 
25,919 (7.20) 
101,219 (4.70)
Note: * percentage of total households in particular subdistrict 
Source: Hastuti, et al, (2006a). 
 
 
4. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
 
As stated earlier, SSN programs like Raskin and BLT are very important in Indonesia, if not to 
reduce, to mitigate the financial burden of the poor. Especially the fact that although the poverty 
rate in Indonesia had been decreasing since the end of the 1997/98 economic crisis (except in 
2006 caused by the price increased of fuel), most of those escaping poverty are just above 
poverty line, meaning that they are still vulnerable. When there is just a small shock, e.g. an 
increase in fuel price or prices of food, can send them quickly below the poverty line. Raskin 
which is an indirect income transfer and BLT which is a direct income transfer may help them to 
stay above the poverty line when a crisis occurs. 
However, data analysis and literature survey in this paper indicate that the implementation of 
Raskin and BLT faced many problems such as lack of accuracy of targeting; under-coverage; 
leakage, insufficient amount of transferred cash for the targeted poor households to cope with 
their increased financial burden caused by the increases of prices of basic needs; budget 
constraints; lack of a permanent and a well developed administration for such as eligibility 
testing, benefit award and delivery; lack of program monitoring and evaluation; lack of unified 
national data base for SSN programs; and lack of good coordination and information exchange 
among involved government agencies at all levels.  
Among these problems, lack of accuracy of targeting, under-coverage and leakage are said to 
be the most serious ones, because such problems make a SSN program not only ineffective 
according to its objective but it is also socially unfair and a political unacceptable since it costs a 
lot of public money (very high opportunity costs). Lack of accuracy of targeting occurred when 
households or individuals are considered as poor so they are eligible for a SSN program but in 
fact they are not poor. Whereas, under-coverage occurred as many poor households were not 
reached by a SSN program and have therefore not received the assistance that was actually 
intended for them.  At the same time, there has been a significant amount of leakage, with far too 
many non-poor households able to access program benefits. This problem is caused, partly, by 
incorrectness in defining poor households and lack of accuracy of the data used, and, partly, by 
nepotism and corruption, especially at the village level. In a developing country like Indonesia 
which is still confronting with corruption at all levels, lack of accurate data, lack of infrastructure 
(e.g. road and communication facilities) especially in rather isolated/rural areas outside Java, 
lack of coordination among key stakeholders, and lack of law enforcement, such problems in fact 
are not unexpected.  
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Therefore to improve targeting the beneficiaries, to expand the coverage, and to prevent the 
leakage of the Raskin and BLT programs (and other SSN programs), a number of considerations 
should be taken into account. First, accurate targeting is indeed crucial to the effectiveness of 
such SNN programs. The questions here are: who should be targeted, and why (why others 
should not)? In Indonesia, the target population of these programs (or any other SSN program) 
should be: (1) the chronically poor, i.e. those who are firmly anchored in poverty and are 
unlikely to benefit much from growth; for them, the emphasis is on protection, on coping; and (2) 
the vulnerable “near poor” that churn around the poverty line as a result of short-term, often 
seasonal, income shocks; for them, the emphasis is on safety net and risk pooling mechanisms 
that can serve as a springboard out of poverty. In defining the criteria, some allowance for local 
flexibility in a huge country with social and cultural complexity as Indonesia should be given. 
For instance, a house without electricity in Jakarta is certainly considered as poor. However, in 
many backward areas like in Papua where houses still do not have electricity, but the families are 
not ‘poor’; they own large lands and many livestock.   
.Second, targeting should have a good and detailed administrative guidance, a good delivery 
system, and community full involvement. Effective geographic targeting, especially in a huge 
country like Indonesia which consists of many habited islands separated by sea, requires up to, 
complete, and accurate data. Such database should be supported by a good administration system 
from the central down to the village level, so every new emerging poor or shocked households 
can be on time included in the database.  Further with respect to data, as discussed in this paper, 
targeting the beneficiaries was based first on BKKBN data, namely registration of family welfare 
status as the only available source of poverty data covering the entire country. However, because 
the data have many shortages (e.g. the data do not capture transitory shocks and do not include 
any reference to factors such as household income levels, source and status of employment, 
family size and number of dependents, the programs use SUSENAS data. But these data have 
also a serious problem, as they only cover a representative sample of the population and only as 
far as at the province level. Thus, the data cannot be used for household targeting of a national 
poverty alleviation program that is delivered throughout the entire country.  So, a complete 
household survey covering all of Indonesia’s urban and rural areas is needed. However, it, 
although theoretically feasible, would be extremely expensive and hence an overwhelming 
additional cost burden on these programs. Thus, the only solution is to improve BKKBN 
methodology in collecting family welfare status data to include all variables which are 
considered as good criteria for defining poor households. The ‘new revised’ BKKBN data should 
be matched with the BPS data.  
Third, improving administrative capacity of government agencies to design, plan and 
implement programs according to a consistent set of objectives and coordination among the 
agencies at central government level as well as between the central and local government level is 
one of preconditions to have an effective SSN program. Also, good coordination between 
government on one side, and, private agencies involved directly or indirectly with the SSN 
programs, on the other side is a necessity.    
Fourth, well developed infrastructures and human resource to fully support the 
implementation of SSN programs (and hence to achieve highly effectiveness of the programs), 
must be in place in all parts and all levels of government administrations across the country. It is 
not surprise to find that many local governments in Indonesia, especially in less developed and 
rather isolated regions outside Java and Sumatera are in short supplies of skilled staffs with 
enough knowledge on poverty and manpower to reach out poor households in their 
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administration areas. This condition is exaggerated by lack of infrastructure such as road and 
communication and transportation facilities linking the local government offices with the rest of 
the regions. 
Finally, another element which is also crucial in order to improve effectiveness of the SSN 
programs is an effective monitoring and reporting process. In the early stages of the 
implementation of the Raskin program, for instance, monitoring activities were carried out in 
specific areas by a range of community groups and non-government organizations. Some of 
these activities were supported by foreign donor agencies through small grants mainly to 
promote the idea of transparency and public accountability. However, the monitoring that 
resulted was somewhat ad hoc and not covered all regions. A rigorous and effective monitoring 
process is therefore needed by a central independent monitoring unit which can be established in 
Jakarta, with branches to be set up at the provincial level throughout the country. 
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